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ABSTRACT.
There is a general agreement that disclosure practices are not random. Yet, 
knowledge of the factors which they are associated with is far from perfect, 
particularly in the developing world where the literature in this area is sparse. 
Developing countries environments are significantly different from the market 
economies of the west. There is a general lack of effective enforcement system, 
active stock exchanges and appropriate accounting regulation and training 
schemes.
In order to study corporate disclosure practices and the factors with which they are 
associated in Tanzania, a random sample of 58 profit-motivated companies was 
selected and their CARs obtained. The study focused on the 1986 CARs, although, 
due to data availability problems, CARs for the years 1985-1987 were examined.
The four measures of the quality of corporate disclosure were examined. These are 
the extent of mandatory disclosures, the extent of voluntary disclosures, the 
timeliness of these disclosures and type of audit opinions. Two indexes were 
constructed in order to capture the extent of corporate disclosures. One was based 
on disclosure requirements as stipulated by the National Board of Accountants and 
Auditors (NBAA) and the Companies Ordinance. The other evolved from a 
literature review and was refined through interviews conducted in Tanzania. It 
contains the items considered desirable given the environment but are not 
prescribed requirements. The timeliness of disclosure was captured by the period 
between the end of accounting period and the signing of audit report in months. 
The five possible types of audit opinion were ranked from one (negative opinion) 
to five (clean opinion).
It was observed that, in general, the quality of disdosure practices in Tanzania is 
unsatisfactory. On the average, the extent of mandatory disclosure is only 50.5%.
The average reporting time is 8.1 months* well beyond the legal requirement of six 
months. It was observed, however, that most CARs receive clean audit reports.
Using Spearman's rank order correlation test, Mann-Whitney test, Kruskal-Wallis 
test and x2-test, it is revealed that:
- While the extent of mandatoiy information disclosure may be used as a proxy for 
the extent of voluntary information disclosure and vice versa, it is also necessaiy 
to examine the timeliness of disclosures and types of audit opinion if conclusions 
on quality of corporate disclosures are to be drawn.
- The four measure of quality of corporate information disclosures are associated 
with different corporate attributes. While types of audit opinion were found to be 
negatively associated to P/ E ratio; timeliness of disclosures were associated 
jointly to F/T ratio and current ratio, and voluntary disclosures related to asset 
size and type of accounting firms providing audit services, it was not dear 
whether timeliness of disclosure is also related jointly to type of corporate 
governance or type of audit firms. It was also not dear whether the extent of 
mandatory disdosures is related jointly to type of corporate governance and type 
of audit firms or just to one of the two factors.
The overall explanation of the observed unsatisfadory disdosure practices 
resulting from the findings of this study is the failure to stimulate demand for 
accounting informatioa While disdosure regulatory approach appropriate only to 
market economies was adopted in Tanzania, the conditions which make it 
meaningful were not found in Tanzania. Thus, for example, effective finandal 
press, stock exchange and finandal analysts are all lacking More significantly, It 
was observed that partidpants in corporate governance in Tanzania do not base 
the dedsions on accounting information.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION - DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN TANZANIA
1.1) THE RESEARCH PROBLEM:
The need for adequate Corporate Annual Reports (CARs) is well recognised and 
documented in Tanzania (NBAA, 1979; 1983; Mengi, 1985; Msuya, 1985; TAQ 1987). 
Several attempts were made to improve financial reporting in the country. 
Significant moves to improve financial reporting in Tanzania began with the 
establishment of the Tanzania Audit Corporation (TAC) in 1968 and later the 
National Board of Accountants and Auditors (NBAA) in 1972 by an Act of 
Parliament. While TAC was established primarily to provide audit services to the 
state-owned companies (or parastatals as they are commonly referred to in 
Tanzania), NBAA's primary roles were envisaged to be the promotion of an 
accounting profession and regulation of accounting practice.
As early as 1976, TAC had reported inadequate reporting practices in the public 
sector in Tanzania. The major problems reported by TAC were that CARS are not 
presented on time, they often receive a qualified audit opinion and they lack 
essential details (see, for example, TAC, 1987).
These reports* according to Senkoro (1988), led to the establishment of a 
parliamentary standing Committee on Parastatal Organisations (POO in 1978. The 
POCs main responsibility is to examine CARs of parastatals and report its findings 
to the parliament. The general impression POC is presenting is that of 
dissatisfaction with the corporate disclosure practices in the public sector. TACs 
reports were also the basis of the ruling Party's directive on submission of timely 
CARs in 1978 (Sayore, 1980). The Party directed that all parastatal organisations
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with their accounts in arrears must update their accounts within a year. It did not 
define however, what it meant by up-to-date accounts or accounts in arrears.
In 1981, the parliament had to set a time frame within which CARs are to be 
prepared and submitted to various interested parties in the countiy because of 
persistent TAC reports that CARs are not prepared on time. This was done by 
amending the Companies Ordinance (CAP 212) through (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) Act No. 22 of 1981 (NBAA 1989). Subsequent to this, the NBAA 
stipulated disclosure and other reporting requirements in 1983.
In order to take up the issues raised by TAC, the NBAA organised a conference for 
accountants and auditors with the objective of adopting an action programme for 
clearing the accounts in arrears and also to deliberate on possible factors which 
might have been responsible for the inadequacies of the reported disclosure 
practices. In the conference, no empirical research paper was presented to highlight 
the possible causes of the situation. However, Mengi (1985) and Msuya (1985) (both 
papers based on personal experiences) and the discussions which ensued revealed 
interesting issues about corporate disclosure practices in Tanzania. Among the 
factors raised as responsible for the unsatisfactory disclosure practices were;
" * Inadequate training and lack of relevant experience in respect of:
Board of directors 
Accounting personnel.
* Lack of knowledge and commitment by;
Board of directors 
General Management 
Accounting personnel.
* Inadequate supervision and control by;
Parent ministries
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Board of directors 
financial executives.
* Insufficient supply of trained accounting personnel.
* Possibility that there could be a deliberate suppression of the 
accounting function to obscure the abuse of corporate powers.
* Weak administrative procedures to cope with:
Decentralised organisations
Accounting routines." (NBAA, 1985 p.3)
The conclusion reached by the conference was that the poor accounting 
performance reflects the equally poor general management performance of many 
institutions and corporations.
The deliberations of this conference had interesting implications as well. In 
particular, it is noteworthy that the regulatoiy agencies became concerned with the 
inadequacies of corporate disclosure practices not because of the users expressed 
concern with a lack of reliable information to facilitate their decisions but instead, 
because TACs annual reports were reporting appalling disclosure practices in the 
parastatals. The seriousness of the inadequate financial reporting should have 
triggered a series of complaints by the users (banks, shareholders, Registrar of 
Companies, Price commissioner, Commissioner for Income Tax, etc) but this did 
not happen precisely because these institutions do not use accounting information 
in their decision making process. In fact, it was felt that this problem was 
essentially only a public sector problem because "the Registrar of Companies has 
not published annual reports,..... like the Tanzania Audit Corporation" (Mengi, 
1985; p.3). It was felt that the private companies could not afford to keep their 
accounts in arrears. Private companies have to submit CARs to the Commissioner 
of Income Tax (CIT) and pay taxes due in order to obtain a tax clearance certificate.
It was also felt that the subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have to
have up-to-date financial statements in order to meet the head office set deadlines.
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Having speculated on the possible financial reporting situation in the private 
sector, the conference called for a study to describe the corporate disclosure 
practices in the countiy (including the private sector) in order to confirm whether 
the observed financial reporting weaknesses were a public sector problem only or 
a general problem facing all sectors of the economy. The conference also called for 
a study of factors associated with corporate disclosure practices in the country. This 
study is a response to that call.
In addition to this call, the picture presented by the international community 
appears to be totally different from the one presented locally. Thus, international 
reports by the World Bank, the International Labour Organisation and the United 
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporation indicate that Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe are the only independent African countries that keep their accounts 
books in order (NBAA, 1991 p.44). These views are reinforced by U. N. (1991) 
which states that Tanzania is among few African countries with advanced 
regulatory frameworks. In light of these conflicting reports, it may be necessary to 
undertake a detailed study to investigate the current state of disclosure practices in 
Tanzania.
In particular, this study investigates two main research questions:
- What are the current disclosure practices in Tanzania ?
- What are the factors associated with these disclosure practices.
12) RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE.
The study intends to extend our knowledge of corporate disclosure practices in 
Africa. Tanzania may provide a unique environment to undertake such a study. 
This study is considered to be useful in two main respects. In the first place,
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Tanzania attempted to evolve its own unique approach to economic development 
as is discussed in chapter two. In the second place, Tanzania devoted significant 
efforts in order to develop a regulatory framework and accounting training 
appropriate to its own environment as discussed in chapter four. As is pointed out 
in the first section above, these efforts have already placed Tanzania ahead of 
many African countries in terms of the regulatory framework in place and also in 
terms of properly kept books of accounts. It may be interesting to find out whether 
these attempts have impacted on the corporate disdosure practices in the countiy. 
Also, comparison of disclosure practices and statutory requirements may reveal 
inconsistendes, gaps and non-disclosure of corporate information in Tanzania. 
This may not only reveal the effectiveness of the regulatory process but also 
provide an insight necessary to suggest improvements in the existing regulatory 
framework
But of more significance, the study may extend our understanding of the factors 
assodated with disclosure practices. Corporate attributes have been found 
elsewhere to be assodated with disdosure practices as is discussed in chapter five. 
This knowledge is, however, far from perfed. Moreover, there is a sparse literature 
on corporate disdosure practices and the fadors with which they are assodated in 
the developing countries in general and Africa, in particular. Developing countries 
are significantly different from the developed economies of the west. Rampant 
corruption is reported in many countries, including Tanzania (Chow and Wong- 
Baren, 1987; Wallace; 1987 and Mwinyi, 1991). In addition, developing countries 
sometimes import accounting regulation and training without careful 
consideration of their appropriateness to the local conditions (Briston, 1978 and 
Briston and Wallace, 1990). Furthermore, Actively trading stock exchange, effective 
finandal press, finandal analysts and other such fadors which ad to induce 
improved disdosure practices in the western economies are not properly 
developed in the developing world or have not been instituted at all. In some
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developing countries, their natural evolution have been thwarted by deliberate 
government policies and regulations. Improvement in disclosure practices can 
only be brought about in the developing countries if the factors influencing 
disclosure practices are known. The knowledge gained may be crucial in further 
developing and testing theories of corporate information disclosure.
13) STRUCTURE OF PRESENTATION:
This study is divided into nine chapters. The next chapter adopts a historical 
perspective and looks at the development of the Tanzanian socio-economic system 
right from the pre-colonial period. The Arusha Declaration as a strategy for socio­
economic development had an impact on both corporate governance and attitudes 
towards corporate information disclosures in Tanzania Yet the strategy was a 
move to re-introduce the pre-colonial socio-economic system. The colonial period 
had a permanent legacy in Tanzania. The Companies Ordinance instituted by the 
colonial government in 1932 is still the major basis of corporate governance in 
Tanzania. The chapter concludes that the attempts to transform the Tanzanian 
socio-economic system were not successful. Attempts to introduce reforms in 
order to create a viable socio-economic system are also discussed in this chapter. 
Finally, the chapter examines some environmental aspects which may have had 
an impact on corporate information disclosure in Tanzania.
Chapter three looks at the coiporate governance in Tanzania. It defines the 
concepts and conditions necessary for effective corporate governance in general 
terms. It is argued that corporate information disclosure is likely to be influenced 
by the corporate governance framework in general, and the allocation of resources 
and the compensation system in particular. These aspects are examined with 
reference to Tanzania and the weaknesses of the Tanzanian system emphasised.
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Chapter four dwells on one specific aspect of corporate governance. It examines the 
regulation of financial reporting in Tanzania. Despite vigorous attempts to 
introduce disclosure regulation which is appropriate to the unique Tanzanian 
environment it is argued that the regulatory approach itself is faulty. One cannot 
expect disclosure regulations to be appropriate to the intended socialist objectives. 
Disclosure requirements presuppose the existence of an active stock exchange and 
many public companies through which investment resources are mobilised. It is 
argued further that a knowledge of socialist accounting was necessaiy in order to 
introduce a regulatoiy approach which would have been relevant to the socialist 
objectives. Now that most accountants and regulators are more familiar with the 
capitalist accounting systems, the challenge facing them is to mobilise public 
opinion to accept a system they understand and believe in. This, however, is just 
as difficult as creating a relevant regulatory approach for the socialist objectives.
Chapter five addresses prior empirical research and corporate information 
disclosure theory. Following the findings reported with respect to other 
developing countries (Singhvi, 1967; 1968; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987 and 
Wallace, 1987), the major hypothesis for this study is developed namely that 
corporate disdosurepractices are assodated with spedfic corporate attributes.
Chapter six and seven present the research activities and procedures undertaken in 
order to draw condusions on corporate disdosure practices and factors with which 
they are assodated. While chapter six defines research questions; sets-out the 
hypotheses to be tested; sample design and implementation, and defines 
explanatory variables, how they were captured, the nature of their distribution and 
the relationship among them, chapter seven focuses on the dependent variables 
and disclosure practices in Tanzania.
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It is argued in chapter seven that conclusions on the quality of disclosure practices 
in a countiy cannot be based on the analysis of the extent of information disclosure 
alone. There is a need to examine also the timeliness of these disclosures and the 
professional audit opinion given on the disclosures. This argument is particularly 
valid for developing countries where little is known about disclosure practices and 
they are also known to have severely limited capacity to enforce regulatory 
requirements (Chow and Wong-Baren, 1987; Wallace, 1987). This chapter also 
defines and discusses how the four variables were measured and captured. The 
chapter finally examines disclosure practices in Tanzania and attempts to compare 
the findings of this study to results found in other developing countries.
Chapter eight presents the findings regarding the factors associated with corporate 
information disclosures in Tanzania. Chapter nine summarises the major findings 
of this study and draws conclusions regarding the implications of the findings. It is 
argued that the observed unsatisfactory disclosure practices have resulted from the 
failure to stimulate demand for accounting information.
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CHAPTER TWO.
THETANZANIAN SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.
2.1) INTRODUCTION.
The objective of this chapter is to examine the socio-economic system of Tanzania. 
The chapter has taken a broad perspective in order to highlight the policies and 
institutional changes that have shaped the existing economic system and 
regulatoiy framework in Tanzania. This is necessary as no meaningful study can 
be undertaken on corporate accountability and information disclosure without 
relating it to the socio-economic system of a given society and its historical 
experiences (Wallace and Briston, 1991; Wallace, 1987; Lee, 1981; Choi and Muller, 
1987.).
This chapter is divided into eight sections. The next section traces the 
transformations Tanzania underwent from the pre-colonial era to independence. 
This is followed by discussions on developments and factors leading to the 
adoption of The Arusha Declaration as a strategy for economic development in 
1967. Section four examines the Arusha Declaration itself while section five 
questions the likelihood of this strategy being implemented. The actual 
implementation of this strategy is then examined in order to pave the way for a 
discussion of the existing socio-economic system on which this study is based.
2.2) HISTORICAL SETTING:
2.2.1) Pre-Colonial Period.
What today constitutes Tanzania was divided into chiefdoms and tribal groupings 
in the pre-colonial era. The dominant productive system was the village
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community - a pre-capitalist mode of production. The purpose of work was not 
accumulation of wealth. Rather people laboured to maintain themselves and their 
families as well as the communal body (village) as a whole. Production relations 
were intimate with participants sharing a multitude of social ties and relations. 
Work was part of social obligations to kin, friends and even rulers (Kimambo and 
Temu, 1970; Rweyemamu, 1973; Rodney, 1973).
The major features of this mode of production have been summarized by 
Rweyemamu (1973). First, the small peasant cultivators were not alienated from 
the land. Each worked on a piece of land which they owned communally. These 
traditional societies were not class-based. It is not surprising therefore that these 
peasants behaved not as workers but as owners.
Secondly, the acquisition of the bulk of the means of subsistence did not rely on 
market exchanges. The system was independent of market forces. Kinship, religion 
and political organisations are examples of social controls which determined 
production processes and relations. Social relationships and values were the most 
important determinants of work organisation. This is in sharp contrast to the 
capitalist mode of production which was later to be imposed during the colonial 
period.
Although the village community was the predominant mode of production in the 
pre-colonial Tanzania, other modes were also observed either in different parts of 
the countiy or over time. These included the Pastoral mode, Banana culture and 
Artisans and Traders (Nyerere, 1968; Kimambo and Temu, 1970; Gray and 
Birmingham, 1970; Rweyemamu, 1973; and Rodney, 1973)
The major drawback of these pre-colonial modes of production was that the 
material level of life was extremely low. This resulted from the social organisation
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which failed to inspire innovation and technical changes which could have raised 
the societies' production frontier. Small scale operations and the failure of the 
system to reward innovation were essential ingredients of the village economy 
which hampered the accumulation of wealth and growth.
However, despite these drawbacks, the pre-colonial economy was viable as a unit 
It did not exhibit the tendencies of dependency relations currently prevalent all 
over Africa. The slave trade which was later to develop and the colonial system 
may help explain what is currently talcing place in Africa.
Rodney (1973), for example, argues that the slave trade deprived the continent of 
the most active section of the population. Both the slave trade and the colonial 
system undermined the traditional economy and thereby thwarted its natural 
development and transformation. Their psychological effects deprived the 
Africans of their self-confidence and is responsible for the formation of attitudes 
and values which are not conducive to economic development. Moreover, the 
institutional framework resulting from the colonial system placed Tanzania in a 
disadvantageous positioa These are discussed next.
2.2.2) Colonial Period:
The impact of the colonial period (German 1884-1918 and British 1919 -1961) on the 
independent Tanzania may be examined by a discussion of four main systems 
introduced during this period. These are the plantation system, class formation, 
financial and other infrastructures and the institutional framework.
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2.2.2.1) Plantation system:
Germans introduced a number of tropical agricultural products to Tanzania 
including sisal, for which Tanzania became world famous. Rweyemamu (1973) 
argued that Tanzania was principally viewed as a source of strategic as opposed to 
cheap raw materials. It also provided a market and an opportunity for the export of 
capital and population migration.
The introduction of tropical crops was based on strategic considerations. The USA 
was, for example, a cheaper source of cotton. But a different source was considered 
necessary by the Germans as a way of reducing price fluctuations which 
accompanied the American imports of the time (Rweyemamu, 1973). Of more 
strategic importance, the Germans wanted to control the source of products which 
had some military significance. One therefore finds the Germans building up a 
high cost sisal industry in Tanzania in order to have cordage for the navy from an 
independent source they controlled. The British were later to encourage this 
industry when the source of manilla hemp fibre was blocked by the Japanese 
during the second world war.
The fact that the establishment of the plantation system was not based on 
comparative cost advantages had serious implications for the economic 
development of Tanzania. As the strategic importance of Tanzania as a source of 
these products diminished, the entire sisal industry, for example, started to 
collapse.
The labour policy adopted by the plantations system is the second aspect whose 
impact can be traced to the present day Tanzania. It has already been mentioned 
that labour was not for sale in the pre-colonial societies. Therefore, finding a 
labour force for the plantations was extremely difficult. Several methods were
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tried by the colonial government to get the indigenous citizens to sell their labour 
power. These varied from the use of brutal force to evicting the Africans from the 
land, barring them from producing certain cash crops, use of tax system (poll tax 
and hut tax) and attempts to create a market for labour.
AH these attempts were not well received among the indigenous Africans. Even 
the creation of a mechanism whereby labourers were to be paid wages was resisted. 
Leubuscher (1940) argued that this resistance resulted from the fact that the 
Africans were unfamiliar with the tasks required of them and therefore unwilling 
to undertake them. This argument cannot be considered plausible. The resistance 
was political in nature. The indigenous people were resisting foreign domination. 
Moreover, the colonial government underestimated the level of wages that would 
attract the Africans to provide their labour power.
The consequences of the labour policies of the plantation system can be traced to 
the present day Tanzania and Rweyemamu (1973) has highlighted some of them. 
First, the failure to attract a labour force meant that capital intensive techniques 
were preferred. There is evidence to prove this. For example, while the estate 
coffee output increased by 200% between 1945 and 1960, the labour employed by 
these estates increased by only 33%. At independence wage rates increased. 
However, rather than this change leading to more employment as more people 
were now willing to work, it led to employers continuing to increase their capital 
intensity and so reduced employment opportunities even further. This led to 
further unemployment problems which forced the government to resort back to a 
low wage regime in 1966.
Secondly, the cheap labour policy pursued during this period led to the 
perpetuation of unskilled labour which is still evident today. It has also meant that 
the few skilled workers have not been effective as is discussed later in chapter four.
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Lastly, capital, entrepreneurs and managers for the plantation system came from 
abroad. This is considered a positive aspect in the sense that the missing factors of 
production were imported. The problem with this approach is that all secondaiy 
effects are felt in the country where the missing factors are coming from, 
(cumulative additional income, employment, capital, technical knowledge, 
external economies of scale). Since the resource use is determined by the economic 
interest of the owners, perceptions of investment opportunities became biased in 
favour of the metropolitan economies. Inter-sectoral linkages have remained 
weak to date. The entrepreneurial and management capabilities of the countiy are 
limited to data Much of the savings and investment potentials are depleted by 
outflows of factor payments such as interest payments to financiers and dividends 
to shareholders.
1122) Class Formation:
The colonial system brougjit with it class differences among the population. There 
were separate residential areas for various racial communities, different schools, 
hospitals, social dubs, etc. As Nyerere (1971, p3) put it "-—the entire political, 
economic and sodal structure was based on race. African workers in both private 
and public sedors got less pay for doing the same job than an Asian worker, who 
himself got less than a European".
The education system introduced also produced a salaried African class although 
most of them held inferior positions. The introduction of chiefs brought a group of 
individuals with higher offidal salaries and preferential treatment in all spheres of 
life. Finally, the system encouraged individualistic holdings, gradually eroding the 
fundamental features of communal land tenure and started to create the landless 
peasants.
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If there is one thing the first leadership after independence was so concerned with, 
it was the class formation during the colonial period. It appears that 'Ujamaa'1, 
which is the official policy of Tanzania, emerged as an attempt to eradicate the 
evils of the colonial system by returning to the old communal African societies.
2.2.23) Financial and other Infrastructures:
Banks and other financial intermediaries were set up to transfer resources from 
the peripheiy to the metropolis. During the British colonial period, for example, 
the East Africa Currency Board (EACB), with headquarters in London, acted as a 
central bank to the three East African countries. The East African shilling was 
freely convertible to the pound sterling. It was backed by 100% reserve in pound 
sterling. The reserves were financed by proceeds from these countries' exports. 
Moreover, commercial banks were required to invest at least two-thirds of their 
deposits in London. Insurance companies invested most of their insurance income 
abroad and carried an excessive reinsurance (with overseas companies) 
programme (Rweyemamu, 1973).
This arrangement has been criticised by Tanzanian politicians and academics alike*. 
Nyerere (1971) and Nsekela (1978) argue that this arrangement transferred 
important decisions to foreigners. Governments in East Africa had no control 
whatsoever over their monetary policies. Rweyemamu (1973) pointed out that this 
arrangement had a high opportunity cost in terms of lost imports as a result of the 
requirement that amounts equivalent to shillings in circulation must be held in 
pound sterling reserves in London. Kahama et al. (1986) stated that the
1 literally translated as familyhood.
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arrangement subjected the expansion of the East African market to its ability to 
export and deprived these countries of the dearly needed funds for investment.
Much as these arguments are valid it is fair to say that the backing of the shilling by 
equivalent reserves in pound sterling instituted some discipline in the 
management of the Tanzanian economy. This arrangement ensured a self-policing 
system in managing the economy.
2.22A) Institutional Framework
The basic institutions of trade were established with the metropolis. A network of 
oligopolistic firms were established which were mainly branches or subsidiaries of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) with their headquarters in Nairobi2 rather 
than Dar Es Salaam. Although companies ordinance (CAP 212) was introduced as 
early as 1932, no serious efforts were made to establish or incorporate domestic 
companies.
As pointed out by Rweyemamu (1973), the essence of the development of the 
underdevelopment instituted during this period was not the formal political link 
with the colonial powers. Its essence lies in the economic links. The attainment of 
political independence was therefore considered to be inadequate to alter the major 
aspects of this development. Colonization destroyed Tanzania's rural industry and 
crafts without substituting domestic capital goods for them. It created a dependency 
relationship between the colony and the mother country. It created dependency on 
foreign entrepreneurs, foreign markets, foreign capital and foreign technology. The 
Tanzanian leadership of the time argued that this relationship is self-reinforcing
2Kenya was a British Colony while Tanganyika was a U. N. trusteeship territory 
under the British supervision. Kenya was therefore considered to be more of a 
permanent home. By the time of independence, Kenya had a far better developed 
infrastructure, which acted to perpetuate the situation.
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in the absence of deliberate efforts to change the entire system that produces it. It 
was this realization which led to the adoption of Arusha Declaration in 1967.
2.3) THE ROAD TO THE ARUSHA DECLARATION:
In the early years of independence, it was assumed that the major impetus to 
growth in the economy would come from the foreign sector. International trade 
was believed to provide easily collectable revenue to the government.
International private capital was expected to easily flow in if the rigjit conditions 
existed. Indeed, traces of attempts by the independent government to bring about 
economic development in the three year Development plan (1961-63) and the first 
five year Development plan (1964-69) revealed that the aims of the time were to 
transform traditional agricultural methods by introducing capital intensive 
modem farming to the peasant farms, transform the economic structure by 
introducing import substitution industries and to provide some socio-economic 
infrastructure. The bulk of funds required to finance these plans were expected to 
come from the foreign sector, in the form of private capital, foreign government 
loans and grants or by taxing foreign trade. This assumption ignored many dangers 
as the subsequent events were to show. In the first place, it ignored the possibility 
of antagonistic contradictions between Tanzania's national interests and those of 
international capital. Much as tax incentives, relatively cheap labour, legal 
assurance against nationalization of foreign investment and the like are factors 
which could attract investors, they probably remained sceptical of the political risks 
involved. The possible intentions of the nationalist leadership and their ambitions 
vis-a-vis the capacity of the economy to transform the socio-economic system and 
improve the standard of living of the masses could send a clear signal regarding 
the magnitude of the political risks involved.
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Secondly, the existence of a developed and expanding industrial structure is one 
key factor in inviting international capital. The existence of a market and the 
inputs required for the various production processes are important considerations 
for investment decisions. A well developed and integrated transport system would 
add to smooth operations. In this regard, Tanzania was the least developed relative 
to her neighbours. Leaving industrial location to market forces saw very few plants 
being located in Tanzania.
In the third place, although the strategy assumed international capital would flow 
in, appropriate efforts were not made to mobilize it. We now know the importance 
of a stock exchange in mobilizing both domestic and international capital. Baumol 
(1965) pointed out specific features which make a stock exchange a suitable 
resource mobilizen
a) it offers a simple mechanism for the transfer of funds which encourages 
investors to participate in the market. This simplicity enables individuals to 
finance long term investments even though most of them would like to commit 
their funds for only a short period of time.
b) it permits companies to have access to a large number of investors scattered over 
the world. When share prices are quoted publicly, the overseas investors can gauge 
the level of local and international confidence in a particular company and the 
economy as a whole.
c) it appraises financial condition and future prospects of the company in need of 
funds. The price of its securities and the magnitude of its price movements are 
clear indicators of the risk-retum relationship involved.
d) it offers guidance to management through the cost of capital. This cost of capital 
determines the level of investment appropriate for a company.
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Despite these propounded advantages, no attempts were made to establish a stock 
exchange. Instead, the National Development Corporation (NDC) was 
incorporated to encourage foreign investment through identifying feasible projects 
and inviting foreign investors to join in as partners in joint ventures. Even the 
importance of the Accountancy profession and information disclosure was not 
recognized. This is evidenced by the lack of significant efforts to promote this 
profession prior to the creation of NBAA in 1973 as is discussed in chapter five.
Fourthly, the leadership seemed to have ignored the fact that economics and 
politics are inseparable. The foreign policy adopted, for example, influences not 
only the amount of international private capital or government loans flowing in, 
but also the type of investments. Experience has shown that foreign policy must be 
in line with the overall strategy for economic development. The events which 
were to happen in 1964 and after, made this point veiy clear.
In 1964 and 1965 there were army mutiny in Tanzania (necessitating the use of the 
British troops); the union with Zanzibar (Tanganyika united with Zanzibar in 1964 
to form the United Republic of Tanzania); substantial contacts with socialist 
countries and the allegation that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was 
attempting to overthrow the government of Tanzania. In all these events the 
Tanzanian leadership of the time believed it acted in the best interests of the 
country. In the aftermath of these events, the events that were to follow clearly 
showed that the west felt otherwise:
-There was a capital flight of about Tshs 290 million in 1965. This was 
a significant amount given that the entire capital formation for the 
year 1964 was only Tshs 603 million (Rweyemamu, 1973).
-Sisal (the main cash crop of the time) was no longer of any strategic 
importance. Its price dropped from Tshs 2094 per ton in 1964 to Tshs
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1507 per ton in 1965. This was happening when the country's import 
price index was rising (a rise of 14% between 1963 and 1965).
-When West Germany invoked the 'Hallstein Doctrine'3 in 1964, Tanzania 
rejected all its economic assistance.
-The breaking of diplomatic relations with Britain over Rhodesia's 
unilateral declaration of independence also meant Tanzania lost some 
promised loans.
These events made it apparent that there was a contradiction between Tanzania's 
national interests and those of the West and therefore contradictions between 
national interests and those of international capital.
As international funds became increasingly insufficient to finance the First Five 
Year Development Plan (FFYDP) launched in July 1964, it became necessary to 
augment the available external funds with a larger proportion of domestic 
resources. Yet in an attempt to borrow domestically, the inadequacies of the 
inherited institutional framework for domestic borrowing became obvious 
(Binhammer, 1975), We then see the leadership's desire to control the economy 
being translated into its control of the important economic institutions of the 
country.
Much as these international factors prompted the Arusha Declaration, domestic 
events also contributed. It has already been pointed out that the early days of 
independence saw the laissez faire approach to economic development. During
3West Germany considered East Germany to be part of its territory. GDR had 
diplomatic relations with Zanzibar. Union with Zanzibar meant that Tanzania had to 
establish diplomatic relations with the GDR, thereby recognising it as an 
independent state. West Germany threatened to withdraw all its economic assistance 
to Tanzania if it established diplomatic relations with the GDR. The leadership 
reacted by telling the Germans to withdraw their assistance if  it meant that by 
assisting Tanzania they also had aright to choose her friends.
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this initial period, the leadership was mainly concerned with restoring the lost 
African dignity and consolidating political power without excessive intervention 
into economic processes. The approach taken to achieve these objectives included: 
-the outlawing of all discriminatoiy laws and practices.
-the Africanisation programme.
-the elimination of the other centres of power through constitutional 
changes and bringing the trade unions under tight government control.
By 1965, Tanzania was a republic and a one party state. All trade union 
movements were outlawed and the National Union of Tanganyika workers 
(NUTA),whose Secretary-general is appointed by the President of the United 
Republic of Tanzania, was set-up.
By 1966, it was obvious that the economy was not developing as anticipated and 
therefore the strategy was not working The planning adopted in Tanzania was an 
indicative sort of planning - like the French plans. Co-operation between the 
public and private sectors was anticipated to follow automatically. Unfortunately 
for Tanzania, the private sector was not co-operating
In constant prices, the income per capita was expected to grow at 6.7% p.a. By 1966 it 
was discovered that it was growing at 4.8% p.a. It was also expected that 78% of the 
finances required to execute the FFYDP would come from international sources, 
14% was expected from domestic borrowing and 8% from taxation. 1966 statistics 
revealed that only 20% came from the international sources. The bulk of the 
required finances were mobilized domestically. The statistics also showed that 
Tanzania was a net capital exporter (Nyerere, 1970 and ILO, 1978).
Secondly, it was apparent to the leadership that their aspiration for the return of 
the traditional communal values were not taking place. Sectoral differences began 
to emerge. Wage earners acquired the lion's share of the increase in real output.
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Between 1961 and 1966 wage rates rose by 80% while prices went up by only 11%. 
The increase was not shared equally by the wage earners. Workers in the branches 
or subsidiaries of the MNC had a minimum wage of Tshs 330, while other 
employees had obtained only half that amount. The senior civil servants and 
managers had inherited "the European" salary structure which was incomparable 
to what the other workers were earning. Nyerere (1971) argued that these elites 
also had access to credit facilities and technical advice which enabled them to enter 
into property-earning activities such as building houses for renting and buying 
shares in private companies.
The climax of the emergence of the class society was reached when the university 
students refused to attend the compulsoiy national service training in 1966. The 
refusal was interpreted by the politicians as a signal of the elites' failure to identify 
themselves with the course of the masses of the peasants and workers and a 
further manifestation of the already existing income gap between the rural and the 
urban sectors and between different parts and sections of the Tanzanian society. It 
was time some action was taken to reverse the situation (Nyerere, 1971).
The fear was intensified by the events taking place elsewhere in Africa. 1966 was a 
particularly bad year for the continent. Many civilian governments (e.g. Ghana, 
Nigeria) witnessed a series of coups. It has been argued that this was due to the 
politicians failure to respond to popular demands (Mwansasu and Pratt, 1979 p.8). 
The Tanzanian leadership of the time had to find ways of drawing itself closer to 
the people.
These events made the politicians aware of the inadequacies of the political and 
economic development strategy adopted at independence. The strategy was 
unlikely to lead towards a self-sustaining and self-generating economy. It was 
leading to a class-based society with the majority being exploited for the benefits of
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the few. Most critical economic decisions were made outside the country. The 
government had no control over credit and monetary policies. It was necessary to 
reverse this situation. It is in these ways that one can explain the emergence of the 
Arusha Declaration.
2.4) THE ARUSHA DECLARATION:
The ruling party - Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) - met at Arusha to 
define the social, economic and political strategy to be adopted in the light of the 
inadequacies and weaknesses as observed above. On 5th February 1967, the party 
resolved that:
MA poor country cannot rely on financial resources as a major 
instrument for development. It is stupid to think that foreign 
assistance will rid ourselves of our poverty. These (sic) assistance are 
not available in any significant quantity. Even if the financial 
assistance were available, their use might jeopardise the country's 
political and economic independence.
It is equally a mistake to think that development begins with 
industries. We do not have the necessary means to establish modem 
industries. We lack technical know-how and the required financial 
resources. Agriculture must be emphasized if any success in 
transforming our economy is to be achieved" (Nyerere, 1968 p. 157).
The party emphasized that the economic development of Tanzania must 
primarily rely on national efforts and must depend on the internal mobilization of 
resources. Two basic principles were declared: Socialism and self-reliance.
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Socialism in the Tanzanian context meant that a classless society must be created. 
Exploitation of man by man was not to be allowed to continue. The major means 
of production were to be owned communally through the government. It also 
meant that the people of Tanzania must participate in all important decisions. The 
declaration therefore called for a genuine political and economic democracy.
Self-reliance meant that the economic development of the country must depend 
primarily on internal resources. The people of Tanzania must control the 
economy of the country. To be able to transform the economy, four crucial factors 
were emphasized: the people, the land, good policies and good leadership.
The question of good leadership was so central to the whole strategy adopted that a 
leadership code was laid down. This code defined who the leaders are and the 
conditions which they are expected to fulfil. The leaders were defined to include all 
members of TANU, ministers, members of parliament, senior officials of the 
organizations affiliated to TANU, senior officials of the parastatal organizations, 
all those elected or appointed under any clause of TANU constitution, councillors 
and civil servants in high and middle cadres. The members of their families were 
also considered to be leaders and were bound by conditions laid down in the 
leadership code.
Five conditions were specified by the leadership code. In the first place, leaders 
ought to be peasants or workers and should not be associated with any capitalist or 
feudalist practices. Secondly, leaders ought not to own shares in capitalist 
enterprises. Thirdly, leaders ought not to hold directorships in any privately 
owned enterprises. Fourthly, leaders ought not to receive two or more salaries. 
Lastly, leaders ought not to own houses which they rent to others or any other 
revenue earning property.
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Following the inauguration of this declaration, the main eight milling firms, the 
eight major export-import trading firms and all insurance companies were 
nationalized. The government made a compulsory acquisition of a controlling 
interest in the seven main industrial firms and the sisal estates. These measures 
were, however, not accompanied by a qualitative change in the way these firms 
were run. The government entered into management agreements with the former 
owners to continue managing the nationalized companies.
In an endeavour to integrate the newly declared socio-economic transformation 
strategy, the leadership came up with three other policy initiatives between March 
1967 and February 1971. The first policy was on the education system. It was 
intended to transform the education system to serve the needs of Tanzanian 
society and its socio-economic objectives. It directed that primary school education 
should be complete in itself (as opposed to being a preparatory stage for secondary 
school education). It also directed that the curriculum be changed to ensure that 
the skills and values developed would encourage the development of proud, 
independent and free citizens and would be appropriate for the necessary 
economic transformation.
The second policy initiative was concerned with rural transformation. It 
earmarked Ujamaa (familyhood) as a basic unit of production in the rural areas 
and favoured a co-operative production approach. It, however, adopted a 
voluntary approach and thus introduced discriminatory assistance to peasants 
opting out of the individualistic system in favour of the villagisation programme. 
The villagisation process was expected to facilitate the provision of educational 
and health services and other social services to the whole country. It was also 
expected that moving people together into these villages would enable the 
government to improve the organization of productive activities so that the 
individual villages were better placed to enjoy economies of scale, technological
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dissemination and more efficient use of inputs. By 1973, it was estimated that only 
two million, out of a population of about seventeen million people, had actually 
moved into the villages. The voluntaiy approach to villagisation was abandoned.
It became compulsory, for everybody in the countryside to move into the villages.
The third initiative was the "Mwongozo" guide-lines of 1971. The guide-lines were 
intended to introduce socialist relations of production. It was intended to create 
new attitudes and practices more conducive to public participation in all decision 
making processes and workers participation in management. Unfortunately, like 
the Arusha Declaration itself, the guide-lines prescribed what ought not to be done 
and failed as a guide to managers as to what sort of behaviour was expected from 
them.
The major features of the Arusha Declaration can now be summarised. First, this 
Declaration emphasised the need to build a self-sustaining economy. It expected 
economic development to depend primarily on the mobilisation of domestic 
resources. Secondly, it emphasised the need to own the major means of 
production communally through the government. Contrast this with the pre­
colonial period where they were owned communally through the village 
communities and the colonial system which emphasised private property. While 
in transit to 'Ujamaa', private property was to be tolerated and even encouraged. 
The government intended to invite in foreign capital and technology through 
private property and joint ventures. Lastly, the Arusha Declaration aimed at 
creating an environment which would be conducive to the development of 
socialist values. It called for the democratic participation of the public in all matters 
of national interest and a society of equals regardless of ones' race, beliefs or sex
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2.5) THE FEASIBILTY OF THE ARUSHA DECLARATION: SOME THEORETICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS.
By proclaiming ’ Ujamaa', the leadership opted for the restitution of the 
egalitarian and humanistic principles of traditional African societies. It has been 
pointed out that the observed production relations in traditional African societies 
were necessaiy consequences of a specific mode of production (Rweyemamu 1973)4. 
When a closed society has a plentiful supply of resources and there is no 
production for exchange, there would be little pressure for social differentiation. 
Changing from subsistence production to commodity production inevitably leads 
to changes in production relations. Indeed, some social differentiation had began 
to emerge even before the coming of the colonial era (Rodney, 1973; Kimambo and 
Temu, 1970). The colonial division of labour, colonial political power and colonial 
capital not only frustrated and distorted the natural development of traditional 
African societies, but also introduced some basic elements of the capitalist mode of 
production. Opting for a socio-economic development strategy which aims at a 
return to the traditional African way of life is ignoring the history of Tanzanians as 
a people and is not likely to succeed. It is just like attempting to turn the clock back 
several decades.
The second important question is the likelihood that this strategy would be 
implemented. There are three basic issues which were likely to make its 
implementation almost impossible. The first is that the success of this strategy 
would not only directly affect the interest of the world powers, but would have set 
a precedent for others to follow. As the London Sunday Times remarked; "if
4The conventional chronology accepted by most scholars is that societies undergo 
fundamental transition from peasant, feudal society to capitalist and finally 
communism. Even medieval Europe was a society rooted in the stable norms of 
kinship and the village community. This gave way to an impersonal, fragmented 
and changing world characterised by market, urbanisation and, eventually, 
industrialisation.
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Tanzania gets away with this, there are going to be tremendous repercussions all 
over Africa" (quoted from Temu, 1967 p.41). The economic development of 
Tanzania, and indeed the third world in general, will automatically change the 
power structure of the world. It is unlikely that this can be allowed to happen.
The second issue which casts doubt on its viability is that its formulation was 
neither backed by research nor proceeded by intensive and extensive public debate 
on the strategy. It is ironical that the document that calls for democratic 
participation by the public on all issues of national interest was not itself adopted 
in the manner it calls for. Mwansasu (1979) argued that even the National 
Executive Committee (NEC) of the ruling Party did not have prior knowledge of 
the agenda to adopt the Arusha Declaration as a development strategy. Its 
acceptance as a development strategy depended so much on the convincing power 
of the leadership of the time. This is a relevant point given that it lacked any 
reference point in histoiy. It rejected both tyrannical approaches of Marxian 
thinking and the market incentives of the west. The western corporate 
accountability system is based on the market system while the eastern system is 
based on the central plan (this is developed further in the next chapter). The 
Arusha Declaration rejected both without introducing a working substitute.
Lastly, the strategy cut deeply into the interests and privileges of the very people 
who were supposed to implement it. It is doubtful whether a significant 
proportion of the population was really committed to this strategy. As Nyerere 
(1977 p.22) himself was quick to point out: "...the Party leaders have been known 
to break the leadership code as soon as they cease to be leaders. This shows that 
they just wanted to hold office; they were not believers in 'Ujamaa'". Clearly, if 
there is one major weakness of the Arusha Declaration as a strategy for economic 
development, it is its failure to realise that the two objectives- the need for 
economic development and the need for an egalitarian society- are in
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contradiction. It failed to realise the importance of rewarding hard work and 
initiative and penalising laziness. The appropriate socialist economic 
development ought to have recognised each individual's contribution in 
distributing the national cake. It has to adhere to a long standing socialist dictum, 
"from each according to his ability, and to each according to his contribution" 
(Seidman 1972)5. At this stage of economic development, equality should have 
been interpreted to mean that all citizens stand an equal chance of accessing the 
opportunities available. Beyond this, everybody's contribution has to be taken into 
account in distributing the cake.
2.6) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA DECLARATION: THE FINANCING 
SYSTEM.
The Arusha Declaration created an institutional framework througjh which 
financial resources could be mobilized and channelled to where they are needed. 
The nationalised financial institutions and the newly created organizations were 
expected to perform this function. The institutions in question are the Bank of 
Tanzania (BOT); the National Bank of Commerce (NBQ, the Peoples Bank of 
Zanzibar (PBZ); the Development Finance Banks; Pension Funds; the National 
Insurance Corporation (NIC); Holding Corporations and even Subsidiary 
Companies.
The Bank of Tanzania is the central bank of Tanzania. Its central banking functions 
include issuance of currency, holding foreign exchange reserves, operating a 
foreign exchange control system, regulating the domestic monetary system and 
banker to the government and other banks. BOT also assists other financial 
institutions in financing specific sectors of the economy. It has established a Rural
^According to Marxian thinking, distribution according to ones' need is achieved at 
the highest stage of economic development-Communism.
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Finance Fund from its profits with a view to financing long term loans to the rural 
areas. It also guarantees loans offered to the rural sector and purchases debentures, 
bonds and other negotiable instruments offered by firms involved in financing the 
rural sector. It also subscribes to shares of banks and other financial institutions.
BOT has several options it can use to regulate the monetary system in the country. 
It may impose reserves and liquidity requirements on commercial banks. It may 
also opt for open market operations, direct instruments and interest rate policies. 
However, for quite sometime, it was assumed that successful mobilization of 
funds depended primarily on the extension and improvement of commercial 
banking services since foreign exchange controls were in place. Interest rates were 
deliberately kept below economic rates (Kimei, 1987). By 1983, it was clear that this 
strategy was not working as people preferred keeping their money outside the 
banking system because of low interest rates.
For quite sometime, the NBC and the PBZ were the only two banks allowed to 
offer commercial banking services. They extend their services to both public and 
private sectors of the economy. They also invest directly in equity shares of 
companies in Tanzania although loan capital is the preferred form of financing in 
the country (Rweyemamu, 1973; Sanare, 1986).
In theory, at least, banks have complete discretion in making their banking 
decisions. They are only subjected to the constraints imposed by the central bank. 
The act incorporating the NBC, for example, requires the use of the best 
commercial practice in making credit decisions. This has been interpreted to mean 
that the bank must minimize risks for any given level of returns (Nsekela, 1986).
Kahama et al (1986), reported that the NBC would like to establish the level of risks 
involved before extending credit. They focus on the viability of the proposed
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projects and the efficiency with which the potential debtor firm is managed. 
Rwegasira (1978) conducted research in order to diagnose and appraise the precise 
way in which financial statements' information is put to use by the banker. He 
concluded that CARs played a significant role in banking decisions. For the private 
sector firms, credit applications must be supported with acceptable collateral. This 
is not a normal requirement for the public sector firms. For parastatals, the 
demand for collateral depends on the extent of private sector participation in the 
parastatal seeking financial accommodation. Where a parastatal has extensively 
borrowed from the private sector or there is significant private sector participation 
in its equity, demands similar to the ones required of the private sector firms are 
imposed on such a parastatal (Nsekela, 1978). The public sector therefore receives, 
at least in theory, some preferential treatment in the resource allocation process.
There are also specialised banks which mainly deal with channelling financial 
resources to their area of speciality. These are Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB), Co­
operative and Rural Development Bank (CRDB), and Tanzania Housing Bank 
(THB). Specialization was considered necessary to enable these financial 
institutions to acquire specialized knowledge in their area of speciality. This may 
be valuable in evaluating coordinating and supervising the use of financial 
resources in their area of competence.
These are the main institutions envisaged by the Arusha Declaration as the main 
part of the financing system in Tanzania. Although private sector institutions 
were not promoted, they continued to play a significant role in the economic life 
of the country. For example, in 1986, the private sector contributed 80% of the GDP. 
Some private sector financial institutions have continued to play a significant part 
in the financing system of the country (Kimei, 1987). These are Tanganyika 
Development Finance Company Ltd. (TDFL), East Africa Development Bank
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(EADB), Industrial Promotion Services (IPS) and Diamond Jubilee Investment 
Trust.
2.7). ECONOMIC REFORMS;
The Arusha Declaration formed the basis of the Tanzanian socio-economic system 
for sometime. To enforce the Declaration several agencies were formed to regulate 
the economic framework. These are discussed in chapter three and four. In this 
section, some achievements of the Declaration are highlighted and the reforms 
undertaken to make the Tanzanian economic system feasible are discussed.
In the early years of the Declaration, there were tremendous successes. The 
nationalisations enabled the government to retain the generated profits within the 
country. Most nationalised enterprises were veiy profitable given the cartel 
arrangements in place at the time. The government was able to pay the required 
compensation from the profits of the initial few years. It was surprising however, 
that the Declaration attracted more international capital instead of turning it away. 
Coulson (1982) has argued that this phenomenon was due to the Tanzanian 
leadership's bargaining ability and the country's ability to write-up what appeared 
to be feasible projects. A more plausible explanation, however, is the one given by 
Okoko (1987). He observed that the apparent inflow of foreign capital and 
assistance after the Declaration was intended to merge the Tanzanian economy 
further into the world economic system and thus pre-empt the creation of a 
socialist and self-reliant Tanzania.
However, the implementation of this strategy proved to be vety difficult. The 
Declaration is well researched and it is generally believed that it has failed in its 
objective of transforming Tanzania into a socialist and self-reliant state. Several 
reasons for this failure have also been pointed out (Coulson, 1979 and 1982; Hyden,
32
1983; Chachage, 1986; Kahama;et al; 1986; Okoko, 1987 and Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa, 1990).
By 19796, the distress in the Tanzania economy was clearly visible. The signs of this 
distress ranged from the absence of consumer goods in the shops, most companies 
operating at 10-20% of their operating capacity, to the many illegal activities taking 
place. Examples of the activities considered illegal were smuggling foreign 
currency out of the country, smuggling goods which could readily be sold abroad 
such as cattle, gold, ploughs, medicine, radio sets and batteries. There also arose a 
class of people which bought large quantities of whatever the shops could offer, 
stored them and therefore exacerbated the situation and later sold them at 
exorbitant prices. Government leaders and parastatal managers also participated in 
these activities (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990).
This situation prompted the parliament to enact the Economic and Organised 
Crime Control Act (1983). This Act defined economic offences to include foreign 
exchange control offences; bribery and corruption; hoarding of commodities; 
hoarding of money; leading organised crime; fraudulent schemes; wild life 
poaching; theft of public property, etc.
Despite the adoption of this Act and subsequent trial of several suspected 
individuals, it was clear to the Tanzanian leadership that it was no longer able to 
control economic activities through bureaucratic procedures. These administrative 
controls were leading to the expansion of the second market (Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa, 1990). This was the beginning of the many economic liberalisations and 
reforms which were to follow.
^It should be remembered that Tanzania was at war with Uganda at this time.
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The first reform was called the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). It was 
expected to last for three years from 1985. It aimed at restoring the national output 
to the pre-1978 level, improving the public sector finances, reducing inflation, 
improving the national balance of payments, restructuring the economic activities 
through a system of incentives and prices, improving capacity utilisation and 
labour productivity and institute effective budgeting and monitoring in the public 
sector.
These objectives were to be achieved through the removal of inter-regional trade 
barriers, abolishing price controls on all agricultural products, reducing the 
number of items whose prices are controlled and abolishing crop export taxes. The 
programme assumed that there would be foreign capital inflow which never 
materialised This undermined the whole programme and led to the adoption of 
the second reform programme.
The second reform was named the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). In 
addition to objectives set by SAP, ERP also aimed at producing more food and cash 
crops and improving the marketing structures. The additional measures the 
programme introduced included the devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling 
further liberalisation of trade and the reduction of government budget deficits.
The over-valued shilling was leading to foreign currency being smuggled out of 
the country, depressed producer prices and pricing Tanzanian exports out of the 
foreign markets. The shilling was therefore devalued from 9.52 shs to a U. S. $ in 
1982 to 16.50 in 1985; 40.43 in 1986 and 119 in 1988. The interest rates also rose from 
7.5% in 1985 to 24% in 1987 and 29% in 19887. Although it cannot be said that 
Tanzania has a well established and functioning financial markets, the enactment
7Inflation declined from 33.2% in 1985 to 30% in 1987 and 26% in 1988.
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of the Investment Promotion Act (1990) provides a basis on which further 
improvements can be based.
Although Tanzania boasts of uninterrupted history of national unity and
tranquillity, the economic performance and growth have not been commensurate
with the available economic potential. It is argued that this is due, in part because
of foreign exchange constraints and slow growth in the domestic and foreign
investments (Planning Commission, 1990). The National Investment Promotion
Act ,1990 was therefore enacted in order to ensure:
"- Maximum utilization of the nation's natural and other resources;
- Maximize foreign resource inflows through export-oriented 
activities to complement domestic resources;
- Encourage non-debt-creating foreign investment;
- Achievement of identifiable and substantial foreign exchange
savings through efficient import substitution activities;
- Increase in food production;
- Provision of services, or the production of goods, which improve 
linkages among the various economic sectors;
- Encouraging the transfer of appropriate technology and human 
resources development, including the enlargement and development 
of local scientific technological capacity;
- Promotion of balanced and equitable growth throughout the country;
- Enhancement of economic co-operation and development within
Eastern and Southern African Sub-region." (Planning Commission, 1990 p. 2)
This Act provide certain incentives for investors in Tanzania, including:
- Tax holiday for the first five years of productioa
- Reduced corporate tax rate of 45% instead of the usual 50% after the tax holiday.
- Reduced withholding tax rate of 10% on dividends instead of the usual 20%.
Accordingly, the Investment Promotion Centre (IPQ was established to oversee 
and ensure effective implementation of the policy. Specific roles for the IPC are 
specified by Planning Commission (1990, p. 15). These are: 
n- The collection, compilation and dissemination of information 
on investment opportunities in Tanzania;
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- Assist, where appropriate, in the identification of local partners 
for foreign investors;
- Identify and advise potential investors on possible areas of
investment and provide them with available feasibility reports 
and market studies;
- Organise promotional activities such as seminars and exhibitions, 
both in Tanzania and abroad, in order to stimulate local and foreign
investment;
- Liaise with Tanzania Missions abroad in order to publicise Tanzania's 
investment prospects
overseas and to disseminate information on investment opportunities 
in Tanzania;
- Act as link between local inventors and possible investors or 
manufacturers;
- Liaise with the similar institution in Zanzibar,"
On the basis of this Act, for instance, the Director-General of the Investment 
Centre can establish a stock exchange if he so wishes.
Trade liberalisation has been undertaken in several ways. The confinement policy 
whereby the marketing of all consumer items considered 'essential' were done 
through public sector companies was abolished, import substitution industries 
have been exposed to 'healthy1 competition from imported goods8, an export to 
import scheme was introduced and the subsidies reduced and in most cases, given 
only in exceptional circumstances.
Tanzania has been a high tax countiy and received massive foreign aid yet the 
government budgets have remained in perpetual deficits. Attempts to reduce the 
deficits have been done through increasing the government revenue and cutting 
down government expenses.
8Most import controls have been removed and prohibitive import duties and sales 
tax drastically reduced. The maximum import duty and sales tax in 1982 was 500%. 
Compare that with the current maximum of 40%.
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To increase government revenue, efficient tax collection procedures were to be 
introduced and the tax base was to be expanded because of the expected rise in the 
level of economic activities which would result from the reforms undertaken and 
also by taxing economic activities not previously taxed9. Expense-cuts are to be 
effected through the reduction of the over-manned public sector and cutting-down 
subsidies totheparastatals10. The district councils are required to meet some social 
costs in their areas. The poll tax previously thought to be a colonial tool of 
humiliation, forcing people to provide their labour power was re-introduced.
The actual implementation of these reforms and the achievements are matters 
which future research must establish. Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) have 
highlighted some initial achievements. They have argued that GDP grew at 3.9% 
(in real terms)11 in 1986/87; inflation has dropped from 33.3% in 1985 to 29.9% in 
1987/88 and 19% in 1989/1990 and the second market, smuggling and widespread 
tax evasion have been significantly curtailed.
2.8). POSSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES ON CORPORATE 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
The Arusha Declaration discussed above had a variety of influences on many 
aspects of economic life in Tanzania. It is argued that this declaration had an 
impact on corporate disclosure practices in Tanzania. This section discusses the
likely impact of the environmental aspects on disclosure practices in general and
f
the policy of socialism and self-reliance (the Arusha Declaration) in particular.
^Presidential Commission on Taxation was established. It is possible that at the time 
of writing, it has already reported to the President. Its recommendations appear not 
to have been made public yet.
10The privatisation of the parastatals is currently a very sensitive political issue. 
Also .the required ground work which would facilitate privatisation has not been 
done. However, workers are allowed to buy shares in the parastatal organisations in 
which they work.
11 It was negative in 1983.
37
Although the Tanzania of 1986 was clearly different from the Tanzania the 
Arusha Declaration intended to create, nevertheless, the political risks such as the 
possibility for nationalisation, foreign exchange controls, etc were still considerable 
and this was bound to mould corporate attitudes toward information disclosure, 
particularly in the private sector. For example, because of foreign currency controls, 
MNCs are likely to resort to practices such as transfer pricing that may enable them 
to transfer profits to countries where they have ready access to the generated 
profits. Under the circumstances, such companies are not likely to disclose any 
information items which might enable the government to see through such 
practices.
The emphasis that bank loans to the private sector be supported by legal securities, 
preferential treatment afforded to the public sector, the government guarantees on 
the parastatal loan capital (Nsekela, 1978) and the tendency towards subsidising 
some parastatals and offering easy assistance once the companies are facing 
financial and other problems could easily remove the pressure to prove ones' self 
and is bound to have some impact on corporate information disclosure. For 
example, since the the government guarantee loans, the banks do not face risk 
relating to credit decisions related to the guarantied loans. They, therefore, do not 
demand information which may enable them to establish the level of risk they 
might have faced if the government had not guaranteed the loans.
Most administrative controls were already removed or were in the process of being 
removed by 1986. The effectiveness of price as a resource allocator was appreciated 
in many circles. The over-valued shilling was already in the process of being 
devalued so that it reflects better its economic value. Interest rates were on the rise. 
Subsidies were being removed. Several pillars which previously prevented
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effective competition were being demolished12. However, there may be a time lag 
between change in policies and the effective implementation of those policies and 
the ensuing changes in attitude.
The other environmental aspects which are expected to have influenced corporate 
information disclosures are inflation, foreign exchange controls and the 
governments dividend policy. Inflation was relatively high. Foreign exchange 
controls were in place. Dividends declaration and distribution are subject to the 
approval of the Commissioner of Public Investment. Submission of dividends 
abroad is subject to the BOTs approval.
The extent of corporate information disclosure may also depend on the entire 
corporate accountability system, the regulation of financial reporting and the 
available media of corporate information disclosure. These are discussed in the 
next two chapters.
12A word of caution is appropriate at this juncture. The mere removal of 
administrative controls would not make the economy competitive. In fact, the 
removal of administrative controls without introducing competitive structures 
could lead to even worse situation. The leadership is well aware of this and there are 
current moves to introduce competitive structures. For example, private investors 
are now allowed to form private banking institutions.
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CHAPTER THREE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TANZANIA 
3.1). INTRODUCTION:
The objective of this chapter is to describe corporate governance in Tanzania. In 
light of mechanisms introduced by the Arusha Declaration, it would be 
inappropriate to assume a competitive market economy like, for example, Singhvi 
(1967) assumed for India. The factors associated with disclosure practices can only 
be studied with reference to specific environmental factors. It is therefore 
necessaiy to describe the factors which make the system what it is.
The chapter is not designed to facilitate neat quantitative analysis but, rather, it 
provides some general descriptions and discussions of important issues and draws 
some salient conclusions. It is divided into seven sections. The next section 
describes, in general terms, the methods and procedures followed in gathering 
information about corporate governance in Tanzania. Section three looks at some 
theoretical concepts while section four investigates self-regulation and the basic 
framework designed to facilitate it in Tanzania. This is followed by an examination 
of market factors that are likely to have an impact on corporate governance. It is 
argued that these factors do not have the expected impact in the environment 
under study. The chapter then turns to the societal factors and institutions 
designed to make the system work. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the 
prominent factors which make the Tanzanian system of corporate governance 
unique and alternative arrangements are suggested.
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3.2) INTERVIEW DESIGN:
This chapter and the next largely resulted from semi-structured interviews and 
questionnaires conducted and administered in Tanzania. AH nine of the most 
important regulatory agencies in the country, an official in each of three different 
ministries responsible for monitoring corporate activities of companies 
responsible to these ministries and eight professional accountants (directors of 
finance, auditors and bankers) were interviewed.
The three ministries were selected on the basis of their importance in regulating 
corporate activities in Tanzania. The eight professionals were selected on the basis 
of their positions and organisations for which they work. The objective was to 
identify individuals whose experiences gave them a broad view of financial 
reporting in Tanzania. Thus they included prominent auditors from major 
accounting firms, bankers and directors of finance from the main holding 
corporations in the country.
The objectives of the interview were fivefold:
a), to establish their information needs. This was necessary in order to 
improve the voluntary disclosure index
b). to establish how they make use of CARs. The attitude towards 
corporate information disclosure may depend on the penalties or 
incentives based on information contained in the CARs.
c). to get their opinion on factors influencing financial reporting in the 
country.
d). to obtain their opinion on the accounting regulatory framework in 
Tanzania.
e). to obtain information on alternative media of disclosures in Tanzania.
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At the end of each interview, the interviewees were asked to fill in a 
questionnaire. This was designed to capture respondents opinion on factors 
influencing financial reporting in the countiy. The five-point scale Ukert-type 
questions were used to obtain their opinion. The interview guides and the 
questionnaire are presented as appendices 3.1 and 4.1 respectively. The findings of 
the questionnaires are reported in chapter four.
To enhance the reliability of the interviews, several steps were taken. First, the 
confidentiality of some issues involved was seen to be a significant problem. 
Assurances were therefore given that the identity of individuals, corporations and 
regulatory agencies involved would not be disclosed. This is not expected to pose 
any significant obstacle to interpretation and evaluation of the issues involved. 
Second, attempts were made to focus discussions on recent and current experiences 
of the individuals involved. Deliberate attempts were made to prevent 
generalisations about any specific industiy or the countiy as a whole. On average, 
each interview took 30 minutes. The questionnaires required an average of ten 
additional minutes to administer.
This chapter also benefited from the corporate files maintained at the Registrar of 
Companies' Office, CARs, TACs' annual reports and the annual reports by the 
parliamentary committee on parastatal accounts. Published and unpublished 
literature on this area in Tanzania were also consulted (Thomas, 1969; Binhamer, 
1975; Mapolu, 1976; Maseko, 1976; Nyerere, 1976; Mwapachu, 1977; Mramba, 1977; 
Makoye, 1977; Jackson, 1979; Sayore, 1980; Mwapachu, 1983; Katunzi, 1984; Mengi, 
1985; Kahama and Maliyamkono, 1986; Mihyo, 1981; 1986; Mwinyi, 1986; 1990; 
Senkoro, 1988; Maliyamkono and Bagachwa, 1990). This study also had privileged 
access to eleven management audit reports and four board of directors files.
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3.3) CORFRATE GOVERNANCE CONCEPTS:
Corporate governance is a process by which corporate entities are governed. Its 
main concern is to see to it that corporations are run properly. According to Tricker 
(1984), four distinctive functions are involved in this process. These are 
formulation of strategic direction for the company, performance of executive 
actions* supervision of corporate actions and response to legitimate accountability 
needs.
Formulation of strategic and long range direction involves the identification of 
corporate opportunities, threats, weaknesses and strengths. In this process, 
attempts are made to tame the environment so that corporate objectives are 
achieved. The resources are also allocated in such a way as to facilitate 
achievement of corporate objectives. The crucial aspect of this process is the ability 
to perceive as soon as possible the changes taking place in the environment so that 
the overall strategy is modified immediately to cater for the environmental 
changes (Bird,1973).
Executive action deals with crucial elements necessary to run the business. It deals 
with the short-term operational matters of finance, production and marketing It 
involves keeping an eye on performance throughout the enterprise and taking 
decisions consistent with the corporate strategy.
The supervision of executive action is the third element in corporate governance.
It involves monitoring and overseeing the management performance. This 
process is intended to ensure that the interests of the shareholders and other 
groups with legitimate interests in the corporation are guarded and achieved. It 
involves specifying corporate objectives and the expected performance level in 
order to facilitate subsequent performance evaluatioa
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Finally, accountability involves a requirement that corporations must give an 
account of actions taken and face the consequences of their actions. It has been 
argued that how accountability procedures are organised in any society sets the 
pace at which socio-economic development takes place. Without a proper 
framework within which decisions and actions could be questioned and 
appropriate corrective action taken, it is unlikely that a society would be able to 
achieve its development objectives. Accountability therefore involves more than 
just reporting what has been done (Bird, 1973; Chen, 1975; Tricker, 1982) It is a 
process through which the legitimacy of a corporation in a society is established 
and maintained. It represents a feedback mechanism by those held responsible for 
activities undertaken. It is not discretionary and therefore, must be based on a 
specific relationship between the accountor and the accounted Its effectiveness 
depends squarely on whether the accountor receives timely and accurate 
information on corporate actions and results; whether he has powers to impose 
his will and whether he has incentives to use such powers.
Tricker (1984) has identified three sources of corporate powers. In a constitutional 
context, authority over corporations is specified by statute, charter or other 
constitutional means. In Tanzania, companies are incorporated on the basis of the 
Companies Ordinance (CAP 212); Public Corporations Act,1969; District 
Corporations Act,1973; Corporation Sole Act, !975 and several special Acts of 
Parliament. These statutes are expected to specify how corporate activities are to be 
regulated. They are discussed further in the following section.
Secondly, property rights accord corporate powers to the owners. Thomas (1969) 
argued that property rights are the basis of ownership control, authority and 
benefits received within the set regulatory framework in East Africa. Owners may
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delegate corporate powers to directors but retain authority to question corporate 
actions and take required corrective actions.
Lastly, Tricker (1984) argued that power over corporations may arise out of a 
situational context. Specific relationship between accountors and accountees may 
fonn the basis on which accountability is demanded. Examples of such specific 
relationship are those between creditors and debtors, employees and employers 
and suppliers and customers. The power to enforce their will may originate from 
contract law or the accountor’s ability to impose some sanctions such as consumers 
boycotting company's products, creditors refusing to extend further credits or 
suppliers rejecting further orders from a company.
Several conditions have been identified as necessaiy if corporate accountability is 
to become effective. It is argued that precise and accepted corporate objectives are 
required to make accountability meaningful (Tricker, 1982; 1984; Mhagama, 1988). 
Opinion is, however, divided on what should be accepted as corporate objectives. 
On the one end of the continuum, one finds people like Friedman (1963) and 
Friedman and Friedman (1980) who argue that the business of corporations is to 
make profits:
There is one and only one social responsibility of business: to use its 
resources and energy in activities designed to increase its profits as 
long as it stays within the rules of the game..... engages in open and 
free competition, without deception and fraud..... Few trends could 
so thoroughly undermine the veiy foundation of our free society as 
the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other 
than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible...."
Friedman (1963 p.133).
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In short, Friedman argues that coiporations should produce goods and services 
efficiently and leave the solutions of social problems to government agencies and 
other concerned individuals.
While Friedman's views represent the extreme end of the continuum, these views 
may be justified, particularly in the third world countries:
- there is a lot of wastage and inefficiencies in third world countries.
Existence of many corporate objectives tends to obscure 
accountability and reinforce inefficiencies. It becomes difficult to 
link performance to corporate objectives. Managers may easily justify 
their inefficiencies simply by pointing at non-commercial objectives.
- Many corporate objectives would destroy Fayol's unity of direction 
principle. Fayol argued that all operations of any organisation must 
have the same objective and be directed by one plan. Doing otherwise 
would make managers lose their direction and make it difficult to 
make corporate decisions (Stoner, 1982; Damachi, 1978). Making 
managers responsible to many agencies would also destroy the 
autonomy necessary to undertake entrepreneurial decisions.
- Unless corporations are able to raise revenue exceeding expenses, they 
are likely to bleed to death in the long run, unless there is a capital 
transfusion from somewhere else.
It is argued, notwithstanding that corporations must bear a share of responsibility 
because problems of pollution, product safety, job security, etc, are very much a 
product of corporate practices. In addition, corporations and the government are 
the two most powerful institutions in any countiy. Their sheer size and 
dominance oblige them to attack problems of public concern. More importantly, 
corporations must be accepted by the society of which they are a part. Ignoring 
social problems might in the long-run be self-destructive. Nevertheless, the most
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effective arrangement is not likely to be subjecting corporations to a multitude of 
objectives, some of which are conflicting. The most effective way for third world 
countries is likely to be holding corporations responsible for wealth creation 
subject to some constraints imposed by the society. Some attempts to impose these 
constraints in Tanzania are discussed in section 3.5 of this chapter. The 
effectiveness of these attempts is discussed in the last section.
Opinion is also divided on what should be a suitable proxy for the wealth creation 
objective. While most financial economists (e.g. Friedman, 1980; Brealey and 
Myers, 1984) argue that maximization of wealth as reflected by NPVs should be the 
corporate objective, others like Coleman (1982) have argued that corporations 
should also be concerned with the distribution of the created wealth. He argued 
that concern over who gets what is likely to have motivational effects on workers.
Those who support the use of NPV (for example: Friedman, 1980; Brealey and 
Myers, 1984; Jassim, et al, 1988; Kim, 1981) as a proxy for wealth creation maintain 
that, in a well-functioning economic system, maximization of NPVs is consistent 
with maximisation of wealth of the community as whole. The distributive effects 
of such moves would be taken care of by the labour market. Any attempt to reduce 
the employees' compensation package would trigger a move by employees to shop 
around for corporations where they would earn the most. The market would 
finally settle at a point which is fair to all parties involved.
The ability of the market to resolve the capital/ labour conflict is indeed 
questionable. The argument ignores the question of labour mobility and other 
imperfections in the labour market. It is argued here that arrangements such as the 
two-tier board of directors observed in Germany, are likely to ensure that managers 
respond to workers interest without specifying them as corporate objectives. The 
German two-tier board is discussed in the following section.
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The second necessaiy condition for effectiveness of corporate accountability 
procedures is that the accepted corporate objectives must be translated into 
performance indicators. Such indicators provide a focus to both corporate 
managers and interested parties. Managers get a clear message on what to 
maximise while maintaining their discretion to act. Interested parties are also in a 
better position to monitor the extent to which corporate objectives are being 
achieved. They are likely to coordinate activities performed by various parts of a 
corporation or different corporations within an economy.
Thirdly if performance indicators are linked to the compensation system, it is 
likely that private economic interests of managers would be subordinated to 
corporate objectives and thereby enhance their chances of achievement. 
Effectiveness of corporate accountability would also be improved by the 
introduction of the self-policing system which the linking of performance and 
compensation system would provide. Chaubey and Kulkami (1988) investigated 
whether there is a link between corporate performance and the executive 
compensation system. They observed that high performing corporations (in terms 
of risk adjusted return on investment) tended to reward executives on the basis of 
performance indicators linked to the net income improvements.
Fourthly, an effective accountability procedure would also require the timely 
gathering of information relevant to corporate performance and transmission of 
the same to the parties demanding corporate accountability. The late transmission 
of corporate information is likely to put the blame for one generation on the 
reputation of the next. This is likely to obscure corporate accountability.
There are several media through which corporate information could be 
transmitted to the interested parties. Through a formal meeting, the accountors
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and the accountees could formally exchange views. The Annual General Meeting 
(AGM) provides an opportunity for verbal communication between the parties 
involved. Published reports such as CARs or Annual Returns specified by CAP 
212 provide another mode through which communication between corporate 
management and those demanding accountability from them could take place. 
The other possible media of disclosure are ad hoc reports, access to corporate files, 
independent studies by auditors, government inspectors, independent directors 
and other parties independent of corporate management. Corporate information 
disclosure is a significant component of a corporate accountability system. 
Attempts to regulate financial reporting in order to ensure timely and relevant 
corporate information are discussed in the next chapter. The superiority of CARs 
over other media of disclosure is discussed in chapter six
Lastly, effective accountability would require those demanding accountability to 
reward or impose penalties on the basis of the reported information. 
Compensation schemes tied to performance are likely to improve corporate 
accountability procedures in the third world countries as discussed earlier in this 
section.
The corporate governance arrangements in socialist countries is different from the 
variations observed in market economies. The strategic direction and supervision 
are performed by the Party, Planning Commissions, government ministries and 
state-owned banks through the planning mechanisms and the Centralised 
Statistical Office. Corporate accountability outside these central authorities were 
not observed by Granick (1975). Corporate information disclosure is organised 
very differently. The whole economy is organised as if it is one huge corporation. 
Emphasis is placed on management controls rather than corporate accountability. 
The central statistical office is therefore organised to collect data required to 
monitor performance. Accountants are therefore not part of the enterprise
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management and report directly to the central authorities. Their task is to collect 
information and transmit the same to the central statistical office. The banks 
would only release payments after scrutinising the supporting documents and are 
satisfied that the transaction is properly authorised and in line with the central 
plan. The only component of corporate governance observed at the enterprise 
level is the executive role (Granick, 1975; Bailey, 1988; Wierzbicki, 1988;).
The various components of corporate governance discussed are presented in figure 
3.1 below. The relationship between enterprise management and corporate 
governance is also depicted in the diagram. While enterprise management is 
involved in the daily running of corporations, corporate governance is concerned 
with seeing that the corporate business is run or done properly.
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F1gure3:1:Thegovernanceandmanagement of companies 
compared. Tricker (1984) p.237.
3.4) SELF-REGULATION IN TANZANIA
The framework within which corporations regulate and run their affairs is laid 
down in the Companies Ordinance (CAP212); Public Corporations Act, 1969; 
District Corporation Act, 1973; Corporation Sole Act, 1975 and special Acts of 
Parliament, as mentioned earlier in this chapter (p.43)
Apart from CAP 212, the legal framework in Tanzania has been criticised on 
grounds that it is sketchy and skeletal. The Acts lack the required details which 
may offer some guidance to corporations such as disclosure requirements, who is
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responsible for what and penalties for failure to perform corporate responsibilities 
(TAC, 1977; Katunzi, 1984; Mengi, 1985; Mihyo, 1986). This observed deficiency has 
led some regulatory agencies in Tanzania to require corporations to comply with 
the provisions of CAP 212 (TAC, 1977-1984; FOC, 1987), regardless of whether they 
were incorporated on the basis of this ordinance or not. Because of these 
observations, corporate governance in Tanzania is only examined with specific 
reference to CAP 212.
CAP 212 provides a framework within which self-regulation can be exercised. It 
recognises property rights as the basis of corporate powers. It also provides a 
structure within which shareholders can delegate corporate powers to boards of 
directors and expect them to act in their interest, The Registrar of Companies 
administers the provisions of this ordinance. All companies incorporated on the 
basis of this ordinance must be registered with the Registrar and subsequently file 
annual returns. The financial statements must be attached to these returns. At 
least two directors are required to certify the accuracy of financial statements 
through their signature on the financial statements.
The ordinance assumes that, in pursuing their own self-interest, shareholders 
would scrutinise corporate progress and call directors to account. Several 
mechanisms are devised to ensure that shareholders have a say in the running of 
the corporations:
- Through the AGM, shareholders elect the board of directors and can 
question the running of corporations. This electoral process gives them 
the power to impose their wishes on the Board of Directors. The 
potential to replace or fire directors ensures that they should act in 
their (shareholders') interest. The effectiveness of this arrangement 
is a matter for future empirical research. In the past, it has been 
called to question by Thomas (1969) and Sayore (1981).
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With reference to East Africa, Thomas(1969) investigated the 
participation of shareholders in the AGM. He found that most of 
shareholders do not participate in the AGM because they are mostly 
scattered over a large area with serious transport and other 
communication problems.
Sayore (1980) observed that parastatals incorporated on the basis of 
this ordinance do not conduct an AGM as prescribed by the law even 
when they have some private interest. What they call an AGM is a 
special board of directors constituted to receive and scrutinise CARs. 
One wonders how the board of directors can effectively demand 
accountability from itself. Even in situations where the board of 
directors are clearly distinct from enterprise management, the 
effectiveness of this arrangement is doubtful. The power to appoint or 
fire corporate management lies within the ministries and with the 
President as is discussed later in this chapter.
Elsewhere (SEC, 1980; Tricker, 1984), it has been argued that 
shareholders are not ordinarily interested in corporate governance. It 
is held that shareholders are mainly concerned with the value of their 
holdings and the dividends they are able to attract. In connection with 
this, shareholders are more likely to Vote with their feet* rather 
than attempt to get involved in corporate governance. Veiy few 
shareholders have the time and expertise required to hold corporate 
management accountable. Tricker (1984) has observed further that 
there is an exception to this general rule. Institutional investors 
would normally attempt to change matters within the corporations 
rather than sell their holdings. He argued, however, that often, they
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attempt to influence issues directly rather than wait for the AGMs.
- Secondly, the ordinance expects the board of directors to act in the 
best interest of the company and avoid any relationship which might 
lead to conflicting interests. It calls on directors to disclose all 
incomes they receive from the company as a compensation for their 
services as directors or other indirect income through other 
associations with the company. It prescribes that the directors report 
be presented to the AGM and Annual Return be filed with the Registrar 
of Companies. It also stipulates that the auditor, whose appointment 
and terms of service are ordinarily specified by the AGM, must express 
a true and correct view* on the directors' reports and other financial 
statements.
It was observed that this arrangement suffers from the following 
weaknesses:
- non-compliance with the CAP 212 stipulations were observed. From 
a random sample of 248 companies, 98 (40%) companies did not file 
their CARs with the Registrar of Companies; 29 (12%) companies did 
not file the annual return. Most of the filed CARs did not meet the 
stipulated requirements. Section 110 permits foreign prepared CARs 
to be filed with the Registrar of the Companies. It however specifies 
two conditions which must be fulfilled for foreign CARs to be 
acceptable:
i) they must be translated into English if they were not originally 
prepared in English.
ii) they must be adjusted to comply with local reporting requirements.
It was observed that five companies filed foreign prepared CARs.
None of them complied with the NBAA requirements. One (207c) of the
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CARs was prepared in a foreign language other than English. It was 
also observed that some corporations do not hold an AGM at all.
- There is a mismatch between the legal boundaries defined by this 
ordinance and structures within which corporate governance is
talcing place. Consider the case of a MNC subsidiary or a parastatal 
with a MNC management contract. The strategic direction, 
supervision and accountability are done at the parent company's 
headquarters. It is there that most coiporate decisions are taken.
The parent company formulates the long-term strategic 
decisions, allocates resources within the group, makes investment 
plans and most corporate decisions are at their discretion. Yet, in the 
case of bankruptcy, the subsidiary company's creditors do not have 
access to resources beyond the direct possession of the subsidiaiy 
company. Further, the parastatals were created primarily to cater for 
national interests. It is unlikely that such arrangements would 
ensure national interests. In the past, these subsidiaries have been 
used as cash cows, milking them to finance developments elsewhere 
(Coulson,1978; Coulson, 1982; Barker, et al, 1986; TAC, 1988).
- Through memorandum and articles of association, shareholders are 
given a way of specifying rules and regulations which guide 
corporate actions and decisions. Memorandum of association 
govern the relationship between the company and the outside world. 
The articles of association set the rules for governing internal 
relationships.
It was observed however that these documents are generally 
written in such vague terms that they cannot be expected to put any
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effective constraints on corporate manoeuvres. For example,
Tanzania Electric Supplies Company Ltd (TANESCO) was 
incorporated particularly to supply electric power in Tanzania. A 
look at the company’s Memorandum of Association revealed that it 
permits the company to undertake the shipping business, insurance 
brokerage, general trading etc. It is therefore unlikely that 
these documents would impose effective restrictions on companies 
to pursue unauthorised activities.
- The ordinance fails to make a distinction between executive and non­
executive directors. It does not differentiate between functional 
directors and corporate directors. Furthermore, the ordinance 
provides for property rights as the only basis of power in the 
corporations. Employees, consumers, the local community, etc, have 
no say whatsoever in the corporate governance. Attempts to involve 
workers in corporate governance have been successfully tried in 
some countries. In Germany, the two-tier board was introduced. The 
executive board is responsible for long-range plans and executive 
decisions. The supervisory board concerns itself with supervision 
and corporate accountability functions. While the executive board is 
appointed by the supervisory board, the supervisory board is itself 
elected by the shareholders and workers in equal proportions 
(Millar, 1979; Macharzina, 1985). Similar variations were observed 
in France (Parker, 1985a) and the Netherlands (Parker, 1985b).
Tanzania attempted to introduce workers participation outside the 
legal framework.
This approach separates the supervision and accountability functions of the board
from the execution and direction functions. The upper board sets standards and
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monitors the achievement of the targets set. The presence of non-executive 
directors who are not directly involved in the daily running of the business 
implies that the board could be expected to perform its role more objectively and be 
critical in its outlook. This arrangement, however, does not solve two basic 
problems of corporate governance: the question of getting individual board 
members committed to shareholders interest and getting them to devote the time 
required to monitor executive actions.
3.5) MARKET FACTORS:
The second group of factors posing checks and balances on corporate behaviour are 
the market forces. The first post-independence Tanzanian leadership intended to 
mix market mechanisms with administrative controls. The current leadership is 
set up towards market forces. However, oligopolistic and monopolistic structures 
are still common. For example, there are three companies manufacturing cement 
in the country but they are all owned by Tanzania Saruji Corporation. As such 
their policies are coordinated and any serious competition among them cannot be 
expected. This example is not an isolated case. Similar trends are observable in 
most other industries in the country*. It is therefore not expected that competitors' 
action on prices or product quality would significantly influence corporate 
governance in Tanzania.
Furthermore, most decisions are made administratively2. The resulting decisions 
do not necessarily reflect relative scarcity of resources within the economy.
*For example, there is only one company manufacturing tyres. NBC owns several 
other financial institutions either directly or indirectly.
2Foreign currency, raw materials and credit are administratively rationed for all 
companies. Prices were controlled. Wages are regulated. Most parastatal loans are 
guarantied by the government or the State Banks (Kimei, 1987; Osoro, 1987; Sanare, 
1986; Chandresekhar and Bagachwa, 1984; Jackson, 1979).
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Investment projects adopted do not necessarily reflect comparative advantages the 
country might have. The confinement policy gave individuals or corporations 
exclusive rights to perform some economic activities. A company with such a 
favour faces no competition at all. These policies pre-empted competitive pressure 
in both private and public sectors of the economy. The administrative control 
system encouraged corporations to seek additional import allocation, permission 
to charge higher prices or seek subsidies rather than find means and ways to 
control costs, search for new markets or new technologies. They also led to the 
development of what Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) described as the second 
market.
Tine public sector has sometimes been given priority over the private sector. The 
parastatals are bailed-out when they face critical financial problems. For instance, 
the High-Level Manpower Allocation Committee  ^give priority to parastatals 
when allocating manpower. Deliberate efforts were not made to create a well- 
functioning labour market. The appropriate wage policy would have facilitated 
labour movements towards areas they are most needed or encourage acquisition of 
the most needed skills. Instead of using wage policy to institute a well functioning 
labour market, equity issues were given prominence over efficiency. This 
administrative allocation of resources also relieves corporate managers of the 
necessary competitive pressures.
It was observed that most of the mechanisms which were installed to replace the 
market forces were not enforced in practice. For example, the pricing function was 
transferred to the Price Commissioner. In order to approve price increases, the
^This is a standing committee within the Ministry of Labour and Manpower which 
allocates higher level training opportunities to potential students. It also allocates 
jobs to all graduates. Those who are government sponsored are required to serve in 
the positions to which they have been allocated by this committee, Since last year, 
this committee has restricted its activities to what it considers to be rare skills.
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commissioner required three consecutive CARs and the corporate plan. However, 
it appears that this office takes a very liberal view of this requirement. It considered 
its role to be that of facilitating corporate performance rather than the reverse. The 
question of financial statements being in arrears is considered to be a national 
problem resulting from a shortage of accountants. The attitude adopted by this 
office is that it would be inappropriate to penalise corporations for issues beyond 
their control. In light of findings discussed in chapter eight, it is possible that this 
liberal attitude helped to perpetuate financial reporting problems.
Capital markets did not instil the expected corporate discipline. A stock exchange 
and all the mechanisms that make it work such as stock brokers, jobbers, financial 
analysts, financial press, etc, were not instituted. From the interviews conducted, 
even the regulatory agencies which are supposed to monitor the dealings in 
corporate shares appeared to be unaware of the channels through which shares are 
issued, bought or sold. There is a need for future research which will clarify how 
shares are bought and sold in Tanzania. This research is particularly urgent now 
that the I PC has been established but the relationship between the office the 
Registrar' of companies and the IPC has not been clarified. CAP 212 expects the 
Registrar of Companies to protect the investors interests and thus promote 
investment in Tanzania. Before the establishment of IPC in 1990, the office of the 
Registrar also acted as a centre for investment information in Tanzania.
Legally, CAP 212 has specified two types of companies. There are private and public 
companies. Private companies may have a minimum of two and a maximum of 
fifty one shareholders. They are also not allowed to solicit funds through any 
public means. Public companies, on the other hand, are required to have a 
minimum of seven but have no maximum number of shareholders. They are 
allowed to solicit funds through the public means. Both types of companies are 
required to register any prospectus with the Registrar of Companies and,
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presumably, any potential investor can obtained information from there and 
decide where to invest.
The five public companies sometimes invite the public to invest in their shares 
through advertisements in the media, but this is a rare phenomenon. The lack of 
efficient mechanism through which shares can be bought and sold may partially 
explain why loan capital appears to perform a more important role than equity 
capital4. In the sample of 58 companies, 70% of their assets were financed by loan 
capital (on average)5. Banks have played a significant role in the financing system 
of the countiy, but not an equally significant role in corporate governance. In the 
market economy, banks charge the level of interest which reflect the perceived 
risks involved. The process has been used, quite successfully, to instil corporate 
discipline. A company is denied access to resources unless it has viable projects and 
efficient management.
In socialist countries, national priorities are determined and expressed in the form 
of economic plans (Granick, 1975; Nsekela, 1978). These plans are then used to
4 Parastatal shares are allocated to the other parastatals or to the Treasury by the 
CPI. Most of the companies are. however, financed through loan capital. Sanare 
(1986) has suggested several reasons for this tendency. First, the authorised share 
capital is small compared to the volume of transactions these companies are 
expected to handle. Second, in spite of smaller authorised shares, only small 
proportion of this is actually paid. This is because of the prospective shareholders 
inability to raise the required cash. They are themselves under-funded and face 
significant problems funding their own operations let alone subscribing in equity 
capital of other companies. Thirdly, some companies have their capital eaten away 
by the accumulated losses over long period of time.
While, perhaps, there is a need for future research to provide empirical evidence 
on possible reasons for preference of loan capital over equity, two additional 
conjectures may be provided. Interest rates for loan capital has been significantly 
low for sometimes in Tanzania. While the interest rates charged by banks in 1985 
was only 7.5%, the inflation was 332% as was discussed in chapter two. The changes 
observed in chapter two are likely to change this tendency in the long run. It is 
also possible that the Dividend Limitation Act (1972), has played a role towards 
crating this tendency. This Act empowers the CPI to regulate dividend payment in 
the country as is discussed later in this chapter.
5The apparent preference for loan capital over equity capital is an intriguing 
research question, but one that is beyond the scope of this research.
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allocate credit and other resources within the economy. Performance indicators are 
set to coordinate activities of various economic entities and ensure that the set 
targets are achieved. Unfortunately, the Tanzanian economic plans are vague and 
cannot be used to achieve such objectives (Nsekela, 1978; Loxley, 1978). The 
national priorities have not been organised in a manner that could guide resource 
allocation decisions.
Recently, for example, Tanzania Investment Bank has adopted a policy of 
financing projects which promise a return on investments of not less than 31.5% 
when they are locally financed or 14.5% when they are foreign financed. These 
measures were taken when the inflation rate was 33%. The approach suffers from 
a further problem. The risks varies from company to company and between 
industries. Interest rate charged must reflect this. The uniform treatment of 
companies would continue to prevent the market forces from instituting corporate 
discipline.
Gven this environment, it is not expected that capital maricet theories would 
influence corporate disclosure practices in the way, for example, Singhvi (1968) 
observed in India.
3.6). SOCIETAL CONTROLS:
The Arusha declaration saw the governments direct participation in most 
economic activities in the country. Below is a summary of some attempts to 
impose some restrictions on corporate governance. It is argued that as efforts were 
being made to introduce more regulatory agencies, it reached a point where it was 
not dear who was responsible for what Their ineffectiveness also resulted from 
the fact that their activities were not well synchronised. Each agency tried to impact 
corporate governance directly.
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3.6.1). THE PARTY:
The Tanzanian constitution accords supremacy to the only political Party in the 
country. This means that it has a constitutional right to issue policies and guide­
lines on matters of public interest and supervise their implementation. It 
established a framework within which it can perform this constitutional 
responsibility. There is a sub-committee of the Central Committee of the Party 
which is expected to supervise all economic activities in the country. Sayore (1980) 
argued that this is the highest organ to which economic entities were expected to 
report.
The Party established four ways through which it can participate in corporate 
governance:
a) It issues policies and programmes to be followed by all economic entities in the 
countiy. The Arusha Declaration and the Party Guide-lines of 1971 (Mwongozo) 
are two examples of such Party policies. These were discussed in chapter two. It 
also issues 5-year Party programmes. The programmes lay down the national 
economic strategy. Other individual corporate strategies are expected to be in line 
with the Party’s blueprint.
b) It has commissars in all the major economic entities. The commissars are the 
link between workers, management and the Party. They attend the Board of 
directors' meetings. They can summon the Party branch meetings to discuss 
corporate objectives and problems encountered in their implementation. They 
report directly to the Party headquarters (Mwapachu, 1983).
c) The Party branches participate directly in corporate governance. The branch 
chairman is a member of the board of directors. He is also a member of Workers 
Committee (trade union at micro-level) and Workers Council. The branch's role is 
to convey and defend the Party's policies in their respective corporations. It is also
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expected to mobilise workers political consciousness in order to improve 
productivity (Sayore,!981; Mwapachu, 1983).
d) The Party has a grip over the trade union movement in the country. There is 
only one Trade Union and it has been affiliated to the Party, All its policies and 
rules must be approved by the Party. Its CEO is also appointed by the Party.
The direct participation by the Party in corporate governance has not been 
welcomed by all (Mihyo, 1983). There were calls for the Party to 'get out of the 
kitchen' in the 1970s. It was felt that the Party should only get involved with policy 
issues and leave the operational aspects to the managers. It is also argued that the 
Party's direct involvement in corporate governance is likely to interfere with 
Fayol's principle of unity of direction discussed earlier. But of more significant 
importance, the Party is likely to concentrate on political issues at the expense of 
efficiency. Thirdly, while the Party's capacity to participate directly in corporate 
governance effectively is a matter for empirical research, there are signs that its 
capacity is limited. It failed, for example, to define its corporate information needs 
as is discussed later in chapter four. Fourthly, its direct participation in corporate 
governance is likely to violate property rights acknowledged by section 24 of the 
constitution. One inevitable consequence of acceptance of property rights is that it 
becomes the basis of corporate powers.
3.6.2). THE GOVERNMENT:
The Government has participated in corporate governance directly through its 
high offices, departments and ministries and indirectly through various regulatoiy 
agencies.
- The President:
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The President appoints CEOs and chairmen of the boards of the parastatals. He also 
appoints the ministers who in turn appoint the other directors. For parastatals, it 
may be argued that the role of shareholders in corporate governance has been 
taken-over by the President. In addition to the power to appoint key actors, other 
mechanisms were instituted to enable him to participate effectively in the 
corporate governance:
- The Presidential Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisation (SCOPO) was 
formed in order to coordinate the staffing and training of parastatal personnel, 
define their salary structure and other fringe benefits and approve organisation 
structures. This committee reports directly to the President.
- The Tanzania Audit Corporation (TAC) was incorporated to perform statutory 
and management audits of all parastatals. It reviews performance and discloses 
relevant issues relating to supervisory aspects and reports directly to the President. 
It was observed, however, that no action were taken on the basis of TAC 
disclosures. Two examples may be offered in support of this. First, TAC was 
reporting that some parastatals are reluctant to appoint them as auditors as early as 
the 1970s. Legally, TAC is expected to audit all parastatals. It is viewed as an 
important government aid in performing its supervisory role. Despite the 
importance attached to TAC's role in corporate governance, TAC still reported in 
1989 that some parastatals were reluctant to be audited by TAC (TAC, 1989). No 
action appears to have been taken to rectify this anomaly by the concerned 
authorities. Secondly, it has been reporting two major reporting problems in 
parastatals: that the financial statements are not prepared on time and that some 
fail to attract clean audit reports. This led to the establishment of a parliamentary 
committee (POC)6 to examine parastatal accounts in 1978. In addition, the Party 
issued a deadline for parastatals to update their accounts in the same year (Sayore, 
1980). The deadline passed and no action was taken against those corporations
^This is discussed later.
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which failed to comply with the Party's directive. In 1985, despite the existence of 
POC for seven years, a second deadline for clearance of accounts in arrears was set - 
this time by the President. The second deadline expired on 31-12-1989. The NBAA 
compiled a report on the extent of compliance with the presidential directive. It 
reported that only 60.4% (279) of the parastatals complied with the directive. 
Compare this to 70% (291) of parastatals whose accounts were up-to-date in 1984 
(TAC, 1984), a year before the second deadline was issued. While perhaps more 
detailed analysis is necessary to draw more informed conclusions, it appears that 
the presidential voice had no impact on timeliness of corporate reporting
- Parent Ministries:
If has already been mentioned that directors are appointed by the minister 
although the chairmen and the CEOs are appointed by the President. Each ministry 
also has a section responsible for monitoring corporate activities of all companies 
falling under its jurisdiction. All new projects must be approved by the ministry. 
Sectoral policies stipulated by the ministries must be complied with by all 
companies (including private companies) reporting to the ministry (Mwapachu, 
1983). They may also provide subsidies when it is deemed necessary. For 
parastatals, the ministries have additional responsibilities. They approve corporate 
plans and budgets. They also receive and scrutinise CARs and management audit 
reports and are expected to evaluate corporate performance.
It was observed, however, that the ministries are not likely to effectively influence 
corporate governance. Although all three interviewees from Ministries had 
masters degrees in economics, all of them appeared to lack corporate experience, 
the authority and status necessary to perform the expected responsibilities. All of 
them expressed concern that they lacked authority to take corrective actions they 
considered necessary. They also expressed the view that most of their 
recommendations are not implemented or investigated further. The Principal
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Secretary who would have taken up the issues raised appeared -in their opinion- 
to be preoccupied by issues considered to be of more national significance than, for 
example, taking appropriate steps to ensure adequate disclosure of corporate 
information. Compare this to corporate governance in Eastern Europe. Granick 
(1975) observed that most effective corporate governance processes were taking 
place within the government ministries. He observed that the success in corporate 
governance depended crucially on the relationship between the Party, Planning 
Commission and government ministries. AH aspects of corporate supervision are 
performed within the government ministries.
In Tanzania, the ministries receive CARs and management audit reports. The 
supervisoiy unit calculates profitability, liquidity and solvency ratios. They then 
compare these ratios over time and report the findings to the Principal Secretary. 
Unfortunately, no action is taken on the basis of this exercise. It was also stated by 
the interviewees that no other performance standards are available. Budgets are 
sometimes prepared in support of requests for government grants and subsidies 
but were not subsequently used as a measure of performance. In addition, no 
attempts are made to adjust for changes in accounting policies in an attempt to 
analyse corporate performance over time. The most significant observation was 
that no "carrot or stick" is based on this exercise - no action was based on this 
undertaking.
- Commissioner for Public Investment (CPI):
This office is located within the ministiy of finance. The Commissioner is expected 
to approve dividend policies and payments for all companies in the country. He is 
also expected to set financial targets, approve annual plans and take care of 
government interests in the parastatals. He negotiates compensation plans in case
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of any nationalisation and ratifies the contracts between parastatals and MNCs. 
Further, he monitors the implementation of these contracts.
Sources of corporate information for the CPI are the CARs, interim reports, 
management audit reports and corporate plans. The commissioner is represented 
on all parastatals1 board of directors. Under special circumstances, a commission of 
inquiry may be set-up to investigate any allegations. This office, however, suffers 
from identical problems reported in the parent ministries. The office exerts little 
influence in terms of determining strategic direction of the corporations in 
Tanzania. It has little impact on supervisory aspects of corporate governance.
-Ministry of Labour
This ministry monitors training programmes and allocates high level manpower 
in the country. It reviews labour productivity, sets production targets and manages 
the bonus system through the Permanent Labour Tribunal (PLT). The PLT also 
administers labour agreements and adjudicates labour disputes. Finally, it 
monitors workers rights (Jackson, 1979).
3.6.3) THE PARLIAMENT:
The parliament has legislative powers and a supervisory role. It supervises 
economic performance at the macro level but may question issues at micro levels 
as well. As mentioned earlier, it formed Parastatal Accounts Committee (POC) to 
scrutinise financial statements and recommend corrective actions. POC is 
composed of 12 Members of Parliament, TACs Director General, Principal 
Secretaries (Ministiy of finance, relevant parent ministries and Prime Ministers
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office), CPI, relevant CEO, relevant Director of Finance and relevant Chairman of 
the Board of Directors.
The committee adopted an approach whereby it examines the audit 
recommendations and take them up to ensure that they are implemented. It may 
recommend a penalty of up to 15% of the relevant managers salaries for failures to 
comply with audit recommendations or any other form of mismanagement.
In 1987, the committee discussed corporate information relating to 76 parastatals. 
The main issues raised in this sitting were:
- 67% (51) of the companies had long outstanding debtors. Some had no adequate 
supporting documents. Others did not reconcile with subsidiary records. Yet no 
efforts were made to recover these debts.
- 32% (24) of the companies had no title deeds to prove ownership of the fixed 
assets involved.
-17% (13) of the companies had not done bank reconciliations.
-11% or 8 companies were in arrears for many years in preparing financial 
statements.
- 8% or six companies reported misappropriation of corporate properties.
-1,3% or one company did not hold a board of directors meeting throughout the 
year. Other issues raised were failure of some officials, such as principal secretaries 
and chairman of board of directors to attend the committee for no apparent reason; 
some debtors were written off without directors approval and some violated 
SCOFO directives.
Although it was stated that corrective action was taken on about 95% of the 
committee's recommendations, it appears that 15% of one months salary is not 
significant enough to put pressure on managers for adequate performance. Also, 
the system is likely to be more effective if it provided both positive and negative
68
rewards for performance. In addition, despite some serious observations in this 
particular meeting including failure to attend this meeting for no apparent reason, 
no disciplinary action was recommended. Moreover, it appears that the work load 
involved is very demanding and cannot be performed effectively by one 
committee.
3.6.4). WORKERS PARTICIPATION:
Workers Councils are intended to act in an advisory capacity to the board of 
directors in all matters of corporate governance. Members of the Council are the 
CEO, the Party's branch chairman, heads of departments, members of the workers 
committee7, national trade union representatives and elected workers 
representatives. The effectiveness of Workers Councils in corporate governance 
issues were examined by Mapolu (1976) and Maseko (1976). They observed that its 
effectiveness was watered down by deliberate management attempts to pre-empt 
the powers of the Council. In the three case studies they conducted, the CEO was 
also the Party chairman in two of the cases. There were no effective interaction 
between members of the council and the ordinary workers they represent since all 
the proceedings of the workers council were kept confidential. Furthermore, 
workers representatives were not involved in the agenda formulation process. 
Perhaps the most serious observation is the fact that councils have no 
constitutional powers of any sort. They can only advise the board of directors.
3.7). SOME THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS:
Four distinctive processes in corporate governance have been identified. In an 
endeavour to institute effective control systems, the Tanzanian leadership has
7Workers Committee is a trade union organisation at a branch level.
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evolved many regulatory agencies. They are now so many that it is not clear who 
is responsible for what. Take strategic direction for example. The Party, the 
Presidents Office, SCOPO, Board of Directors, Parent Ministries, Prime Ministers 
Office, CPI, etc, are all endowed with some legitimate authority to have a say on 
corporate governance. This had led to a position where it was not clear who was 
responsible for what. As the President once stated:
"The entire nation is now complaining about inefficiency, 
indiscipline and poor supervision in the public sector. Board
of directors, chairmen, General Managers, Ministers,
Principal Secretaries and sometimes even the President 
complain that all is not well. But why is it that everybody is 
complaining? It is because we are avoiding responsibility”
(Mwinyi, 1986).
Despite the existence of many regulatory agencies, their activities are not well 
coordinated and their effectiveness not visible. Each agency demands enterprise 
managers to account directly to it. No accountability is demanded from the 
regulatory agencies or the central authorities. For example, it was stated that the 
President gave a deadline for parastatals to clear the accounts which were in 
arrears. He therefore expected the corporations to be directly answerable to him. It 
appears that if this directive was directed to the NBAA, it would have been more 
useful in the sense that it would have stimulated the regulatory agencies to do 
their job.
It may also be added that the supervisory role lies with the central authorities, yet 
there is no mechanism through which they can be called to account. The Party is 
considered supreme. Yet there is no effective way through which it can be called to 
account. Even if there would have been a way out of this, it may be questioned on 
the basis that the Party members form a tiny proportion of the Tanzanian
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population. 8 How can they be relied on to cater for the public interest at large? In 
this regard, Parliamentary supremacy is suggested. Multi-Party politics would also 
enable the parliament to demand accountability from the government
It is argued here that having many supervisory agencies would not necessarily be 
effective. It is suggested that most of the regulatory agencies should be scrapped. A 
three-tier system should be established. At the enterprise level, there should be a 
two-tier board. The executive board should be responsible for strategic direction 
and executive decisions. The supervisoiy board should be responsible for 
supervisory aspects and respond to legitimate requests for corporate accountability. 
The supervisory board should elect the executive board. The supervisory board 
should itself be elected by workers and shareholders in equal proportions. In the 
case of parastatals, the shareholders proportion should be elected by the Planning 
Commission.
The Planning Commission's mission should be to transform the Tanzanian 
companies to world class corporations. The Commission should therefore be 
endowed with resources (including information) necessary for it to do the job. 
Conditions should be made conducive for it to attract the best brains in the land. 
Precisely how the Commission should be organised is a question for future 
research.
This encouragement from the Commission should be supplemented by a well 
functioning market. Corporations should have control over all variables affecting 
their performance. A stock exchange would be extremely useful. An efficient 
financial press would also aid this process.
s Party members are less than ten percent of the population.
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In the next chapter, one aspect of corporate accountability is examined. 
Information is so crucial in the corporate governance system that attempts to 
regulate financial reporting in Tanzania is discussed separately.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL REPORTING IN TANZANIA
4.1) INTRODUCTION:
The objective of this chapter is to describe financial reporting regulation in 
Tanzania. It is argued that although attempts were made to make disclosure 
regulation appropriate for the Tanzanian information requirements, the lack of a 
stock exchange and a significant number of public companies meant that the 
disclosure regulatory approach was out of touch with objective realities of 
Tanzania.
The chapter is divided into six sections. Section two describes the financial 
reporting regulatoiy framework and significant regulatory activities performed so 
far. Section three is a continuation of the preceding section but focuses more on 
the due process in Tanzania. This is followed by a description of financial 
regulation in developing countries in general and Tanzania in particular. Finally, 
the challenges and problems facing financial reporting and regulation in Tanzania 
are highlighted in the last two sections.
42) FUNCTIONS OF THE NBAA
The NBAA was created by an Act of Parliament in 1972 as was presented in chapter 
one. By virtue of section 39 of the NBAA Act, 1972, the NBAA has the authority to 
regulate accounting practice in Tanzania. In this respect NBAA resembles S. E. C. 
of the United States. This arrangement has several advantages: first, the right to 
place restrictions on the peoples behaviour cannot be questioned because the
73
authority for doing so has been delegated by the body representing the entire 
Tanzanian society.
The second advantage is the police power conferred to the NBAA The proceedings 
of the governing board of the NBAA constituted to look at any issue relating to 
accounting regulations is considered to be judicial by virtue of part (iv) of the Act.
It may therefore fine or otherwise penalise any person or corporation for offences 
relating to accounting regulation. NBAA may cancel registration of an accountant 
for failing to comply with the stipulated requirements. This will automatically 
deny such a person the right to professional practice or employment as an 
accountant Of more significance, the standards stipulated by the NBAA are 
considered to be bye-laws and are enforceable through the court of law (Ringo, 
1987). According to Ringp (1987), such bye-laws would require publication in the 
Official Gazette for the courts in Tanzania to take judicial notice of their existence. 
In situations where the document is bully like the case of TSSAPs, only 
ministerial approval is necessaiy for them to be enforceable in the court of law 
(Interpretation of Laws and General Clauses Act, 1972 as quoted in Ringo, 1987). 
TSSAPs were never published in the Official Gazette and there is nothing in the 
document to suggest that they were approved by the Minister for Finance. It is high 
time the NBAA looked into this issue to make these standards legally enforceable. 
This police power compares favourably with the self-regulation m the U. K.
The Act, however, has several shortcomings which deserve careful consideration. 
One problem created by this Act is that it exempted the TAC and the Controller 
and Auditor-General from the regulatory requirements stipulated by the NBAA 
There is no apparent explanation for this unfortunate situation. The only possible 
conjecture is the general attitude of the Tanzanian bureaucracy to pre-empt any 
possible avenue where it could be held accountable as was observed by Mihyo 
(1986).
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The second problem created by the NBAA (Registration) Act, 1972 is the fact that 
no synchronization was made between this Act on the one side and CAP 212 and 
other statutes on the basis of which companies are incorporated on the other. Thus 
one finds the Registrar of Companies acting without reference to NBAA activities 
and NBAA stipulating standards without reference to provisions of the ordinance. 
CAP 212, for example, has stipulated that the overriding requirement is that the 
financial statements present a ‘true and correct' view while the ovemding 
principle adopted by TSSAPs is ‘true and fair1 view. The ordinance portrays the 
financial reports as precise and accurate while TSSAP realises the limitations 
imposed by the nature of the accounting principles and procedures involved and 
therefore requires only an approximate financial position and results of 
operations.
A second example where the two legal documents are in conflict is emerging with 
the current changes NBAA is introducing in the name of accounting guide-lines. 
TSSAPs defined financial statements to include Directors' Reports1. However, the 
guide-lines have excluded directors reports from the definition of financial 
statements2. This falls short of requirements stipulated by the companies 
ordinance. Section 113 requires presentation of directors report to shareholders at 
the Annual General Meetings (AGM). It is therefore argued that it is high time this 
apparent contradiction is sorted out and these legal documents harmonised or the 
regulation of accounting practice be fully delegated to the NBAA
The initial arrangements, at least, avoided most problems facing public sector 
regulation of accounting sighted by Bromwich (1985) and Taylor and Turley (1986). 
For example, as will be explained later in section 4.3, professional accountants were
*See TSSAP2, section 1.2 and the extended disclosure required in section 9.
2See the Tanzania Statement of Accounting Guide-iines, section 2.2(i i) p,3
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involved in the standard setting process such that it was the experts who handled 
the issues involved. The arrangement also allows swift and efficient introduction 
of the changes considered necessary as the NBAA has the complete authority to do 
so, thus avoiding the lengthy legislative procedures.
Having examined some confusions resulting from the two legal documents, let us 
consider now the specific functions delegated to the NBAA and what has been 
achieved so far. The NBAA regulates the following aspects of the financial 
reporting: First, it regulates who can prepare financial reports. The Act which 
created the NBAA -the Accountants and Auditors (Registration) Act, 1972 - 
empowered it to register all accountants in Tanzania. Nobody is allowed to practice 
or to be employed as an accountant unless he or she is registered with the NBAA 
Employers are also forbidden to employ accountants who are not registered. Any 
enterprise with a turnover of 12 million shillings or asset size of 5 million 
shillings is required to employ at least one authorised accountant. Section 10 of the 
act specified the condition necessaiy for registration:
- pass the examinations set by the NBAA for this purpose or equivalent
qualification.
- post-qualification experience of one year.
- acceptable professional and general conduct. NBAA requires three 
letters of reference before one is registered as an accountant.
To operationalise these legal stipulations, the NBAA introduced a three-tier 
professional scheme. Accounting personnel were categorised into three groups. 
The professional categoiy includes holders of Certified Public Accountancy (CPA) 
qualification or its equivalent. Briston and Wallace (1990 p.287) portray the 
situation as if one has to become an authorised accountant before one can become 
an authorised auditor. This is a misleading impression. Those holding at least one
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year3 post-qualification experience in auditing work are registered as authorised 
auditors while those with post-qualification experience in industry are registered 
as authorised accountants. In practice, there used to be no significant difference 
between the two groups. However, the recently mandated auditing standards 
reserve professional practice to those registered as authorised auditors.
The second category includes what the NBAA used to classify as semi­
professionals4. These are registered as approved accountants. They are required to 
pass the National Accountancy Diploma (NAD) examination or its equivalent and 
have post-qualification experience of one year (now extended to three years). There 
are four domestic qualifications which are considered equivalent to this diploma. 
These are bachelors degree in Commerce and Management (accounting bias) from 
the University of Dar-Es-Salaam, advanced accountancy diplomas from Nyegezi. 
Mzumbe, and Institute of Finance Management.
The last category is classified as the technicians. These are holders of the National 
Bookkeeping Certificate (NABOCE) or its equivalent. Despite this third category, 
the NBAA maintains only two registers. By implication, the NBAA is not 
regulating this category of accounting personnel.
To cater for those who completed only primary school education and would like 
to follow career prospects in the profession, a fourth-tier was added in mid 1980s. 
The primary school-leavers are therefore required to start the profession at a much 
lower level by attempting the Basic Bookkeeping Certificate (BBC) examination.
3This period has now been extended to three years by the NBAA, although the law 
has not been amended to reflect this change.
^Contrary to Briston and Wallace (1990) assertion, the four institutions (not two) 
offer qualifications considered equivalent to NAD. They are exempted from NAD 
examinations and can attempt the CPA exams directly. Also, the working experience 
is not a requirement for attempting any of the NBAA exams. They would normally 
require the candidates to prove that they have been preparing for the exams for at 
least nine months.
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Those who qualify can be employed as accounts clerks and are eligible to sit for 
NABOCE exams.
This four-tier system5 has been praised by Briston and Wallace (1990 p.286) and, 
quoting Tipgos (1987), they asserted six advantages of the system. However, this 
highly regarded four-tier system arrangement has been abolished. Beginning m 
May 1992, a new structure of accounting education became operational, making the 
transplanting of the U. K. system of professional training complete in the 
Tanzanian accounting education system. In the new structure, the two lower 
qualifications - BBC and NABOCE - were combined to form a technician level. The 
intermediate level qualification - NAD- was combined with the professional level 
to form a four level professional examination6 as follows:
PROFESSIONAL LEVEL I:
- Financial Accounting 1; Economics; Business Mathematics and Statistics 
and Business Law.
PROFESSIONAL LEVEL II:
- Cost Accounting Auditing 1; Data Processing and Management 
Information Systems and Taxation 1.
PROFESSIONAL LEVEL III:
- Financial Accounting 2; Quantitative Techniques; Taxation 2 and 
Business Administration and Management.
PROFESSIONAL LEVEL IV:
- Financial Accounting 3; Management Accounting Auditing and 
Investigations and Financial Management.
5firiston and Wallace (1990) discussed only the previous three-tier system,
transitional arrangements for introducing these changes were made. Two years 
were provided to enable the candidates of the old examination system to be phased 
out. Specific levels of entry into the new examination system were also established 
for the holders of the previous qualifications.
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NBAA (1989) presents two reasons for the change in syllabus. It argued that the 
change was an attempt to ensure that the new syllabus produces accountants who 
can better serve the Tanzanian economy and also that the accounting curriculum 
in Tanzania is in line with international developments in the Accountancy 
Profession. The second reason is that the change would lead to abolition of the 
‘approved’ accountants status. The NBAA argues that the existence of the 
'approved' accountants has led to "a great public confusion about the role and 
status of the 'approved' accountants versus the 'authorised' accountants. The new 
scheme will eliminate the cause of this confusion" [NBAA (1989 p.i)J. Those who 
are already recognised as 'approved accountants' will continue to be recognised as 
such if they fail to acquire necessaiy qualification for authorised accountants.
A third reason was revealed by the interviews conducted by this study. It was felt 
that many approved accountants do not attempt CPA exams because they were 
recognised as accountants in the old structure. It was thought that the elimination 
of the approved accountants' category would force holders of NAD or equivalent 
qualifications to attempt CPA exams. The changes, however, allow them to 
continue providing services previously provided by the approved accountants. It 
remain to be seen whether the changes will increase the number of candidates 
attempting CPA exams as it is likely that many potential candidates do not attempt 
the exams because of insignificant difference in terms of remuneration packages 
between the approved and authorised accountants. The changes did not also 
address the question of high failure rates in the CPA exams which is another likely 
factor leading to fewer people attempting the exams.
like the old system, the new syllabus continues to lay more emphasis on Financial 
Accounting in relation to Managerial and Public Sector Accounting After 
comparing this new programme to the ACCA program, Pany and Mushi (1992) 
argued that the two programmes are more or less identical. It appears that these
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changes were made in anticipation of the changes currently taking place in 
Tanzania. While the new syllabus was not relevant to the Tanzanian 
environment of 1989, when the changes were introduced, they appear to be quite 
relevant and are likely to produce accountants who can serve better the Tanzanian 
economy of tomorrow. The government has taken considerable steps to transform 
the current Tanzanian economy into a market economy. There are plans to 
introduce a stock exchange and individuals are encouraged to participate in 
corporate ownership.
Section 11 also provided for temporaiy registration. This involved two categones 
of accountants;
- those who were practicing or employed as accountants before this act
was introduced and did not meet the conditions specified for 
permanent registration. They were allowed to continue practicing or 
being employed as accountants on condition that they make every 
effort to acquire the necessary qualifications.
- expatriate accountants who are expected to work in the country for a 
short period of time.
In addition to regulating who can practice or be employed as an accountant, the 
NBAA monitors, coordinates and regulates accounting training in the country. 
Promotion of the accounting profession through training was one of the major 
reasons for the establishment of the NBAA- 
- it conducts an examination scheme which, as discussed above, forms 
the basis of the registration process. It has established a syllabus for its 
own examinations and expects all accounting training institutions to 
cover at least this syllabus. It also insists that its standards be taught and 
examined by these institutions
-It has set the minimum qualification for accounting instructors.
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Because industry appears to be more lucrative than teaching, there is a 
general tendency for instructors to move to industry. NBAA intends to 
set-up a fund which will be used to top-up the salary of the key 
accounting instructors in order to halt or even to reverse this situation.
-It participates directly in accounting training. It has established an 
accounting training institute at Arusha. It also conducts review classes 
for its examinations.
-It has the exemption power to enforce compliance. The NBAA might 
exempt graduates of any accounting training institution from doing any 
of its lower level examinations. This decision depends on whether the 
NBAA believe the graduates covered its syllabus adequately and whether 
they were taught by qualified instructors.
Third, it also issues mandatoiy standards to be followed in the country. So far, 
three standards* four guide-lines, three auditing standards and one recommended 
practice have been issued. The standards are called Tanzania Statements of 
Standard Accounting Practice (TSSAPs);
TSSAP1 set requirements on the preparation, maintenance and retention of 
accounting records. It has stipulated the bookkeeping methods, requires 
promptness of transactions recording and specified the expected books of accounts. 
Its specific stipulations include;
-transactions be recorded in a chronological and systematic manner.
Each recorded transaction must have supporting documents which are 
easily traceable.
-accounting records be adequate to explain the nature of transactions 
involved, facilitate effective management and facilitate the preparation 
of financial statements.
- accrual accounting method is compulsory.
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- emphasis on prompt recording of transactions. All cash transactions be 
recorded not later than the next working day. Other transactions must 
be recorded as soon as possible.
- ledger accounts be updated and balanced at least every three months.
- recorded transactions which are later found to be in error can only be 
corrected through correcting entries. The correcting entiy must be self- 
explanatory and bear the authority for correction.
- TSSAPI has defined financial statements to include income statement, 
balance sheet, statement of sources and application of funds, group 
financial statements and directors' reports.
- accounting records must be retained within the country for at least ten 
years.
The idea for this standard was borrowed from Sweden as is discussed later in the 
next section. This reflects the point highlighted by Briston (1978) that economic aid 
may lead to some influence on accounting regulation and practice of the recipient 
country.
TSSAP2 dwells on disclosure requirements. All legal entities are 
required to comply with them. Sole traders with a turnover exceeding 50m/=  or 
asset size exceeding30m/ =7 must also comply with them. It started by identifying 
the users of financial statements to include;
-present and potential shareholders 
-present and potential creditors
-public agencies responsible for monitoring public interest 
-the government 
-employees
7by 1983 when these standards were adopted, £1 was equivalent to 20 Tanzanian 
shillings.
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It recognised that their information requirements are neither 
homogeneous nor static. It argued therefore that specialised disclosures cannot be 
catered for by the CARs, as this is likely to "undermine clarity and aggravate 
clutter".
A summaiy of general purpose information required by TSSAP2 includes:
a) Profitability of the enterprise;
-scale of the enterprise/turnover 
-amount of profit earned 
-breakdown of non-operating income 
-depreciation expense 
-income tax paid
-items of abnormal size and incidence
-appropriation of profits
-factors affecting future performance
b) Solvency of the enterprise;
-capital structure
-breakdown of assets and liabilities 
-factors affecting liquidity of the enterprise
c) Operational and administrative efficiency of the enterprise;
-physical units planned and attained 
-administrative lapses
d) Contributions toward national benefits and goals by the enterpnse;
-identify such benefits attained
-identify measures taken by the enterprise to secure the national 
benefits,
e) Fiduciary responsibility of management;
-emoluments paid to management, auditors and related parties.
Related parties are defined to include relatives of the CEO and the
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members of board of directors. Any person who has power to 
determine the composition of the board of directors is included in 
the related party definition.
-identify related parties and disclose their stake in the company 
(e.g contracts with such parties, loans and imprests outstanding etc)
f) Employees welfare;
-working conditions
-avenues through which communication between workers and 
management is taking place.
In addition to a long list of information items, TSSAP2 has also laid down some 
general guide-lines on disclosure of information:
a) Non-compliance with TSSAP2 requirements is permitted under three special 
cases;
-where disclosure may blur the true and fair view of the financial 
position or results of the operations. The true and fair view 
therefore overrides all stipulated requirements as it does in the 
U.K.
-where it is impractical to disclose.
-where such disclosure is considered inappropriate or harmful to 
to the company in question.
But TSSAP2 also requires that such non-compliance must be disclosed, justified 
and explained. Reasons for failing to comply and the financial implications 
involved must be quantified and disclosed (NBAA,1983 R3). It therefore appears 
that these further requirements effectively mean that there are no circumstances 
where non-disclosure is allowed.
b) Consolidated financial statements are not required where the following 
conditions exists;
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-the holding corporation is itself a subsidiary of another corporation 
incorporated in the country.
-where the businesses of the two corporations are so different that they 
cannot reasonably be treated as one entity.
-where it is considered impractical to prepare the group accounts or 
where they provide little or no additional useful information to users 
of the financial statement For example, in situations where 
preparation may lead to delay in releasing the financial statements or 
where there is no significant relationship between the companies 
involved.
TSSAP3 has stipulated the fundamental accounting principles and their disclosure 
in CARS. It contains four basic assumptions, four working rules and three 
accounting bases.
The four assumptions which are expected to be observed in the process of 
preparing financial statements are;
-accounting entity to which accounting records are maintained are 
assumed to be separate and distinct not only from the owners but also 
from any other enterprise the same owners may have.
-financial statements are prepared on the assumption that the enterprise 
will continue operating for the foreseeable future.
-It is assumed that all transactions are measurable and quantifiable in 
money terms.
-It is assumed that the currency is stable over time. This is an unrealistic 
assumption given the current double digit inflation in Tanzania.
The four working rules are;
-the accrual concept that is, income and expenses are recognized and
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accounted for as they are earned and incurred and not when cash is 
received or paid for.
-the matching concept That is, an attempt must be made to match all 
benefits received to all efforts incurred when determining the results of 
operations of the period.
-Revenue realization concept. That is, income is recognized in the 
accounting records only when they are realised either in the form of 
cash or in any other form of asset whose ultimate realisation into cash is 
reasonably certain.
-valuation of balance sheet items;
-fixed assets be recorded at historical cost or valuation less the amount 
written off as depreciation.
-current assets be reported at the lower of market or cost.
-the liabilities be reported at the cash or cash equivalence necessary to 
discharge the obligation on the balance sheet date.
- accounting prudence
Accounting bases are defined to include alternative methods developed for 
applying fundamental accounting principles. TSSAP three has specified the 
following;
-consistency 
- materiality
TSSAP& have some valuation standards visible in them. Alternative revenue 
realization methods are acceptable. Revaluation of fixed asset is permitted. Two 
restrictive conditions were, however, imposed. Revaluation of fixed assets can be 
done either on the basis of Revaluation coefficients provided by the government 
for such purpose or performed by professional valuers.
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In the event that revaluation has taken place, TSSAPs have imposed the following 
disclosure standards;
- the fact that revaluation has taken place be disclosed.
- disclose date of revaluation
- disclose basis of revaluation
- if done through professional revaluation, disclose the identity 
of the valuer and the basis of revaluation.
- disclose the impact of revaluation on the results of operations.
From the interviews conducted, it was clear that the NBAA did not undertake the 
necessaiy preparations which would have made this requirement operational. The 
options of using the government provided revaluation coefficients was not 
available to preparers of financial statements as the government had not provided 
the revaluation coefficients since TSSAPs were adopted in June 1983. From a 
random sample of 58 companies, 24 or 41% of the sample revalued their fixed 
assets. All of them used the services of professional valuers.
The NBAA is silent on the format or the form through which corporate 
information should be disclosed. However, it has offered some guide-lines which 
are intended to aid comprehension. These include the use of captions, sub-totais, 
supplementary schedules, footnotes, parenthetical information, simple language, 
emphasis on important issues and classification to aid comprehension. Setting-off 
figures is also discouraged
The NBAA has set a requirement on timely reporting Draft accounts must be 
presented for auditing within three months of the accounting period. No mtenm 
reporting is prescribed by the NBAA In the interim, companies are expected to 
record their cash transactions on a daily basis (at least not later than the next 
working day) and are also expected to balance their books once eveiy three 
months.
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It was stated above that despite the delegation of accounting regulation to the 
NBAA, the parliament still legislates on issues related to financial reporting. 
Companies ordinance (CAP 212) is widely noted in this regard. This ordinance was 
originally enacted in 1932 (during the colonial period) but has been subsequently 
amended to better reflect current developments. Several issues relating to financial 
reporting are specified in the ordinance:
a) ANNUAL RETURN:
Companies incorporated on the basis of this ordinance are required to submit the 
annual return to the registrar of companies. The annual return must be 
accompanied by audited financial statements. The ordinance defined financial 
statements to include the income statement (profit and loss account), balance sheet 
and directors' report. Contrast this to the TSSAPs which have defined financial 
statements to include statement of sources and application of funds and 
Consolidated financial statements in addition to the ones specified by the 
ordinance.
b) ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT;
The ordinance requires companies to maintain proper books of accounts and that 
financial statements be audited. The auditor must express a view on whether the 
statements are true and correct' and state whether he obtained all information he 
considered necessary for the formation of the opinion. It specified that the auditors 
must be appointed and have their remuneration fixed by the annual general 
meeting of the shareholders. It disqualified the following categories of people from 
undertaking the auditing tasks;
- director or officer of the company
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- a partner or employee of the company
- a body corporate. It is worth noting that TAC is a body corporate.
c)DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS;
CAP 212 mandates minimum disclosure in the directors' report and the balance 
sheet. It requires the directors report to disclose;
-state of affairs of the company.
-recommended dividends.
-proposed reserve funds.
It requires the balance sheet to provide the following details;
- authorised share capital
- issued and paid share capital
- breakdown of assets and liabilities
- how fixed assets have been valued
- preliminary expenses
- any expense incurred in respect of shares or debentures issued
- intangible assets
- secured liabilities
- intra-group payables
- intra-group receivables
- details of investments in subsidiary companies
- auditor's reports which must state whether they obtained all 
information they considered necessary to form an opinion and 
whether the financial statements reflect a true and correct view.
- loans to directors or officers of the company
- directors remuneration (excluding the amount paid to the CEO 
and the executive directors).
4.3) DUE PROCESS:
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First due process was designed to facilitate the development of accounting 
standards which were relevant to the unique Tanzanian environment. This 
process begins with the identification of a problem by the NBAA secretariat. The 
secretariat then conducts research on the identified problem. For example the 
problems leading to the promulgation of TSSAPs 1-3 were identified in 1978. 
Research was conducted on the topics involved. This effort was spread over a 
period of 18 months. At the end of this period 27 people presented papers in a 
professional brain-storming seminar. The seminar took four days and the four 
themes which were discussed are:
a) Objectives and limitations of accounting disclosures
b) Disclosures under socialist environment of Tanzania
c) Disclosure requirements elsewhere. The focus were directed 
towards disclosure requirements in the U. K, Canada, Sweden,
India and Sri-Lanka.
d) Disclosure requirements for special purposes.
Regulatory agencies were asked to present papers on their specific information 
requirements and to what extent the present CARs disclosed these information 
items. Regulatory agencies which presented papers were the Party (CCM), 
Commissioner of Income Tax (CIT), Commissioner of Public Investment (CPI), 
Presidential Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisations (SCOPO) and 
Tanzania Audit Corporation (TAC). Looking at the papers presented at this 
conference, it appears that most of them were not fully aware of their information 
needs. Take the paper presented by the Party, for example. It never addressed the 
Party's information needs and whether the present CARs satisfied their 
information requirements. CPI is the custodian of the government's interest m the 
Parastatal organisations. As such the Commission Is expected to supervise, 
monitor performance and provide strategic direction for the parastatals. The paper 
presented by the Commission, however, concentrated on the administration of the
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Dividend Limitation Act (1972) and did not touch at all the other areas of its 
interest Only two papers -those presented by SCOPO and CIT showed some 
awareness of the corporate information needs and problems facing CARs as source 
of information.
The other problem was the choice of countries whose experience were considered 
relevant to the needs of Tanzania. The countries whose expenences were 
consulted were U. K, India, Canada, Sweden and Sri Lanka. India, Canada and Sn 
Lanka are ail Commonwealth countries and it can therefore be stated that Sweden 
was the only country outside the British sphere of influence whose accounting 
experiences were consulted. It is surprising that no socialist accounting experiences 
were examined despite the socialist orientation of Tanzanian policies and despite 
warnings by Kilimba and Kitilya (1980) that the disclosure approach to accounting 
regulation may be inappropriate to the Tanzanian socio-economic system. The 
French accounting system was likely to yield a rich experience for Tanzania. Both 
France and Tanzania operate an indicative planning system in which both private 
sector andpubhc sectors are expectedto cooperate.
Lastly, all papers presented in this seminar were descriptive in nature. Only one 
paper provided some empirical evidence (Kilimba and Kitilya, 1980) but no 
attempt was made to establish possible factors explaining disclosure practice. None 
at all examined how the economy was working the checks and balances on 
corporate behaviour, resource mobilisation and investment schemes or even the 
framework within which accounting information is used for decision making 
When Kilimba and Kitilya (1980) suggested that the nature of the Tanzanian 
economic system and how it operates should first be studied before deciding on the 
regulatory approach, they were easily brushed aside merely by pin-pointing who 
the potential users of financial statements are (NBAA, 1983 p.8 section 1.4).
91
This professional seminar appointed a 12-member steering committee to 
recommend accounting standards for Tanzania. Five members of the committee 
were from professional practice, three were accountants employed in industry, one 
academic, the Attomey-General's office, one representative from the Dar Es 
Salaam Chamber of Commerce and one accounting expert from the NBAA, who 
also chaired the committee.
This committee recommended the three standards which ultimately led to the 
TSSAPs which were discussed earlier. It released its recommendations in the form 
of an Exposure Draft on 1st September 1981. Ten months were allowed for the 
public to respond to the Exposure Draft. Nine responses were received from 
individuals working for the Tanzania Legal Corporation, Board of Internal Trade, 
Coopers and Lybrand and Tanzania Audit Corporation. The TSSAPs were finally 
approved by the governing board of the NBAA in June 1983 and became effective 
on 1-1-1984.
Some commendable efforts worth praising were made in an endeavour to 
promulgate disclosure standards appropriate to the Tanzanian Socialist 
environment The participants were conscious of the unique information 
requirements of this environment. There were genuine attempts to promulgate 
standards which reflected the critical issues of the time. Some examples are 
discussed to clarify this point
First, at that time, Tanzania lacked qualified and experienced managers. Most of 
them could be appropriately classified as trainee managers. The Faculty of 
Commerce and Management of the University of Dar-Es Salaam was established 
only in 1979 with the first graduates coming out in 1981. There were many 
symptoms of administrative inefficiency resulting from this lack of experienced
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managers8. Thus TSSAPs focused on disclosure items which aimed at disclosing 
administrative efficiency of corporations in Tanzania.
Second, the shortage of qualified accountants also meant that a standard on 
preparation and maintenance of accounting records was necessary as a guide to the 
few and inexperienced accountants of the time. It is for this reason that TSSAP1 
was adopted as a standard, making Tanzania the only country in the 
commonwealth with a standard on bookkeeping and accounting records.
Third, the Arusha Declaration was concerned with the equitable distribution of 
wealth and ownership of property in the country. It was also concerned with the 
country's path towards self-reliance. Thus one finds TSSAPs requiring disclosure 
of distribution of income within corporations, efforts made to acquire technology, 
the use of domestic resources, etc. The Arusha Declaration is well reflected in the 
disclosure requirements.
Fourth, at the time, the country was facing a critical foreign currency shortage, it is 
for this reason that TSSAPs require the disclosure of efforts made to earn and 
conserve foreign currency.
Fifth, as inflation continued to bite, salaries and other benefits paid to workers in 
general and managers in particular became insufficient to afford them a 'decent* 
life style. Some resorted to unofficial ways and methods of obtaining funds from 
their employers in order to get ends meet. It was because of this that 'related 
parties' was defined in the context of Tanzania to include executive managers,
8In 1986, TIB reported that the projects they financed faced two types of problems: 
operational and implementation problems..."operational problems related to weak 
management, low capacity utilisation, poor capital structure, and tight liquidity. 
Implementation problems were caused by organisational inefficiency or 
managerial inexperience and ineffectiveness in planning and starting up new 
projects" (TIB, 1986 p. 7).
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members of board of directors and their relatives. It is for the same reason that 
some petty issues such as staff hotel accommodation expenses and breakdown of 
outstanding 'safari' imprest are to be disclosed and justified in CARs, etc
Sixth, agriculture is the bulwark of the Tanzanian economy. It was therefore 
necessary to stipulate some standards which would facilitate accounting for crops.
These are few commendable examples which were made to identity relevant 
issues to be reported in CARs. However, a disclosure approach to accounting 
regulation was inappropriate to the Tanzanian environment of the time. As 
Briston (1978 and 1984) and Briston and Wallace (1990) have observed, disclosure 
requirements pre-suppose the existence of private investors and an efficiently 
operating stock exchange. In an environment where private investors are few and 
government involvement in economic activities is high, disclosure regulations 
are at best meaningless.
The adoption of a disclosure approach to accounting regulation has a lot to do with 
the factors observed by Briston (1978). These factors are discussed in general terms 
in the next section. Specifically, economic aid; International accounting firms; 
English as the business and academic language and the colonial system all shaped 
the approach to accounting regulation in Tanzania.
Tanzania has been a significant recipient of economic aid particularly after the 
adoption of Arusha Declaration (Okoko, 1987). The economic aid has been coming 
in the form of expatriate manpower, scholarship grants to Tanzanian students 
abroad, etc. The architect of the accounting regulation in Tanzania was a World 
Bank sponsored expatriate with the NBAA. TSSAP1 borrowed extensively from 
the Swedish Accounting Act, 1976 (Briston and Wallace, 1990). The adoption of 
this standard was influenced by a paper presented by a Swedish expatriate in
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Tanzania (Zetterstorm, 1980). Mr Zetterstorm was an expatriate auditor with 
Tanzania Audit Corporation (TAC). He was sponsored to TAC by the Swedish 
International Development Authority (SIDA).
Of the twenty seven people who contributed articles to this process, 17 were 
holders of commonwealth (other than Tanzania) professional qualifications. Some 
of them were working with the International Accounting Firms. English Language 
has also played a part in determining what books are read in the country and the 
adoption of the U.K. professional training system.
The colonial system has had an impact on the accounting regulation in Tanzania, 
mainly through the colonial legal system. The companies ordinance was imposed 
by the colonial system. Although this ordinance has been amended several times, 
it has remained essentially British in its orientation. It is also worth mentioning 
that Tanzania had no single accountant at independence (Briston and Wallace, 
1990). Therefore, well established professional accountants or a professional body 
with vested interest in the continuation of the colonial system of accounting 
regulation were not there However, once Tanzania embarked on its training 
programme, Britain was the major training ground. Out of 123 registered 
authorised auditors in 1987, 73 or about 60% held British professional 
qualifications.
Apart from the adoption of the inappropriate disclosure approach to accounting 
regulation, NBAA has not instituted a system of monitonng compliance to-date. It 
expects the registered members to do whatever is possible to ensure that its 
standards are accepted and practiced. Accounting instructors are requested to teach 
and examine them. Auditors are expected to demand compliance or qualify their 
reports where these standards are not complied with. Although, as Taylor and 
Turley (1986) pointed out, the audit function is the traditional way through which
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compliance with the accounting standards is monitored, the effectiveness of this 
approach is dependent on the environment in question. Effectiveness of audit 
opinion requires a framework within which some action is taken on the basis of 
the auditors reports. Where the market is operating efficiently, audit qualifications 
are discounted by the market and this is likely to operate against the interest of the 
managers. In addition, there are listing requirements and investigation done by 
the Department of Trade and Industry in the case of U.K. Apart from the 
Parliamentaiy Committee on Parastatals and the bankers (for private sector firms), 
few appear to be interested in the audit opinion in Tanzania. It was observed, for 
example, that some annual reports which were prepared by an accounting firm for 
their clients had no independent audit opinion. All the accounting firm reported 
was the fact that they prepared the CAR The Registrar of Companies appeared to 
regard this as sufficient for the purposes specified in companies ordinance (CAP 
212). The ordinance requires an audited annual report to be attached to the annual 
return. There is a need therefore to have coordination of some sort between 
standard setters and those who enforce legal provisions in the corporations.
It is this lack of an effective system to monitor compliance with the legal 
provisions and other requirements that has led to the weaknesses TAC audit 
reports have been highlighting for quite sometime. TAC has been reporting in its 
annual reports that financial reporting in the public sector faces three main 
problems: they are not timely, they lack essential details and are of doubtful 
quality. Although these reports led to the formation of Parliamentary Committee 
on Parastatal Accounts (POC) in 1978, the Party's deadline for submission of up-to- 
date accounts in 1979 and the Presidential directive that all CARs must be up-to- 
date by the end of the 1987, TAC (1989) still reported the same old problems in their 
1989 annual report.
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Thirdly, TSSAPs are too flexible and permit a variety of alternative procedures. 
Their scope is also too broad in the sense that they apply to all types of entities 
regardless of size, ownership or industry. This is in sharp contrast to the U. K. 
where they are applicable only to the limited companies (Gray, 1987) and U. S. A 
where they are restricted to the listed companies (Benston 1976).
4.4) FINANCIAL REPORTING REGULATION LITERATURE ON TANZANIA
Briston and Wallace (1990) gave an extended description of accounting regulation 
m Tanzania. However, some of the description gives a misleading impression of 
what has happened there. Yet more of their descriptions are now history. This 
section will rectify these shortcomings and add the missing details.
Briston and Wallace (1990) have argued that there are three possible approaches to 
regulation of accounting education and practice open to third world countries. A 
country may develop its own procedures on the basis of its own socio-economic 
needs and environmental context without learning from others' experience; it 
may transplant them from developed countries to its own environment or it may 
learn from others experience while adapting these experiences to suit its own 
needs and environment.
Given the present day world system, it is unlikely that any countiy will develop its 
own system without recourse to others experience. Even without admitting it, 
developments elsewhere are likely to influence the thinking in the country m 
question. It may therefore be difficult to find any third world countiy which could 
be classified in this first category, although this is a matter for future research to 
establish.
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The second approach acknowledges accounting as a business language and like 
other languages> it could be applied universally. Given this belief, some third 
world countries have transplanted accounting procedures regardless of whether 
they are relevant to their own environment or not. Briston (1978) argues that most 
third world countries are trapped in this situation and sights some examples to 
support his argument.
It is argued, however, that it is not a belief in the universality of accounting 
principles that is leading to this approach to accounting regulation. Briston (1978) 
has provided convincing arguments as to the factors leading to this approach to 
accounting regulation. He suggests six factors which may explain this tendency: 
First, using the British colonial system as an example, Bnston argues that the 
colonial system had imposed the British Companies Acts with its disclosure and 
auditing requirements on the former colonies. The colonial system also meant 
that professional status could only be achieved through registration with the 
British professional bodies. Once the system was established it reinforced itself. 
Those who operate the system have a vested interest in its perpetuation because of 
its lucrative rewards and the fact that they are not likely to admit that what they 
studied and practiced is now irrelevant to the current socio-economic 
requirements.
Secondly, he maintains that most MNCs are based in the U. K or the U. S.A and 
have adopted the accounting systems of home country for their overseas 
subsidiaries and have trained local staff in those systems. It is therefore unlikely 
that a totally new approach will be adopted as the professional accountants are 
unaware of alternatives and are likely to stiffly resist any attempt to introduce a 
totally different approach. Suggestions by Kilimba and Kitilya (1980) is a case in 
point. It is also unlikely that alternative approaches will ever be conceived in the 
first place since research facilities are also lacking in these environments.
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Thirdly, he also asserted that most International accounting firms are either 
British or American and have trained their local staff to service their clients 
according to the U. S. A  or U. K. systems.
His fourth argument is that the World Bank and other international financial 
institutions insists that the projects they finance be audited by the international 
accounting firms, thus perpetuating the superiority of the of the U. K./ U. S. A  
systems in the eyes of third world professional accountants.
His fifth point is that international aid has also contributed towards the 
perpetuation of the system. The aid is often provided in the form of staff exchange, 
provision of scholarships and grants of textbooks. These forms of aid can only 
increase the knowledge and acceptance of the donor countries1 approaches as the 
Swedish case discussed above
His final argument is that the use of English language in most of these countries 
and the dominance of the U. S/ U. K. textbooks in the accounting field has meant 
that education m these countries is based on the standard U. K./ U. S. A education 
system.
To this list, Nobes (1988 p.41) adds the accidents of history and provides some 
examples as to what he means by this.
The third world countries may opt for a third approach. They may learn from 
others' experience and use this experience to develop systems and procedures 
which are appropriate to their needs and environment. Briston and Wallace have 
classified Tanzania as belonging to this group of countries. It must be pointed out 
that for a country to follow this approach to accounting regulation, two conditions
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must be fulfilled. The regulators must be aware of the information needs and also 
be well conversant with the environment A deep knowledge of the environment 
would require not only knowledge of the domestic legal systems and 
requirements, but also a good knowledge of how the system is working and the 
formal and informal checks and balances on the corporate behaviour. Lack of 
research on how the third world economies are working has meant that most 
third world regulators are not aware of how the system works and therefore their 
infonmation needs. The situation is aggravated by the use of accounting expatriates 
in the regulatory process who may not be well aware of the environment she or he 
is required to regulate. The lack of knowledge of the unique environmental aspects 
may mean that they are unaware of information needs of the users of accounting 
reports.
A casual look at the Tanzanian accounting regulatoiy process may lead to her 
classification into this third category. A more critical eye would reveal quite a 
different picture as the discussions in section three above clearly shows.
4,5) OPINIONS ON FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS QUALITY OF CARS:
A questionnaire was designed to capture opinions and attitudes on factors which 
contribute towards the quality of financial reporting in Tanzania (see appendix 4.1). 
Complete results of this investigation are enclosed as appendix 4.2. In summary, 
the opinions gathered by a five-point Likert-type scales, eight out of twenty factors 
ranked high as negative contributors towards the quality of financial reporting m 
Tanzania. These are shortage of qualified accountants (4.45), inadequate 
remuneration for accountants(3.85), quality of accounting training (3.75), 
accounting manpower turnover (3.55), inadequate use of accounting reports (3.40), 
regulation of accounting practice by the NBAA (3.32), inadequate assiduity on part
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of accountants (3.30) and communication problems between the branches and 
corporate headquarters (3.16).
Other factors investigated ranked low as causes of inadequate corporate disclosure 
practices in Tanzania. These are deliberate suppression of accounting function 
(2.95), accountants are unaware of the regulatory requirements (2.95), inadequate 
data processing equipments (2.74), inadequate printing facilities (2.65), cost of 
publishing CARs (2.55), cost of data collection and processing (2.55), possibility of 
intervention by tax authorities (2.50) or other regulatory agencies (2.20), nature of 
the reported message (255), cost of auditing CARS (2.50), professional disputes 
between accountants and auditors (1.58) and the cost of competitive disadvantage 
(1.58). In the opinions of regulators, these factors did not contribute significantly 
towards negative corporate information disclosure.
These opinions may be compared with the reasons given for failure to comply 
with the 1985 Presidential directive on timeliness of CARs. As pointed out earlier, 
the President had issued a directive that all parastatals must submit up-to-date 
CARs by the end of the year 1987 onwards. This deadline was further extended by 
two years. The NBAA took-up the issue and prepared a report on the extent to 
which parastatais complied with this directive and the possible reasons for failure 
to comply.
Of the parastatals responding to the NBAA's questionnaires, 42 companies did not 
comply with the directive. 14 companies did not state the reasons for their failure 
to comply. Of the remaining twenty-eight companies:
-13 (46%) stated that they failed to comply because they lacked 
qualified accountants.
- 9 (32%) stated that they could not afford to pay the audit fees.
- 2 (7%) could not meet the deadline because of heavy backlog work to
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clear the accounts.
- 2 (7%) failed because of the poor communication between the 
branches and the head offices.
- 2 (7%) reported that poor compensation for the accountants was 
responsible for their failure to meet the deadline
4.6) CHALLENGES FACING FINANCIAL REPORTING REGULATORS:
The Tanzanian approach to accounting regulation has been praised and lessons for 
other third world countries identified (Briston and Wallace, 1990 pp.296-298). The 
most striking lesson is that the regulators were able to identify national objectives 
and then structured the disclosure requirements to facilitate monitoring of the 
identified objectives.
It is argued, however, that although efforts were made to identify national 
objectives, no attempts were made to identify how the economy of Tanzania was 
functioning the checks and balances on corporate behaviour and mechanisms 
available for attainment of the identified objectives. As a result of this, regulators 
adopted a regulatoiy approach which appears to be environmental specific at the 
outset. Deeper analysis would reveal that they transplanted the U.K./ U.S approach. 
The following arguments are presented in support of this position:
First, the disclosure approach to accounting regulation was adopted despite the 
countiys socialist orientation. The disclosure approach to financial reporting is 
intended to provide information to individual investors scattered around the 
world. The success of such an approach in stimulating economic development 
depends on the existence of mechanisms which would encourage managers to 
exert maximum efforts such as stock exchanges. A socialist economy essentially 
means that corporate control is exercised at the centre. Socialist accounting has to
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be designed to primarily provide control information to the centre. Such a system 
is much simpler in its outlook and can well be operated by bookkeepers rather 
than professional accountants9 (Bailey, 1988). It tends to be uniform in its 
procedures and principles in order to facilitate performance evaluation of various 
enterprises in a socialist economy. No attempt has been made at all to introduce 
socialist accounting.
At the outset, it appears as if accounting education in Tanzania was designed to 
achieve its socialist objectives. This is suspect. The approach adopted emphasised 
professional training of accountants mainly found in capitalist countries 
(Wierzbicki, 1988). Deliberate attempts were made to make accounting education 
in Tanzania equivalent to the one provided by the U.K/ U.S system. A look into 
the accounting training programme would reveal only three subjects in the entire 
programme which emphasize issues unique to the Tanzanian environment and 
except for one subject, they are all optional. These are co-operative principles or 
government accounting offered at NABOCE level, Government accounting or Co­
operative principles offered at NAD level and the political economy of Tanzania. 
There is no significant difference in terms of topics covered in professional 
training in Tanzania and U.K. There was a deliberate attempt to make professional 
qualifications in Tanzania equivalent to other professional qualifications in other 
commonwealth countries. Textbooks used in professional training are basically 
British.
Finally, the reporting principles involved in Tanzania are not significantly 
different from the ones observed in the U. K. For example, the overriding 
principle in financial reporting in the U.K. is the true and fair1 rule. This is also 
the overriding principle stipulated by TSSAPs.
^This would be an added advantage in less developed countries where accounting 
manpower is in short supply.
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It can now be concluded that the single most important challenge facing financial 
reporting regulators in Tanzania is to develop an approach which is relevant to 
her economic development. This would require a deeper knowledge of how the 
economy is functioning. Since socialism essentially means central planning which 
implies control of corporate activities from a central position, the importance of an 
accounting system in facilitating such control can not be over-emphasized. To 
develop a relevant accounting approach would require creation of an institutional 
arrangement which is consistent with the national policies. The accounting system 
would then be designed to serve such a system.
Tanzania has been busy preaching socialism while creating capitalist institutional 
arrangements and expecting not only to learn from capitalism how to build 
socialism, but also expecting capitalist countries to help her build socialism. It is 
wishful thinking to imagine that this could happen. Worst still, some capitalist 
institutions which would facilitate the rapid transformation of the economy such 
as a stock exchange were pre-empted because of the socialist policies. Since 
professional accountants in Tanzania are more conversant with the capitalist way 
of organising business enterprises, the alternative challenge facing them is to 
convince the leadership to adopt a system they understand and believe in.
The sooner the environment is restructured to be relevant to the regulatoiy 
approach or the regulatory approach restructured to be relevant to the 
environment the better. Otherwise the regulatoiy approach will continue to be 
alien to its environment for a long time to come. Fortunately, there are signs that 
the environment is undergoing serious transformations which are consistent with 
the current regulatory approach (Malima, 1992).
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCLOSURE THEORY AND PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH.
5.1 INTRODUCTION:
The objective of this chapter is to discuss disclosure theory and prior empirical 
research in this area. There is general agreement that corporate information 
disclosure is not random. There are specific factors which influence corporate 
information disclosure practices. This chapter discusses these factors and also sets 
out the hypothesis for investigation.
The chapter is divided into ten sections. The next section examines general issues 
in corporate information disclosure. This is followed by a debate on free market, 
regulatory approaches to financial reporting qualitative aspects of corporate 
disclosures and the dependent variables under investigation. Section seven 
discusses major factors affecting corporate information disclosure practices. 
Obstacles to corporate information disclosures are discussed in section eight. 
Section nine reviews prior empirical research in this area while the last section 
sets out the hypothesis for investigation.
5.2 DISCLOSURE THEORY.
Corporate information disclosure incorporates the entire system for providing 
corporate information to interested parties. Foster (1986) and NBAA (1983) have 
identified the following interested parties:
52.1). Shareholders and potential shareholders need corporate information 
for investment decisions and for monitoring the 
stewardship role of management. Investors require information 
which may enable them to identity mispriced securities. Firm-,
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industry- and economy-related information is likely to be useful in 
this regard. But shareholders are likely to examine information 
relating to trends in prices, trading volume and other such information. 
It has been argued, however, that the potential benefits of CARs for 
investment decisions is limited (Ball and Brown, 1968; Kaplan and 
Ron, 1972; Brealey and Myers, 1984). They argue that it is unlikely 
that investors would obtain superior insights about the future 
prospects of a firm relative to that already implicit in the current 
securities prices.
However, even those who believe in the market efficiency hypothesis 
also agree that in a well functioning market, the returns are 
consistent with the efforts made. Thus Hines (1982 p306) argues 
that an investor with superior interpretive or predictive abilities 
would not be prohibited from using the annual reports (probably 
together with other information) to eam abnormal return simply 
because most of the information disclosed in annual reports have been 
conveyed to the market by interim reports. CARs could still provide 
useful information for predicting firm-specific variables such as risk 
and dividend yield and also confirm previously released interim 
information and thus help to keep the market efficient (Ball, et al., 1978).
Shareholders may also need information on management's stewardship 
role. Such information may enable them to monitor and influence 
managerial behaviour. Management has considerable discretion over 
the use and disposition of companies resources. It may divert 
resources from the existing shareholders if it so wishes. This 
discretion provides a need for
- management contracts which can better align the interests of
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management and other stakeholders. There are two possible ways 
for doing this. These are stock options offers to management and 
tying executive compensation to performance. Stock options would 
ensure that managers would act to maximise the value of the 
firm while executive compensation tied to performance would 
induce managers to strive for the best performance.
- corporate information disclosure. Information on how 
management has used the companies resources may moderate their 
behaviour towards the use of corporate resources while 
information on management's track records may improve 
managerial attitude towards performance.
Investors may use corporate information directly or through the 
financial analysts and such other advisers. These advisers are likely 
to act as a pressure group for more information disclosure. However, 
there may be cases where, intuitively, they may pose obstacles to 
corporate information disclosure. Take a case of forecast information 
disclosure. Financial analysts are not likely to support such 
disclosures as this is likely to affect the demand for their services.
522). Managers may also use corporate information. In situations 
where management contract or compensation scheme is tied to 
financial statement's variables, managers themselves are likely to 
press for more timely information disclosure. They may 
also need corporate information to facilitate their own financing 
investing and operating decisions. Decisions to seek long-term debt 
finance, for example; may depend on some financial statements' 
variables such as debt-equity and interest coverage ratios.
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5.2.3). Employees are likely to require assurance on the continued 
ability of the employer to employ them. In this regard, they 
would like to have information relating to current and future 
profitability and solvency. They would also like information items 
which enable them to establish and monitor the viability of their 
pension plans. They may require corporate information for yet another 
reason. In situations where their compensation is tied to financial 
statement variables, they may require CARs to enable them to 
establish what is due to them.
5.2.4). Lenders and other suppliers of factor inputs may also need 
corporate information to enable them to decide whether to grant 
credit and the terms of such credit. Many bankers have standard 
evaluation procedures that require information relating to liquidity, 
leverage, profitability and the like ( Rwegasira, 1978; Foster, 1986). 
Corporate information available may enable them to decide on the 
amount to loan, the level of interest to change and the security to 
demand in support of a loan. Once the credit is extended, banks may 
need financial statements to monitor terms of the agreement.
52.5). Customers would wish to be assured of continued flow of supplies. 
They would therefore like to establish the financial viability of firms 
with which they have long-term relationship. They would also like to
be assured that long term commitments by suppliers such as 
guarantees and warranties are likely to be honoured.
52.6). Governments and their regulatoiy agencies require corporate 
information for many reasons (Briston, 1984; Foster, 1986; Wallace, 
1987):
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- to determine whether corporations are paying the right amount of 
taxes.
- to monitor firms performing government contracts on a cost plus 
pricing basis in order to establish that companies engaged in 
government's business do not eam excessive profits.
- to facilitate regulation of the economy.
- Most third world countries lack the technological capacity to utilise 
resources they posses. The governments would therefore like to 
monitor the rate at which they acquire capacity to utilise their own 
domestic resources and also monitor the rate at which domestic 
corporations are penetrating international markets.
- to enable governments to decide whether or not to guarantee 
corporate loans and subsequently monitor whether debtor 
corporations conform to the terms of the agreement
- For socialist policies, market failure arguments or lack of 
indigenous entrepreneurs to undertake required investments, 
governments may participate directly in the corporate equity 
investments as a shareholder.
Many parties are therefore interested in corporate information. Foster (1986) has 
pointed out three factors which make CARs a more preferred medium of corporate 
information disclosure;
- it discloses variables which are of direct interest to many parties;
- it is a more reliable source because of the audit function and the 
legal protection afforded by law in most countries;
- it is a cheaper source. The cost of preparing special reports to 
different users may exceed the anticipated benefits.
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Foster (1986) argued that the ability of CARs to reduce uncertainty about future 
cash flows and the availability of alternative sources of corporate information are 
two factors which may influence users' demand for CARs. Compared with 
alternative sources1, CARs appear to be the most important media of corporate 
information disclosure among investors and financial analysts. In the survey they 
conducted among individual and institutional investors and financial analysts in 
the UK, US and New Zealand, Chang Most and Brain (1983) concluded that CARs 
were the most important medium. It was the source which ranked the highest. 
However, their findings should be interpreted with caution given the bias which 
may have resulted from the non response rate2 and the hypothetical nature of the 
research setting - the incentive of individual respondents to misrepresent their 
preferences were not explicitly considered. Wallace (1987 p28) also found CARs to 
rank the highest as a source of corporate information in Nigeria. The idea that 
CAR is the most important source of corporate information has been supported by 
academicians and practitioners alike, including Rwegasira, (1978) and Kilimba 
and Kitilya, (1980) in Tanzania; Firth, (1980) in U. K and U. S. A and Chang et al. 
(1983) in New Zealand and U. K.
The importance of financial reports has led to two opposing schools of thoughts. 
One school argues that CARs are so important that managers would disclose all 
significant information without coercion. Their importance ensures that there are 
adequate forces to ensure this. The other school argues that the only way to ensure 
the full benefits of adequate corporate information disclosure is to regulate 
financial reporting The following section examines the arguments in favour of 
the free market approach to financial reporting
Alternative sources of corporate information varies from tips and rumours, advice 
of friends and personal connections, direct communication with management, 
prospectuses, corporate press release, proxy statements, newspapers and magazines, 
advisory services, stockbroker s advice, to corporate interim reports.
2The response rate for this study varied from 21.3% for U.K. individual investors to 
43.4% for New Zealand financial analysts.
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5.3 THE FREE MARKET APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REPORTING
Economists have long argued that market forces are capable of allocating resources 
efficiently and provide for the individual's freedom to choose. Individuals will 
express their preferences (cast their votes) through the market system without any 
coercion or violation of individual's freedom (Friedman and Friedman, 1980). The 
resulting price transmits information to all participants in the market. Organised 
markets of today have enormously facilitated this transmission of information. 
Anything preventing prices from expressing freely the conditions of demand or 
supply interferes with the transmission of accurate information.
It is argued further that efficient transmission of information alone is a waste of 
resources. Those receiving the transmitted information must have the incentive 
and ability to act on it. The beauty of the market system is that the price which 
brings the information also provides an incentive to act on it (Friedman and 
Friedman, 1980 p37). It provides both information on demand and how to act 
efficiently to meet the demand. So long as the price offered is higher than the 
marginal cost, the producers will continue producing. Producers will maximize 
their benefits at a point where price or marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
To obtain the most out of the market system, it ought to be completely free. All 
actors should be free to enter or to exit the market They should all be price takers. 
All should have a perfect knowledge of the market and transaction costs should 
not distort the efficient functioning of the market.
The argument for free markets is carried to the provision of accounting 
informatioa Accounting information is considered similar to any other economic
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good (Benston, 1976). Corporate management and financial analysts3 are producers 
of this good. Consumers are those who are using accounting information in their 
decision making process.
Both consumers and suppliers of accounting information have incentives to trade 
in this product Consumers need information for their decisions and are therefore 
prepared to pay for it. This derived demand creates a price for it. Benston (1976) 
maintains that, the maricet for accounting information will allocate it efficiently. It 
will ensure that optimum quality and quantity of information is available at a 
right price to all who need it.
The price offered for accounting information is not the only incentive inducing 
disclosure. Shareholders have incentives to ensure that all available information 
is released and impounded in the share prices. Since accounting information is 
used in trading decisions, disclosure of such information should enable them to 
realize gains on their holdings.
Suppliers of accounting information have other incentives too. They would like to 
attract economic resources to their corporations at a reasonable cost. Information 
they release may have beneficial effects on economic indicators such as share 
prices. This may afford them access to resources at a reasonable cost. Managers are 
likely to disclose information in order to pre-empt takeover bids. Finally, 
information disclosure may have positive effects on their human capital. Human 
capital changes with the perception of those using accounting information to 
establish corporate performance. Information disclosed may enable them to get 
higher bonuses and perhaps more easily obtain alternative employment. The 
problem is that managers may not be willing to supply enough infbrmatioa
financial analysts re-analyze the accounting information to provide better 
insights.
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Supporters of the free market approach to financial reporting assert that this 
problem can easily be solved through the agency theoiy (Jensen and Meclding; 
1976).
The agency theory as propounded by Jensen and Meclding (1976) and Fama (1980) 
assumes people act in self-interest to maximise their personal benefits. It also 
assumes that firms are nexus of contracts between various stakeholders. The 
principal uses the contract to create incentives for the agent to act in his interest or 
develops a costly monitoring device While the monitoring costs are incurred by 
the principal, the bonding costs are met by the agent The theory suggests that the 
agent will readily provide information required for monitoring purposes in order 
to minimise the bonding costs. The theory has, however, been criticised by Puxty, 
(1985); Tinker, (1985); Merino and Neimark (1985) and Tinker, et al. (1985) on the 
following grounds:
- the theory fails to explain maricet imperfections.
- it is an ideological statement rather than an objective statement 
about the nature of man.
- the competitive labour market assumed is, perhaps nonexistent in the 
real world.
- shareholders are known to be less effective in policing and monitoring 
their interest than the theoiy assumes.
If the market for accounting information is perfectly competitive and using Pareto 
optimality as the objective, there would be no case for regulation of financial 
reporting. However, although few deny the weaknesses of the free market 
approach to financial reporting opinion is sharply divided on the need for 
accounting regulation. These arguments are presented in the next section.
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5.4 THE NEED FOR REGULATION OF FINANCIAL REPORTING:
In the first place, the market for accounting information is not perfectly 
competitive and does not produce an efficient outcome. Regulation of financial 
reporting is considered necessaiy to make the outcome of the operations more 
efficient Existence of externalities in the market is one possible cause for market 
failures. The public nature of accounting information means that supplying it to 
one participant will confer benefits to all participants simultaneously and 
indiscriminately. Gonedes and Dopuch (1974) point out that this positive 
externality (that is, third parties benefit without paying for it) would lead to less 
than socially desirable levels of accounting information.
In the second places the Pareto optimality criterion may not be satisfactory on 
equity grounds. There may be a number of efficient outcomes which the operation 
of the market can produce. On grounds of equity, one of the outcomes may be 
prefered to the others. Regulation may be necessaiy to ensure that the most 
equitable outcome is obtained. Consider, for example a situation where market 
forces lead to uneven possession of information among investors. Well informed 
investors may 'exploit* poorly informed ones. Hence they must be protected by 
regulating the market.
Assuming there are market failures and lack of equity, can regulation improve the 
situation? Those who argue against regulation question the ability of regulators to 
come up with better solutions. They raise two critical issues in this regard:
- Can the regulator determine the competitive or equitable 
solution?
- Assuming he can, is he motivated to take action which will 
approximate that solution? Intuitively, it is difficult to see 
why regulators would act in the public interest when all
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operators in the market are assumed to act in their own self- 
interest (Jensen and Meckling 1976)4.
Benston (1976) has summarised the arguments used to support accounting 
regulation 5. He pointed out that it is presumed that regulation of accounting 
information can lead to;
a), prevention of fraud, misappropriation and unfairness.
b). improved efficiency in the allocation of resources and the 
operation of the securities market.
c). improved government administration and availability of 
information for the general public and employees.
He concludes, however, that there was no evidence to support the idea that 
regulation of financial reporting leads to these presumed benefits. He aigues that 
fraud existed before the introduction of regulation, it still exists today. Misleading 
financial statements are not a serious problem as the market cannot be fooled. 
While perhaps Benston's (1976) arguments may hold in that the market may see 
through "cosmetic" differences, it may be argued that it can be "fooled" by 
inadequate informatioa
The other arguments Benston used to support his position are also themselves 
questionable. Take his argument against regulation as a way of preventing fraud, 
misrepresentation and unfairness, for instance. He argues that auditors have a 
powerful incentive to report dishonest managers as auditors' integrity is the most 
valuable asset they have. Question the auditor's integrity and his livelihood is 
endangered. What Benston forgets is the fact that it is within the regulatoiy 
framework that the auditors' credibility may be called to question. Without the
^Supporters of free market approach believe in the agency theory. They use this 
theory to support their position that all actors in this market have incentives to 
supply the required information.
^Benston does not believe in accounting regulation.
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explicit legal provisions auditors may lack power or even the desire to report fully 
on the managers. Accounting regulation is necessary to establish the auditors' legal 
obligations and the framework within which his work can be supported and 
monitored.
Benston also doubts the utility of financial reports for investment decisions as the 
economic value of firms are based on the present value of cash flows or the 
current market value of assets and not the accounting figures. What he fails to 
consider is the relationship between those market values or estimates and the 
accounting reports. Accounting numbers provide useful data for estimating the 
cash flows and market values. Without credible accounting figures the forecasts 
and estimates are also likely to be misleading. Moreover, accounting reports 
confirm the information obtained through other less credible sources of corporate 
information and provide means of assessing expectations. The audit report 
confirms the credibility of management. AH in all, the accounting report plays a 
significant role in generating the confidence necessaiy for share trading.
Phillips and Zecher (1980) also examined the beneficial effects of disclosure 
regulation. They argued that it would only be beneficial to investors if it can 
improve the pricing mechanism for securities. They, however, found no evidence 
to support the existence of such an effect.
Chow (1983), in his award winning paper, investigated how the accounting 
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts of the U. S. A  affected investor's 
wealth around the time of their enactment. He concluded that the Act reduced the 
shareholders wealth through inter-firm wealth transfers, out-of-pocket compliance 
costs and reduced opportunity sets. His methodology has, however, been criticised 
by Merino, et al. (1987). They argue that Chow's study lacked a control group, had 
an unsubstantiated test period and misclassified events during the test period.
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From economics literature, regulation of accounting information may be justified 
on grounds of market failures or equity. Regulations may only be justified when 
the benefits of regulation exceeds the costs. As the benefits and costs of regulations 
are difficult to identify and quantify, a case in favour of regulation can never be 
proved to the satisfaction of all.
Moreover, efficiency is not the only criterion for making social decisions. The 
existence of an institutionalised legal system presupposes that the need for 
regulation in the society has been established. The purpose of law is to provide 
justice. Whenever there is dissatisfaction with the outcome of the market, the law 
is called into operatioa
Public choice theory ( Posner 1974) may also explain the existence of the regulation 
of financial reporting. It is argued that every regulation re-allocates resources and 
by so doing makes some groups richer and others poorer. Individuals affected by 
regulation must organise themselves to bid for or against the regulation. Political 
process is an important means through which mankind can pursue its own self- 
interests. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) have argued that, in a regulated economy, 
political process is used to achieve wealth transfers. Accounting theory is then 
used or exists to provide rationale or excuses to support the courses of action 
desired by various groups in the economy.
Consider the accounting profession in the U. K., for instance. They set-up the ASC 
in 1969 in order to define accounting concepts* to narrow differences in financial 
reporting and to codify generally accepted accounting standards in the name of 
public interest. Gray (1987) observes that the ASC soon found itself caught in the 
web of controls and constraints of those it purported to regulate.
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Public choice theory suggests that regulations tend to subsidise relatively small, 
well-organised groups that have a high per capita financial stake in the regulation. 
Economic regulation is thus a tax, justified as furthering the public interest, but 
ultimately having the effect of re-allocating resources within the community. It 
appears that those who enjoy increased demand for their services - financial 
accountants, auditors, tax consultants* etc; tend to benefit most from the regulation 
of financial reporting.
Despite the divided opinion, financial reporting regulation is likely to remain in 
place. Financial reporting regulation in Tanzania was discussed in chapter four. 
The rest of this chapter will define what is meant by quality of corporate 
information disclosure and how these qualitative aspects are measured and 
captured for purposes of this study. The chapter will then move on to examine 
factors which are likely to influence corporate disclosure practices and prior 
research on these factors.
5.5) QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURES.
Several studies have identified qualitative aspects of CARs (e.g. PeasneH, 1974;
ASC, 1975; Stamp, 1980; Burton, 1976 and Gray, 1976). The most significant qualities 
of CARs identified are relevance, completeness, timeliness, reliability and 
comparability.
55.1) Relevance and completeness:
Users expect relevant corporate information which would improve their ability to 
predict and forecast the future. Relevant information is expected to influence 
users' decisions. It is important, therefore, for CARs to contain information 
relevant to users needs. They are also expected to be complete in the sense that
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they cover all important aspects of corporate activities. The completeness of CARs 
in terms of the extent of information disclosure could be captured by both the 
extent of mandatoiy disclosures and extent of voluntary disclosures. Most studies 
concentrate on the extent of voluntaiy disclosures (e.g. Cerf, 1961; Singjwi, 1967; 
1968; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Wallace, 1987). One reason for the interest in 
voluntary disclosure practices is the ability of this variable to capture factors which 
induce or deter corporations from disclosing information. The other reason is the 
assumption that mandatory disclosures would be disclosed, anyway. Some of these 
studies draw conclusions on the quality of corporate disclosures purely on the basis 
of the extent of voluntary information.
Yet the few studies which have examined the extent of mandatory disclosures 
have shown that such requirements are not necessarily complied with (Ernst and 
Whinney, 1979; Ingram and Copeland, 1980; Hiramatsu,1990 and Tai, et al., 1990). 
Ingram and Copeland, for instance, found that municipal authorities in the U.S.A 
disclose very little mandatory information. Tai et al. (1990) found major departures 
from statutory requirements by companies listed on the Hong Kong stock 
exchange. Hiramatsu (1990) observed a general non-compliance with the Japanese 
commercial code on disclosure requirements. In light of these observations it 
would be insufficient to draw conclusions on the quality of disclosure practices 
without observing the extent of compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements. This is likely to be especially so in developing countries such as 
Tanzania where the enforcement mechanisms are likely to be less effective than in 
many developed countries.
There is a third aspect of relevance of corporate information. This is the timeliness 
of corporate information disclosure. Information loses it capacity to influence 
decisions with time. Givoly and Palmon (1982) found the price reaction to the 
disclosure of early announcements to be significantly more pronounced than the
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reaction to late announcements suggesting a decrease in information content as 
the reporting lag increases. It is, therefore, important that CARs are released to the 
public soon after the end of accounting period. The longer it takes before 
accounting information is released to the users the less relevant it becomes for 
decision making In order to draw any valid conclusion on quality of disclosure 
practices, one has, therefore, to observe the timeliness of financial reporting as 
well. Prior studies have investigated the quality of disclosure practices without 
reference to the timeliness of corporate disclosures.
5.5.2). Reliability and Comparability of Corporate Information:
The other qualitative aspects of corporate information disclosure are reliability and 
comparability. Corporate information has to be comparable over time and between 
similar companies. The users of CARs must be confident that the reports contain 
reliable and comparable information. Realising the importance of these aspects, 
the accounting profession introduced the auditing function to cater for this need.
Auditors examine financial records and evidence underlying the financial 
statements. They then issue audit reports to accompany CARs. Their main role is 
to assure the users of the quality of CARs. The audit report may cany one of the 
five possible professional opinions. Auditors may issue a clean opinion where all 
professional and statutory requirements are complied with and the resulting CARs 
present an accurate picture of the financial position and results of operations. They 
may issue ‘subject to' opinions in situations where there is a significant 
uncertainty surrounding the reporting information. The auditors may, for 
example, fail to attend the annual physical stock-taking In such a situation, they 
may not be certain about the validity of the reported stock figure. They may have 
to point this fact out in their audit reports.
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The third type of audit opinion is given where there is significant disagreement 
over the treatment of certain reported information. The disagreement may be over 
professional or statutoiy requirements. The auditors may also believe that the 
treatment of a given information item is such that the reported information 
distorts the true and fair view of what actually transpired. In such case, the 
auditors are expected to issue an 'except for' opinion.
The last two possibilities are disclaimer of opinion and negative opinion. Auditors 
may disclaim their opinion in cases where there is a fundamental uncertainty 
surrounding the reported informatioa The uncertainty may arise out of 
contingencies or failure to perform the required audit procedure. The difference 
between disclaimer of opinion and 'subject to' described above lies in the level of 
uncertainty involved. In situations where the opinion is disclaimed, the level of 
uncertainty is so fundamental that if the unexpected happens, the actual picture 
will be totally different from the one presented in the CARs.
A negative audit opinion is issued where there is a fundamental disagreement 
between the auditors and the client. In this particular case, the auditor believes that 
the CAR presents a misleading picture of the financial position and the results of 
operations.
It may be concluded that the auditors' major role is to examine the various 
qualitative aspects of the CARs and assure the users of CARs of the reliability of 
the reported information. It would seem appropriate that any study of quality of 
corporate disclosures would consider the type of audit opinion expressed in the 
CARs. This is valid conclusion in light of findings that type of audit report is not 
random (Warren, 1975; 1980; Chow, 1983; DeAngelo, 1982). Warren (1975,1980), for 
example, found type of audit opinion to be related to size (measured by turnover). 
Larger firms had lower proportions of audit qualifications than smaller firms. He
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conjectured that this was due to larger firms' ability to 'capture' auditors. He also 
found companies reporting losses to have slightly lower proportion of 
qualifications than those reporting profits. Chow (1983) found that a major 
determinant of the likelihood of receiving an audit qualification was the presence 
of unexpected changes in earnings. There has, however, been little empirical work 
relating to type of audit report on developing countries.
In drawing conclusions on the qualitative aspects of corporate disclosures, it 
appears from the preceding arguments that there is more to quality than the extent 
of voluntary information disclosure. Any study on the quality of corporate 
disclosure practices must investigate the reliability, the relevance, timeliness and 
completeness of corporate disclosures. It is argued that four variables are needed to 
capture the quality of corporate disclosure practices. These are the extent of 
voluntary disclosures, extent of mandatory disclosures, timeliness of disclosures 
and the type of audit opinion expressed on the CAR. Past studies have used 
voluntary disclosure practices as a proxy for quality of corporate information 
disclosure. It could be argued that any one of the four measures could only be used 
as a proxy after proving a statistical relationship between them. Unless this 
relationship is established, conclusions drawn regarding the quality of corporate 
information disclosures based only on one measure would appear to be grossly 
inadequate. The relationship between the four measures of quality of corporate 
information disclosure is tested in this study and the results are presented in 
chapter seven.
5.6). DEPENDENT VARIABLES UNDER INVESTIGATION:
As discussed in the preceding section, the four dependent variables of interest to 
this study are the extent of mandatory disclosures, the extent of voluntary
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disclosures, the type of audit opinion and the timeliness of corporate information 
disclosures.
To capture the extent of disclosure^  two disclosure indexes are used. The first index 
consists of mandatoiy disclosure items. As pointed out above there is evidence to 
suggest that preparers of financial reports may not necessarily comply with 
mandatory disclosure requirements if such disclosures are not in their interest 
especially if the regulatory process is ineffective. They may also lack the ability to 
comply with certain requirements.
In Tanzania, the NBAA has the power to regulate the professional conduct and 
practice of its members, but has no powers over the board of directors. As stated 
earlier in chapter three, information disclosure is a corporate responsibility. 
Moreover, the Tanzania Audit Corporation is explicitly exempted from the NBAA 
regulations by section 39 of the Act which created the NBAA Yet, so far it relies on 
auditors to demand compliance with its requirements but there are no regulatory 
decisions based on the auditor's reports as revealed in chapter four. NBAA has not 
instituted any framework within which disclosure practices could be monitored. In 
short, therefore, apart from the legal confusion, NBAA has not put the legal 
provisions into practice - at least as far as disclosure requirements are concerned as 
was discussed in chapter four.
Section 39 of the Auditors and Accountants ( Registration) Act, 1972 empowers the 
NBAA to regulate the accounting profession and practice by issuing regulatory 
requirements. On the basis of this section, NBAA stipulated very extensive 
disclosure requirements. The aim of this research is to have an all inclusive list of 
these requirements. However, in order to be able to state exactly what proportion 
of requirements is disclosed without penalising some companies for non­
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disclosure of items which are irrelevant to their circumstances, some omissions 
were necessary.
a) where it was likely to be unclear from the CAR whether non-disclosure 
was an attempt by managers to avoid disclosing required
item or the absence of such an item to disclose. For example,
TSSAP 2 require that all material events subsequent to the 
balance sheet date be disclosed. Non-disclosure of these 
events may indicate that there were no such events rather 
than a deliberate attempt by management to avoid publicising 
such information. If it could not be confirmed from CARs 
which of the two possibilities apply, such an item was 
excluded from the index
b) Items which were considered trivial or immaterial in the 
light of the NBAA's stipulated user needs were also excluded.
As reported in chapter four, NBAA would like CARs to 
disclose information on profitability, solvency, operational 
efficiency, contribution of the company towards national 
goals and aspirations, management's fiduciary responsibility 
and accounting policies adopted. Any item which does not add 
much towards this end, such as specific individual items 
forming a breakdown of selling and distribution expenses, 
are considered immaterial. Inclusion of such immaterial
items might portray a distorted picture of corporate 
disclosure practices in Tanzania.
The first index has 88 disclosure items. The full list is presented as appendix 5.1.
The second index (see appendix 5.2) comprises the voluntaiy items. These are 
items considered relevant and useful in the light of the NBAA's specified
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information needs (NBAA, 1983), yet, have not been prescribed. While the first 
disclosure index is likely to explain the ability to comply with or the acceptance of 
the requirements and effectiveness of the regulatory process, this index is more 
likely to uncover the factors which induce or deter voluntary corporate 
information disclosures.
Two approaches were used to evolve items included in the second index; The 
first approach was an attempt to identify the users needs in a normative manner. 
This would, ideally, involve observing decisions made by users and then 
identifying items which might be useful for the decisions actually made. This may 
be difficult to carry out in practice because, it is not easy to define the decision 
models of users and the type of decisions to which the items of information are to 
be applied. Identification of a theory which may link information items to the 
decision making process is equally difficult. There is literature on the relevance of 
some information items to various aspects for which financial statements are used 
in developing countries. Enthoven, (1978); NBAA, (1980); Briston (1984); and 
Wallace, (1987) are examples of such a literature. This literature was consulted in 
the process of constructing this second index Secondly, attempts were also made to 
specify the users information needs through interviews in Tanzania as explained 
in chapter three. Performance variance analysis, corrective actions taken on the 
basis of variance analysis and Kiswahili translation of CARs are few examples of 
information items suggested by the interviewees.
The second index is composed of 44 items and is presented as appendix 5.2. The 
breakdown of the major categories of information items are presented in table 
5.6(a) below:
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Table 5.6(a): Main categories of voluntary information items, 
a) AID TQ. UNDERSTANDING. CARS;
1. Audit opinion on directors reports.
2. Anticipated economic environment.
3. Performance variance analysis.
4. line of business segments.
5. Geographical segments.
6. Turnover of each segment.
7. Contributions of each segment to profits.
8. Number of employees in each segment.
9. Operating costs incurred in each segment.
10. Comparative balance sheet of subsidiary company for two 
years.
11. Comparative income statement for two years.
12. Comparative statement of sources and application of funds 
for
two years (subsidiary companies).
13. Subsidiary company's directors reports.
14. Kiswahili version of annual reports.
b) Future Prospects:
1. Comparative value added statement for two years.
1 Amount spent on research and development (R&D).
3. R&D activities undertaken during the year.
4. Short term quantitative forecasts.
5. Longterm quantitative forecasts.
6. Anticipated economic environment.
7. Corporate objectives.
8. Targets set.
9. Performance variances analysis.
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10. Corrective action on performance variance analysis.
11. Amount spent on marketing activities.
12. Criteria for identifying and appraising projects.
13. Procedures for implementing and monitoring projects.
14. Terms of management contracts.
15. Qualification and experience of directors.
c) Administrative capabilities of management;
1. Audit opinion on timely recording of transactions.
2. R&D activities planned and undertaken during the year.
3. Short term quantitative forecasts.
4. Long term quantitative forecasts.
5. Corporate objectives.
6. Targets set.
7. Performance variance analysis.
8. Corrective action on performance variance analysis.
9. Criteria for identifying and appraising projects.
10. Procedures for implementing and monitoring projects.
11. Marketing activities undertaken during the year.
12. Qualification and experience of directors.
13. Qualification and experience of CEO.
14. Plans and actual transfer of technology.
15. Reasons for failure to comply with terms of management 
contract.
d) NATIONAL INTERESTS;
1. Comparative value added statement for two years.
2. Amount spent on R&D.
3. R&D activities planned and undertaken during the year.
4. Intra-group pricing policies.
5. Intra-group transfers.
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6. Short term quantitative forecasts.
7. Long term quantitative forecasts.
8. Corporate objectives.
9. Targets set.
10. Performance variance analysis.
11. Criteria for identifying and appraising projects.
12. Terms of management contracts.
13. Efforts to protect the environment.
14. Directors' other directorships.
15. Number of employees in the company.
16. Emoluments paid to the highest paid worker.
17.Amounts paid to the average woiker.
18. Amounts paid to the lowest paid employee.
19. Identity of shareholders.
20. Plans and actual transfer of technology.
21. A statement that management has complied with the terms of 
management contract.
22. Reasons for failure to comply with terms of management 
contracts.
23. Loans received in foreign currency.
24. Breakdown of the holding corporation's interest in subsidiary 
company.
To quantify the extent of disclosure, the items were equally weighted. Each item 
scores one if it is disclosed and zero if not disclosed. Other possibilities for 
assigning weights are:
a) subjective weights assigned by the researcher to different
information items (Singhvi and Desai, 1971).
b) replication of weights in previous studies (Barret, 1977;
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Marston, 1986).
c) preferences revealed by users' opinions (McNally, et al, 1977).
d) preferences revealed by preparers' opinion (Spero, 1979).
It is argued that different methods of assigning weights to individual information 
items lead to similar conclusions on the corporate attitude towards information 
disclosure (Spero, 1979). Different weighting schemes are probably not as important 
as the items selected because companies that view information disclosure 
positively will tend to disclose many items and thus attain high scores regardless 
of the specific weights attached.
However, given the nature of this research, some weighting schemes were seen to 
face obvious limitations. The use of preferences revealed by user's opinion would 
have extended the scope of this research, yet, the level of importance attached to 
each information item is likely to vary with the user, the industry, the 
environment and over time.
The use of preparer's opinion is somewhat tautological. It is the preparer's 
willingness to disclose information which is the focus of this research. Replication 
of weights in previous studies was not feasible as different items are included in 
this study. The more serious limitation of replication arises from the fact that the 
possible weights are environment specific. It was therefore decided to use equal 
weighting method in this study.
The other complication faced in the creation of the index resulted from the 
possibility that some items were not applicable to all companies. Consolidated 
income statement is a case in point. This item is only relevant to a group of 
companies. The assemblage of the disclosure indexes were, therefore, designed 
along the line suggested by Marston (1986), Wallace (1987) and Cooke (1989) as a
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way of getting around this problem. The index scores were calculated for each 
company and then converted to a percentage of the maximum possible score. By 
this transformation, it was possible to ensure that a company was not penalised for 
items which were not relevant to it. Specifically: a Maximum Disclosure Score 
(MD), Actual Disclosure Score (AD) and Disclosure Index (DI) were introduced for 
each company;
ME}n= Jfta,
*m=l
where MDm = Maximum mandatory disclosure score.
rim = number of information items in the mandatoiy index
Dim “ 0/ when im is a non-disclosure item (irrelevant
for the company).
Dim = when im is a disclosure item. 
nr
MIV =
i * = l
where MDv = Maximum Voluntaiy Disclosure Score.
nv = number of information items in the voluntary index
Div = 0, when iv is a non-disclosure item.
Div = 1, when iv is a disclosure item.
Am
AQn= SQm,
IflT^
Where ADm=Actual mandatory disclosure score for each company.
Dim when im is disclosed.
Dim = 0/ when im is not disclosed.
IV
a iv = i n * ,
iv=l
Whew ADv = Actual voluntary disclosure for each company.
Div = 1, when iv is disclosed.
Div = 0, when iv is not disclosed.
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The third dependent variable is the type of audit opinion. It is argued that the 
major role of auditing function is to fill the credibility gap (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; 
Meigs et al, 1969; Arens and Loebbecke, 1980). Auditors are expected by both the 
profession and the public to indicate the quality of CAR by the various type of 
opinion they offer on the financial statements. The possible audit opinions were 
ranked in a five-point scale (5 high quality, 1 low quality) as follows; 
clean opinion 5
‘exceptfor' opinion 4 
' subject to* opinion 3 
disclaimer of opinion 2 
negative opinion 1
The fourth dependent variable investigated was timeliness of annual reports. To 
capture this, the period between the end of accounting period and the date the 
audit report was signed was determined (to the nearest month) for each company. 
It was assumed that there was no significant time lag between the date auditors 
expressed an opinion on financial statements and the actual publication of CARs. 
Although this is still a conservative measure, it was not expected to present a 
serious problem in drawing conclusions given that most corporations adopt a 
quicker process of publishing CARs. They normally present typed and duplicated 
version of the CARs. As is presented later in chapter seven, only 22% of the CARs 
studied were actually printed. Furthermore, even those companies which get their 
CARs printed would be expected to make the typed versions public once they are 
audited.
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5.7). FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF CORPORATE INFORMATION 
DISCLOSURE:
Foster (1986) has summarised the factors influencing information disclosure in the 
diagram reproduced below:
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external parties
Decisions by 
firms
Regulatory
forces
Decisions by non firm  
information sources, 
fo r example, 
brokerage houses 
and industry trade 
associations
Fig, 5:1 Factors affecting information set available to 
external parties.
SOURCE: Forster (1986, p.24)
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Based on this figure, Foster (1986) argues that the information set available to the 
external parties depends on the regulatoiy forces and the market forces. The 
influence of the regulatoiy forces was the subject of the last chapter.
Three types of market forces are thought to influence the extent of corporate 
information disclosure:
5.7.1) Capital Market Forces;
Companies compete with each other in the capital market for financial resources 
available. They offer instruments for raising equity funds, preferred shares, bank 
loans, etc. The marketability of these instruments and the terms offered for such 
securities may depend on the level of corporate information disclosed about the 
offering firm. This may exert pressure on firms intending to raise capital to 
provide information required to facilitate decisions relating to the offered 
instruments. Standard and Poor's Corporation (1980) conducted research on 
municipal accounting. Interviews were conducted among different categories of 
investors. It concluded that the capital market may be imposing penalties in the 
form of higher interest cost where accounting and financial statements are 
substandard (Foster, 1986 p.32).
Given the uncertainty about the quality of their instruments (debt or equity), firms 
have incentives to supply a set of information that they believe will enable them 
to raise the required capital on the best available terms (Choi, 1973). Cooke (1989) 
provided several explanations in support of the capital need hypothesis. First, he 
argued that additional disclosures may attract new shareholders and in this way 
help to maintain a healthy demand for shares and a price that reflects more 
accurately the intrinsic value of the shares. Inadequate disclosure is likely to lead to 
mispriced shares which is likely to attract potential predators. Second, increased
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information is likely to reduce the risks involved and thereby lower the cost of 
capital. A lower cost of capital should afford corporations additional marginal 
projects because they become profitable as the cost of capital is reduced. Third, 
companies seeking capital in foreign markets are likely to disclose more 
information as they adjust to foreign customs to meet requirements of banks and 
other suppliers of capital. Lastly, following Watts and Zimmerman (1979), Cooke 
argued that companies might increase their disclosures in order to demonstrate 
that they acted in a socially responsible manner. Companies may be able to raise 
capital in the market because they acted more responsibly (see, for example, U. N., 
1991a).
However, this interest may also provide an incentive for misrepresentation. There 
are several mechanisms which are likely to reduce the likelihood of misrep­
resentation: First, firms issue several equity or debt offers over time. A short term 
gain due to financial misrepresentation could prove to be costly in the long run. 
Companies are more likely to be interested in maintaining credibility and 
reputation with the financial community so that the next time they visit the 
market they are not heavily penalised.
Secondly, managers are likely to be interested in maintaining their own credibility. 
Statements by managers whose credibility have been questioned are likely to be 
discounted heavily by the market. The labour market for managers is also likely to 
penalise individuals who are not perceived to be reliable in their dealings with the 
parties external to the firm. Agency theory ( Jensen and Meclding, 1976; Fama,
1980) seems to suggest that managers are likely to benefit from accurate 
information disclosure.
Thirdly, the auditors' opinion is an assurance of the credibility of CARs.
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Lastly, there is a constant threat of legal penalty for anyone who may attempt to 
defraud parties external to the firm. In Tanzania, for instance, CAP 212 [section 122 
(3)] states that;
“if any person being a director of a company fails to taken (Sic) all 
reasonable steps to secure compliance by the company with 
requirements of this section, or by his own wilful act been the 
cause of any default by company thereunder, he shall, in respect 
of each offence be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not 
exceeding four thousand shillings:. “
5.7.2) Labour Market forces:
Given discretion, management could make decisions that significantly reduce the 
value of the equity or debt components of the firm. They have incentives, 
however, to signal to the labour market that they will not take such actions (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Fama 1980). Managers behaving contrary to market 
expectations may not be hired, or if hired, may be paid lower salaries. The 
marketability of the managerial talents and changes in the promotion prospects, 
salary and other perquisites may provide enough incentives to deter unexpected 
behaviour.
5.73) Corporate Control Market Forces:
Managers are likely to prefer maintaining their ability to control financing 
investment and operating decisions. Any possible interference from outside, such 
as takeover battles, is likely to meet stiff resistance. Bradley (1980) examined the 
nature of inter-firm cash tender offers. His findings support the existence of a 
competitive market for corporate control in which the current target managers
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represent an important alternative to any takeover attempt. The price behaviour 
of the target shares revealed that the tender offer process generates a significant 
amount of new information concerning the value of the target resources. 
Management is therefore likely to disclose information that they perceive is likely 
to increase the likelihood of their retaining control.
5.8 BARRIERS TO CORPORATE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE:
Despite the above stated incentives for corporations to disclose adequate 
information, there are several factors which may hinder corporate information 
disclosure;
A) Corporate information needs to be accumulated and processed before it can be 
disclosed. This process is costly. The costs involved include the amount necessary 
to set-up an adequate accounting system, cost of personnel and equipment 
required, auditing costs and publication costs. For developing countries, this 
problem could be more complicated in the sense that the question ceases to be not 
only costs but also availability of the necessary resources. Modem data processing 
equipment and the personnel required to operate them may be lacking. Qualified 
and experienced accountants may not be available in any significant numbers. The 
NBAA (1989) conducted research to establish the state of accounts in the parastatal 
and government sectors. They reported that:
"Many of the parastatals whose accounts are in arrears have 
pointed out that lack of qualified staff is one of the significant 
reasons which led to the bad situation. This problem has gone 
to the extent that some parastatals of medium to large size 
operate their accounting system without a single 
professional accountant on their staff' (P. 39).
The NBAA did not, however, relate the number of accountants employed to the 
quality of reporting practices. If it is true that shortage of qualified accountants is a
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significant reason for the observed "bad situation" and it is also true that these 
companies face different degrees of this problem, then it is logical to expect the 
companies facing more critical accounting manpower problem to have poorer 
reporting practices.
Parry and Groves (1990) examined this issue with specific reference to Bangladesh. 
They came up with very surprising findings. They did not find any evidence to 
support an association between the number of qualified accountants employed and 
the quality of disclosure practices. However, their research suffers from several 
methodological weaknesses (Abayo and Roberts,1991).
B) The threat of litigation may also operate to reduce information disclosure. 
Consider the disclosure of financial forecasts, for example.
In an ex-post basis, the forecast may turn out to be overly optimistic or pessimistic 
Investors who might have relied on the financial forecast to make their 
investment decisions may use the incorrect forecast as a basis to sue management 
for whatever loss they might have incurred as a result of this decision.
C) Governments may expropriate wealth from corporate owners and redistribute 
the same to other parties in the society. CARs are one source of information 
governments may use to choose firms or industries which may be singled out for 
expropriation. Firms are likely, therefore, to choose accounting methods and 
disclosure practices which are likely to minimise their exposure to such political 
risks. They are more likely to disclose more information that provides evidence 
that the arguments used by those wishing to appropriate wealth from them are 
invalid. They may also aggregate information items such that their political risks 
are reduced.
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D) Firms are not likely to disclose any information which may give their 
competitors any competitive edge (Firth,1980). For example, a firm seeking 
financial resources from the capital markets to finance its new research program is 
likely to be tempted to disclose such information in order to obtain the required 
funds at the right price (given the risks involved). Yet disclosure of such 
information in the CAR is likely to reduce the lead time within which competitors 
learn about the developments in the firm. Trade Unions and other suppliers of 
factor inputs are likely to use information disclosed in the CARs to improve their 
bargaining power.
E) Corporate information disclosure may constrain managerial behaviour. 
Disclosure of corporate objectives, for instance, may put pressure on management 
to reject short-term projects with positive NPVs simply because their adoption is 
inconsistent with the publicly stated corporate objectives.
5.9 PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH:
Three prior research papers on the extent of corporate disclosures in Tanzania 
have been consulted (Kilimba and Kitilya, 1980; Sayore, 1980; and Mihyo 1986). All 
these papers focused on the parastatals. This is the first study to examine corporate 
disclosure practices in the private sector. Moreover, none of them looked at the 
factors which could possibly be associated with the extent of disclosure, although 
Mihyo (1986) conducted an interview on the possible factors explaining the 
timeliness of disclosure.
Kilimba and Kitilya (1980) intended to offer some guidance to the NBAA on 
disclosure regulation. They dealt with three themes, i.e., methods which could be 
used to facilitate adequate disclosures through the CARs; the possible techniques
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preparers of CARs could use to misrepresent information disclosure and the extent 
of corporate information disclosure in Tanzania between 1975 and 1977.
On the extent of disclosure, Kilimba and Kitilya (1980) used the extent of 
information disclosed by the National Development Corporation (NDC) group of 
companies as a case study. They constructed an index of disclosure comprising 38 
items. They found the extent of information disclosure to be only 18%. The items 
most readily disclosed were accounting policy on depreciation (80%); auditors' 
report (78%) and accounting policy on stock valuation (72%). The major 
limitation of this research is that facing any case study, in the sense that the 
external validity of the findings are severely limited.
The second study was that reported by Sayore (1980). He analysed disclosure 
practices of two parastatal organisations and concluded that corporate disclosure 
practices in the parastatal sector were inadequate. Below are the issues which led 
him to that conclusion;
- CARs were produced in insufficient numbers and distributed to the 
institutions and persons with whom they had business relations 
rather than the public libraries where they can be accessed by all. The 
remaining few were being sold at prices beyond a common man's 
reach.
- He also argued that the majority of potential users failed to access 
them because there were no Kiswahili translation. Since most people 
do not understand English, then it is most likely that they would not
be able to understand the contents of the CARs.
It could be argued that the problem here is not whether there is Kiswahili 
translation or whether the CARs are accessed by the public or not. There are two 
basicproblems with this argument;
- almost all the constituents Sayore is saying do not understand
139
English are probably not sophisticated enough to understand the 
contents of the CARs even if the Kiswahili versions are produced.
- there is lack of a mechanism or framework within which the public 
as such could participate in holding parastatal managers 
accountable. In the western economic system, where the press in 
general and the financial press in particular plays a key role in the 
accountability system, the investors have both the incentive and 
ability to act on such information. They may decide to sell, hold or 
purchase additional shares. Managers realising the danger that 
they may be starved of the required financial and other resources, 
are forced to behave accordingly.
- He found that parastatals disclosed inadequate information. He 
provided some examples of information items he expected to find that 
were not disclosed. These were group accounts, summary of the nature 
of operational problems faced during the period and steps taken to 
rectify them, plans and objectives set and the extent to which they 
have been achieved, ministerial directives received and the extent of 
their implementation and the planned programmes for the coming 
years. He found that most companies prefered disclosing only 'good news' 
and taking a congratulatory tone even when it was clear that the 
company was in serious financial difficulty.
The major limitation of Sayore's work is the lack of an adequate framework 
within which to draw conclusions. Ever since Cerf (1961) introduced the idea of a 
disclosure index into the accounting research, it has facilitated research on 
corporate information disclosure. It highlights the items disclosed and those not 
disclosed. The external validity of his findings was also limited by the case study 
approach the study adopted.
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Although Mihyo (1986) examined the period up-to 1985, he appeared to have been 
ignorant of the functions of the NBAA and completely unaware of the existence of 
TSSAPs. Thus one finds Mihyo advancing seriously false allegations;
- “There is absence of legal provisions compelling enterprises to dis­
close information about their operations." (p.255).
- "Nowhere in the law is any regulatoiy agency empowered to pass 
regulations governing the manner in which public enterprises' 
accounts should be compiled or the standards that should be used in 
the presentation of these accounts" (p.260).
- "Very few guidelines (sic) exists as regards how these accounts
should be compiled and their formats" (p.259).
Perhaps, the most serious limitation of Mihyo's work is the lack of explicitly stated 
research methodology. Thus one finds Mihyo coming-up with very bold and 
controversial statements but one fails to see how such conclusions are arrived at. 
The implicit methods found in his research report appear suspect. For example, in 
an effort to establish possible causes for the public enterprises' failure to submit the 
CARs to the parliament6, he interviewed twenty managers and reported that;
- 42% of the interviewees reported that this problem results from the 
the lack of guide-lines on the format and contents of CARs.
- 87% of the interviewees reported that the shortage of accountants 
was the major problem.
- 28% of the interviewees believe the failure to submit CARs to the 
parliament results from the delays in approving their annual budgets 
and development projects by the ministers.
- 4% of the interviewees reported that ministers have inside informa­
tion and therefore CARs would not serve any useful purpose.
6He found an average of only 19 companies submitting their CARs to the parliament 
between 1970 and 1980.
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While these are perhaps the reasons for untimely preparation of CARs by the 
public enterprises, the statistics presented appear suspect. Thus one finds 42% of 20 
managers to be 8.4 managers; 877c of 20 managers is 17.4 managers, etc!
Several other studies have examined the question of corporate disclosure of 
information and the possible factors to which they can be associated, both in the 
developed world and the developing countries. Cerf (1961) was the first to apply a 
scientific method to study corporate information disclosure. He constructed an 
index of disclosure which enabled him to quantify the extent of information 
disclosure. Using class means, Cerf established the fact that corporate information 
disclosure is not a random variable. He attempted to study the relationship 
between disclosure scores on the one hand and asset size, profitability, number of 
shareholders, earnings and dividend growth stability, product of the firm, degree 
of competition, industry, stage of development, auditors and characteristics of 
management on the other. He, however succeeded in quantifying and observing 
only the first four explanatory variables, i.e., asset size, profitability, number of 
shareholders and earnings and dividend growth stability. He found positive 
association between the disclosure scores and asset size, number of shareholders 
and profitability.
Singhvi (1967) identified the major limitation of Cerfs study to be his inability to 
perform statistical tests on the data. He therefore designed his research 
methodology to cater for this weakness. He also extended the list of explanatory 
variables and observed these factors in operation in a less developed country 
environment- India. The independent variables included in his study were size, 
profitability, frequency of external financing industry, audit firms, management 
characteristics, and listing status. He observed a positive association between 
disclosure scores and asset size, foreign management, and profitability. He did not, 
however, establish any association between type of auditors and quality of
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disclosures. He argued that this was because auditors were primarily concerned 
with statutory requirements only.
Singhvi's study may be criticized on three grounds. First, the information items 
included in the disclosure index were selected on the basis of their usefulness to 
investors. In the view of the general purpose nature of the CARs and the 
conflicting nature of information needs of the various users of CARs, it is perhaps 
not proper to draw conclusions on the quality of corporate disclosure practices on 
the basis of information items thus derived. Secondly, conclusions on the quality 
of corporate information disclosures were based merely on the extent of 
disclosures. Certainly, there is more to quality than the extent of information 
disclosure alone. More significantly, Singhvi (1967) performed statistical tests using 
t-tests and z-tests. These tests assign value to different figures while the nature of 
the disclosure scores constructed for this study were inherently ranks. One is 
therefore only in a position to say that disclosure scores of one company is better 
than the other without being able to say by how much more or less.
Since these two leading studies were carried out, a lot more studies have been 
conducted (e.g. Buzby, 1972; Stanga, 1976; Barret, 1977; Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978; 
Firth, 1979; 1980; and Cooke 1989) although only few studies have been conducted 
in less developed countries (Singhvi, 1968; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; and 
Wallace, 1987). Several factors have been found to be associated with extent of 
corporate information disclosure:
a) Company Size:
Company size was found to be associated with the extent of information disclosure 
by Cerf (1961); Singhvi (1967,1968); Singhvi and Desai (1971); Buzby (1972);
Belkaoui and Kahl (1978); Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Cooke (1989).
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To investigate the association between quality of disclosures and size, Singhvi 
(1967) captured the company size by the use of asset size (book value) and number 
of shareholders. He established a positive association between disclosure scores 
and asset size in India and U. S. A  Several reasons were given for this observation.
First, he argued that larger companies tend to accumulate and use similar 
information items for internal decisions while smaller firms are likely to collect 
and accumulate such information primarily for the annual reports. This makes 
disclosure costs a more severe constraint on smaller companies than the larger
ones.
Secondly, larger firms are likely to benefit more from information disclosure than 
the smaller ones. Larger firms are more likely to raise financial resources from the 
capital market than their smaller counterparts. They would therefore disclose 
more information as a way of promoting the marketability of their securities and 
raise the required financial resources at the appropriate cost. He also confirmed 
that there is a greater dispersion in the security prices of the firms which disclose 
less information. He therefore concluded that adequate information disclosure 
minimizes ignorance in the market and causes the market to more accurately 
reflect the true value of shares and hence the observed narrower price dispersion 
of securities of the corporations disclosing more information.
Thirdly, smaller firms are likely to be more sensitive to competitive threat than 
their larger counterparts. This is because it is relatively easier to squeeze the 
marginal firms out of the market.
Lastly, Larger firms are likely to have more shareholders than smaller ones. This is 
likely to place the organisation in more public eyes. Financial analysts are likely to 
exert more pressure for corporate information disclosure. The company itself is
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likely to pre-empt excessive pressure from regulatory agencies by disclosing more 
information.
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) also observed a positive association between 
corporate information disclosure and company size (measured by market value of 
equity plus book value of debt) in Mexico. They based their explanation for the 
observation in the agency theory framework. Following Jensen and Meclding 
(1976), they argued that the agency costs increases with the amount of outside 
capital. Since Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) showed that the proportion 
of outside capital tends to be higher for larger firms, the potential benefits of the 
shareholder-debtholders-manager contracting, including the extent of 
information disclosure, would tend to increase with size.
Cooke (1989) investigated the extent of voluntary disclosure and the relationship 
between this extent and a number of firm-specific characteristics7 in corporate 
annual reports of unlisted and listed Swedish companies. He established a positive 
association between the extent of disclosure and size. He, however, observed 
further that asset size and number of shareholders were more likely to explain the 
variability in disclosure than was annual sales.
Wallace (1987) argued that company size may influence the extent of information 
disclosure but the direction of association can not be specified. He argued that all 
previous studies which specified direction were spurious. He offered two 
explanations for the negative association between corporate information 
disclosure and the company size. His first explanation is based in the Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) agency theory. It is surprising that agency theory could be used to 
explain non-disclosure of information because the basic message of the theory is
7He investigated multiple quotation, size, parent company relationship and 
industry.
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that the other parties would use their own means to obtain the same information 
managers are not disclosing. As managers have a comparative advantage in 
producing this information, they are likely to disclose information on their own in 
order to reduce the monitoring costs.
The second explanation Wallace offered is that larger firms are more likely to face 
more political risks than their smaller counterparts. He argued that larger firms are 
more likely to be subjected to social responsibility requirements, price regulations, 
higher corporate tax and even nationalisation. Their impact in the economy is 
more likely to increase the government and regulatoiy agencies' interest in their 
activities than their smaller counterparts. In the context of Nigeria, he argued that 
the indigenization programme is based on size. He concluded that larger firms are 
therefore more likely to employ a variety of techniques, including disclosing less 
information (contrary to the agency theory and and the normal political cost 
argument, see for example, Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) to blur their political 
visibility.
In the context of Tanzania, the normal political cost argument (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986) is more likely to be applicable. It may, therefore, be 
hypothesized that corporate information disclosure is likely to be positively 
associated with company size. The company size in this case is captured by both the 
book asset value and turnover. The Arusha Declaration meant that Tanzanian 
companies are particularly vulnerable to political risks. Through the Declaration, 
the government adopted a policy of owning the 'commanding heights' of the 
economy (Nyerere, 1971; 1977). This suggests that they were more concerned with 
the larger firms than the smaller ones. In response to this threat, larger firms have 
tended to adopt techniques which may help reduce this threat - including 
disclosing more information which would make the government believe that it is 
in its own interest not to expropriate them. They may also attempt to improve the
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quality of corporate disclosures in order to pre-empt the need for special reports by 
the regulatory agencies as these are likely to be more expensive to prepare.
The number of people requiring corporate information about a company may 
have an impact on the extent of corporate information disclosure. In the 
Tanzanian context, instead of using the number of shareholders as a proxy for 
number of people demanding information, it may be more meaningful to test for 
the number of loan sources as loan capital plays a more significant role in the 
financing system of the country as was discussed earlier in chapter three. The more 
the number of sources of loan capital, the more the number of people demanding 
corporate information on the company in question, and therefore the more likely 
it is that different information items would be demanded and the more likely it is 
that the regulatory agencies would press for more disclosures. It is expected 
therefore that corporate information disclosure is positively associated with the 
number of sources of loan capital.
b) Type of Corporate Governance:
Singhvi (1967) and Wallace (1987) found corporate information disclosure to be 
positively associated with foreign management. While Singhvi explained his 
findings in terms of the superiority of foreign management, Wallace argued that 
the observed association was due to the external influence. Singhvi argued that the 
observed difference was due to the fact that most foreign managers were 
professionals who were aware of the benefits of information disclosures, while 
Indian managers tended to lack management training as the employment criterion 
is based on the caste system and religious considerations rather than management 
training and experience. This inadequacy meant that the indigenous managers 
were not aware of the benefits to be derived from better disclosures. Wallace
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argued that the foreign elements meant that these companies were subjected to the 
requirements of different countries.
In the Tanzanian case, foreign managers are expected to be associated with better 
disclosure practices. Several reasons may be specified for this expectation. These 
may better be discussed from the perspective of the type of governance. Senkoro 
(1985) speaking in the context of disclosure regulation in Tanzania, argued that 
TSS APs placed emphasis on items which would make management's ability to 
maintain efficient operations transparent because most Tanzanian managers could 
be classified as manager trainees. This may be confirmed by the fact that the Faculty 
of Commerce and Management (University of Dar-Es-Salaam) was only 
established in 1979. The observation Singhvi found in India may be equally 
applicable for Tanzania. Secondly, most companies managed by foreign directors 
are subsidiaries of multinational corporations. These companies, therefore, 
indirectly seek their financial resources through the international capital markets. 
They are more likely to benefit from better information disclosures. Professional 
training and the wider experience of their managers is more likely to make them 
aware of the possible benefits of disclosures. But more significantly, it may be 
possible that their foreign connections may subject them to more extended 
information requirements and make them more politically sensitive as Wallace 
observed in Nigeria.
Most foreign directors are full-time executive directors who are appointed on the 
basis of their professional training and experience while their domestic 
counterparts are mostly part-time non-executive directors who are mostly civil 
servants and are appointed more for their political allegiance than their 
professional qualifications and experience. Mengi (1985), writing on the role of 
directors in the public sector, argued that some parastatal directors were 
themselves ignorant of corporate information. This view is supported by Kaijage
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(1985) who, quoting the case of GAPEX, voiced concern that parastatal directors 
may also be learning what is happening in their organisations through the press 
like outsiders. This may mean that these directors are less effective in supervising 
and directing corporate activities.
Parastatal directors remuneration are not tied to corporate performance. The 
meagre sitting allowance is unlikely to get them committed to corporate affairs. 
Directors' fees are paid directly to the employer, often a government department or 
another parastatal. It is possible to observe poor disclosure practices associated with 
parastatal corporate governance as part of general mismanagement in the public 
sector.
c) Financial Soundness of the Company
Fama and Miller (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Smith and Warner (1979) 
all argued that agency costs tend to be higher for firms with a higher proportion of 
debt in their capital structures. This suggests a positive relationship between the 
extent of corporate information disclosure and financial leverage. Chow and 
Wong-Baren (1987)8 investigated this relationship for the Mexican companies and 
no relationship was established. Belkaoui and Kahl (1974) and Wallace (1987) 
argued that financially stronger companies are more likely to be associated with 
better information disclosures.
In the context of Tanzania, a positive association between financial soundness and 
corporate information disclosure may be expected. Profitability may be used as 
measures for financial soundness. A positive association may be expected for 
several reasons. Profitability as measured by net profit before taxes to sales may be
^Financial leverage was measured by book value of debt divided by size. Size is 
measured by book value of total assets.
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used as a proxy for financial soundness in the sense that it measures the 
company's ability to absorb rising costs. It may be positively associated with 
corporate information disclosures for two reasons. First, ability to absorb rising 
costs implies also that the company is in a better position to cope with price 
competition. It is, therefore, unlikely that such companies will be sensitive to 
competitive threat. Fear of giving the company's competitors a competitive edge 
is less likely to hinder corporate information disclosure. Second, ability to absorb 
rising costs also implies ability to incur additional costs required to meet 
operational expenses, including costs necessary to accumulate, process and disclose 
corporate information.
d) Liquidity:
Corporate information disclosure may be associated with liquidity problems.
While Belkaoui and Kahl (1974) proved this relationship for the Canadian 
companies, Wallace (1987) argued that Nigerian companies cannot be 
discriminated on the basis of their liquidity ratios and, therefore, did not test this 
relationship.
Companies with higher current ratio are likely to be associated with better 
corporate disclosure practices. Current ratio measures the companies' ability to 
meet maturing obligations as they fall due. Companies facing liquidity problems 
are less likely, for example, to afford the costs necessaiy to audit and prepare CARs 
as soon as the year ends. This is likely to delay the publication of CARs. Companies 
in better liquidity are likely to disclose more information as a signal for the good 
news.
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e). Auditing firms:
Singhvi (1967) expected disclosure practices to vary with auditing firms. He argued 
that companies audited by larger audit firms are more likely to disclose more 
information because larger audit firms are more likely to demand more corporate 
information. He was surprised to discover that auditing firm size was not related 
to the corporate information disclosure. He explained his findings by concluding 
that auditors were mainly concerned with statutory requirements.
In the Tanzanian context, auditors' views on the disclosures in general may be 
important. Auditors must express an opinion as to whether the CARs show a true 
and fair view or true and correct view of the company's operations and financial 
position and whether they comply with the companies ordinance and the TSSAPs. 
Auditors may advise or influence companies in their decisions on disclosure 
policies beyond the required minimum.
There is evidence to suggest that while TSSAPs' disclosure requirements have 
been accepted by the international audit firms, they have not been accepted by the 
domestic auditors. For example, some international accounting firms issued 
comprehensive guide-lines on corporate disclosures immediately the TSSAPs 
were adopted in Tanzania. Contrast this to the fact that no similar general 
guidance has been issued by state-owned auditors, for example. In addition, the 
interview conducted with sources within the Tanzania Audit Corporation (TAC), 
revealed that the TSSAPs in general and the disclosures required in the directors 
report in particular, were not well received. They argued that the directors report 
was not approved by the governing board of the NBAA
Moreover, section 39 of the Accountants and Auditors (Registration) Act, 1972, 
empowers the NBAA to set the standards and regulation required to regulate
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accounting practice in the country but has exempted state-owned audit firms from 
these regulations. By virtue of this exemption, the NBAA cannot impose its will 
over the TAC or the Exchequer and Auditor-General.
In light of the above observations, companies audited by International Audit firms 
are expected to be associated with better corporate information disclosures.
f). Industry:
Wallace (1987) expected uniform disclosure practices among companies in the 
same industry. He argued that dominant firms tend to set standards other 
companies within the same industry may want to comply with. He, however, 
expected disclosure practices to vary between industries because information needs 
are industry specific Manufacturing firms, for instance, tend to communicate 
more environmental issues than, say, financial institutions. Since information 
disclosure depends on the demand for corporate information, variation among 
different industries was anticipated. However, data from a sample of Nigerian 
companies did not prove the existence of such a relationship. In Tanzania, it is 
expected that disclosure practices would be associated with the industry type 
because of differences in political costs and monitoring agencies. For example, 
financial institutions are considered to be of more strategic importance than, say, 
textiles manufacturing industry.
g) Good management
Singhvi and Desai (1971) argued that net profit to net worth may be used as a 
measure of good management and may be associated with the quality of corporate 
information disclosure. When this ratio is high management may disclose more 
detailed information to support the continuance of its position and compensation
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or to attract a better compensation scheme When this ratio is low, management is 
likely to disclose less information in order to cover up the reasons for die losses or 
the declining profits. Management may, for example, be reluctant to disclose 
segmental information when one or more of the divisions are making losses, 
preferring to disclose an aggregate profit figure only.
5.10 CONCLUSIONS:
Inligjit of prior empirical research in other parts of the world in general and 
developing countries in particular, the hypothesis may be set with specific 
reference to Tanzania The general null hypothesis adopted is that there are no 
associations between the quality of corporate disclosure practices and specific 
corporate characteristics. The alternative hypothesis is that there are associations 
between corporate attributes and the quality erf coiporate disclosure practices. More 
specific hypotheses are set in the following chapter.
CHAPTER SIX.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY,
6.1). INTRODUCTION:
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the procedures and activities undertaken 
in order to describe and identify the factors associated with disclosure practices in 
Tanzania. The chapter is divided into seven sections. The next section presents 
the research hypotheses under investigation. This is followed by a discussion of 
the sample design, problems faced at the implementation stage and solutions 
adopted in the actual sample selection.
Section four defines the nine explanatoiy variables and states how they were 
captured and measured. This section also selects the appropriate statistical tests for 
each hypothesis. Section five examines the relationship between the nine different 
variables in order to control for those which are closely correlated at the data 
analysis stage. This is followed by a discussion of the software package used.
Finally the main observations presented in this chapter are summarised in the 
last section.
6.2) RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES:
The main research questions were discussed in chapter one. The study investigated 
two main issues: the disclosure practices and factors to which they are associated in 
Tanzania. Research findings in India, Mexico and Nigeria (Singhvi, 1967,1968; 
Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Wallace, 1987), have revealed that disclosure 
practices are associated with specific corporate attributes. As discussed in chapter
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five specific hypotheses were, therefore, set in order to investigate these factors 
with specific reference to Tanzania The hypotheses are:
6.2.1. Ha The level of profits earned by corporations in Tanzania is
associated with disclosure practices
6.2.2. Ho: The type of accounting firm auditing CARs is associated with 
disclosure practices in the country.
62.3. Ha The type of corporate governance is associated with corporate 
disclosure practices
6.2.4. Ha Company size is associated with corporate disclosure 
practices
62.5. Ho: The number of qualified accountants employed is associated with 
corporate disclosure practices.
6.2.6. Ho: Industry type is related to the corporate disclosure practices.
6.2.7. Ho: The liquidity position of a company is associated with corporate 
disclosure practices
6.2.8. Ho: The number of sources of loan capital is associated with corporate 
disclosure practices.
6.2.9. Ho: The proportion of liquid assets in place is associated with 
corporate disclosure practices
How these corporate variables were defined and captured are discussed in section
6.4.
63) SAMPLE DESIGN:
To investigate disclosure practices in Tanzania, one possible approach is to 
investigate all possible media of disclosure by all economic entities in the country - 
a very expensive, time consuming and unnecessary effort. A sample of economic 
entities may be sufficient to facilitate conclusions. If a sample is chosen with
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adequate care, a clear picture of disclosure practices may be seen and relevant 
factors to which they are associated identified.
This research focuses on the Corporate Annual Reports (CARs) prepared by the 
sampled economic entities. No attempt was made to study the alternative modes 
of disclosure discussed in the last chapter. There are several reasons for this choice;
a) CARs are the most significant source of corporate information in 
Tanzania. They are accessible to all and contain a whole variety of 
information not generally disclosed in any other report. Apart from 
management audit reports ( for parastatal organisations), there is no 
specialised report filed regularly with any regulatory agency in the 
country. The annual report filed with the Registrar of Companies or 
Commissioner of Income Tax rely on CARs in so far as corporate 
information is concerned.
b) CARs are the most credible source of information. They are prepared 
on the basis of professional principles developed over a long period of 
time. The double entry system provides a strong check on accuracy.
Above all, auditors attest to their credibility.
The intention of this research was to draw a random sample from economic 
entities in Tanzania. A random sample was necessaiy in order to ensure the 
external validity of the findings and also to facilitate the planned data analysis. 
Economic entities were defined for the purposes of this research to include all 
entities whose major objective is to create wealth. As was discussed in chapter 
three, there is a general agreement that profit generation is equivalent to wealth 
creation. Therefore, economic entities as opposed to social institutions such as 
universities and hospitals were of interest to this study.
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There was a second reason for the interest in profit orientated companies. This 
study intended to test the capital market theoiy of corporate information 
disclosure. Tanzania provides a unique opportunity to test the capital market 
theory. Unlike most environments where resources are allocated on the basis of 
anticipated profits, resources are allocated administratively in Tanzania and are 
not necessarily directed where they can earn the most in terms of profits (price). 
Often there is a sympathy by politicians to subsidise loss making enterprises in the 
name of 'national interests' and other justifications not directly related to 
performance in terms of wealth creation (Ndulu, 1984; Sanare, 1986; Msambichaka 
and Bagachwa, 1983)
Economic entities in Tanzania are organised as sole proprietors, partnerships, 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs), domestic private sector 
companies and state-owned corporations (parastatals). Sole traders and 
partnerships are not legal entities and are not required to file annual reports by any 
agency in the country. As such, data availability and collection are likely to be more 
problematic and expensive. It is also possible that most of them do not even 
prepare annual reports. Sole traders and partnerships were, therefore, eliminated 
from the sampling frames.
The Registrar of Companies' register and the SCOPO's parastatal organisations 
directory were the two sampling frames used for selecting corporations whose 
annual reports were used in this investigation. However, the two sampling frames 
were of limited use because of lack of details on the companies involved. They are 
mainly lists of names and addresses. Details of company size and industry type 
were also required to allow for stratified sample selection. Size was an important
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factor because the NBAA regulatoiy requirements are based on size1. Industry was 
important because it was thought that disclosure practices would vary from one 
industry to another as was discussed in chapter five. This meant that initial larger 
simple random samples were drawn to facilitate subsequent stratification and 
further drawing of stratified samples.
Each sampling frame on its own was inadequate for the purposes of drawing a 
random sample of profit orientated companies in Tanzania. The Registrar’s list 
included only the companies incorporated under the companies ordinance (CAP 
212). Some parastatals are established through special Acts of Parliament and the 
Public Corporations Act, 1969 and are; therefore, not required to file their annual 
reports with the Registrar of Companies. SCOPO's directory contains the 
parastatals alone. Domestic private companies and the multinationals are not 
subsumed in this directory. This missing element problem in any one of the two 
sampling frames was solved by the use of both sampling frames.
Two hundred and forty-eight companies were initially selected from the Registrar 
of Companies filing system and seventy-three parastatals selected from the SCOPO 
directory. The selection process intended to achieve a simple random sample of 
profit-orientated companies in Tanzania. Thus, every ninetieth file was selected 
from the Registrar's filing system, the contents of the file carefully studied and a 
photocopy of the CAR taken where available. This procedure revealed other 
problems in the sample selection:
a) Some companies were included in the Registrar's register despite
1 Section 39 of the Accountants and Auditors (Registration) Act, 1972 empowers the 
NBAA to regulate accounting practice and the conduct of accountants in the 
country. However, part VI of the Act has specified that only entities with asset value 
exceeding 10M/= or turnover exceeding 5M/= are required to employ at least one 
authorised accountant or auditor. Since the NBAA was mainly meant to regulate 
professional conduct and practice, it follows that any entity with less than these 
requirements can escape the regulatory powers of the NBAA.
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the fact that they had been liquidated. Out of the 248 
companies in the initial simple random sample, four companies were 
found to have been liquidated. Nine companies were registered but 
were yet to start operating two companies were found to be non­
profit organisations and five companies filed foreign prepared CARs.
The existence of these phenomena meant that the two sampling 
frames contained elements which were not of interest. Twenty 
companies were therefore dropped from the sample. This 
reduced this initial simple random sample from 248 to 228 
companies. Of these remaining companies, a total of 98 companies2 
did not file their CARs with the Registrar of Companies as is 
required by law. This further reduced this simple random 
sample to 130 companies.
b) The use of two sampling frames implied that some parastatals could 
be drawn twice. Because of this anticipated problem, all parastatals 
incorporated under the companies ordinance (CAP 212) were 
eliminated from the second sampling frame. Parastatals 
incorporated under CAP 212 were easily identified by the fact that 
they cany the words "Company Ltd" as the last two words in their 
names. This reduced the second sampling frame from 406 
parastatals to 112. Some enterprises in this sampling frame could 
not be classified as profit seeking. Thirty nine parastatals were 
classified as non-profit seeking organisations. These were also 
eliminated. This reduced the population size to 73 companies. It was
20f these companies which did not file their CARs with the Registrar. 15 were 
parastatals (25% of all parastatals randomly selected from the Registrar's files), 32 
were MNCs (44% of all MNCs selected) and 50 were domestic private sector 
companies (45% of ail domestic private sector companies selected). While the rate of 
non-filing is more or less similar between MNCs and domestic private companies, a 
higher proportion of parastatals filed their CARs.
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decided to seek CARs from these parastatals.
c) Both sampling frames had insufficient information. It was, therefore, 
necessary to get some further information before selecting the final 
sample. CARs were obtained from the Registrar's files as 
discussed above or directly from parastatal offices and details of 
size and industry obtained before selecting the final sample. This 
process produced 149 CARs (64 parastatals, 54 domestic private 
sector companies, 26 MNCs and 5 joint-ventures). 37 companies were 
later considered to be too small. They had an asset size and turnover 
of less than the amounts which would make the NBAA's regulatory 
requirements binding as was discussed above. It was also found that 
one parastatal became operational in 1986. It was considered a 
special case and therefore removed from the sample. These further 
two adjustments left 210 companies in the sample (118 parastatals,
54 domestic companies, 33 MNCs and 5 joint-ventures); as shown in 
table 6.3(a).
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Table 6.3(a): Summary of the sample selection process.
par dspc mnc m+p total
Initial sample:
From Registrar's files 60 110 73 5 248
From SCOPO's directory 73 73
Total 133 110 73 5 321
deduct:
Non-filing companies (15) (50) (33) (98)
Companies not in operations (4) (5) (9)
Liguidated companies (2) (2) (4)
CARs obtained 118 54 33 5 210
deduct:
Non-profit companies (2) (2)
Filed foreign-prepared CARs (5) (5)
Considered too small (37) . (37)
Became operational in 1986 (1) (1)
Companies in 9 omitted industries (95) (3) (9) (107)
The sample 22 14 17 5 58
KEY: Par -  parastatals;
dspc -  domestic private sector companies;
mnc = multinational corporations;
m+p -  joint ventures between MNC and parastatals.
Having obtained these 210 CARs, information was now available to stratify the 
sample into industries on the basis of International Industrial Gassification. This 
process resulted in 14 industries identified below:
a) Distributions, Hotels, Catering and Repairs Service Industry;
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b) Chemical manufacturing Industry;
c) Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Industry,
d) Transport and Communications Industry,
e) Banking Finance^  Insurance and Business services;
f) Textiles manufacturing Industry,
g) Construction and Building Industry
h) Metal goods, Engineering and Vehicle Industries;
i) Non-Metallic mineral products;
j) Energy and Water Supplies industries;
k) Food, Drinks and Tobacco Manufacturing industries.
1) Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products.
m) Manufacture of leather and leather goods.
n) Timber and Wooden furniture Industries.
A simple random sample of 5 industries was drawn from these fourteen3. The 
lottery system was used to select the five industries. These are: Distribution, Hotels, 
Catering and Repairs; Chemical manufacturing industry Banking finance, 
Insurance and business services; Textiles manufacturing industry and Metal goods, 
Engineering and Vehicle Industries. This procedure resulted in 58 companies 
which formed the sample under investigation. The described sample selection 
process is summarised in table 63(a) above.
This study intended to study CARS for the year ending 1986. The two years gap was 
thought to be necessary to enable companies to get familiar with the disclosure 
requirements introduced in June 1983. However, some selected companies (files) 
had no CAR for the year ending 1986.8 companies had their CARs for the year 
ending 1985 but they were all audited in 1986 or later. 18 CARs were for the year
3This was necessary to reduce the sample size to a manageable proportion. The 
number five was determined arbitrarily.
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ending 1987. The rest (32) had their accounting period ending in 1986. The study, 
therefore, covered the period extending from 1985 to 1987.
6.4). EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND STATISTICAL TESTS:
According to Ryan, et al (1985), Daniel and Terrel (1986) and Siegel and Castellan 
(1988), the selection of appropriate statistical tests is based on the level of 
measurement or scaling employed in the operational definition of the variables 
involved, the particular hypotheses to be tested, the manner in which the sample 
scores or data was drawn and the nature of the population from which the sample 
was drawn.
On the level of measurement achieved, Siegel and Castellan (1988) identified four 
levels of measurements. In a nominal scale, the numbers or other symbols are 
employed simply to tell the difference or to group similar elements together. At 
the ordinal scale, the objects in one category are not only differentiated from the 
other categories, but the observers are able to see some land of relationship. They 
are able, for example, to tell which category is better than the other. The ordinal 
scale is said to be unique up-to monotonic transformations. Monotonic 
transformation is one which preserves the ordering of objects. Any transformation 
which does not change the ordering of the classes seems appropriate because it 
does not involve loss of any information. Thus Siegel and Castellan (1988) 
recommends the use of nonparametic or ranking statistics whenever the highest 
level of measurement achieved is ordinal.
The third level of measurement discused is the interval scale. At this level of 
measurement, the observer is not only in position to identify equivalent objects 
and specify which ones are greater or smaller but is also able to establish the ratio
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between any two intervals. That is, once the interval level of measurement is 
achieved, the numbers between any two numbers on the scale are meaningful.
The last level of measurements discussed is the ratio scale At this level of 
measurement, in addition to fulfilling all the conditions for the interval level, the 
researcher could establish the ratio between any two scale values.
In order to use parametric statistics, Siegel and Castellan (1988) have emphasised 
the need for the variables to have achieved at least an interval scale so that the 
researcher is able to meaningfully interpret the results obtained. They argue that in 
order to perform certain operations on numbers that have been assigned to 
observations, the structure of the method of assigning scores to the observations 
must be isomorphic to the numerical structure which includes these operations. 
The two systems are considered isomorphic if their structures are the same in the 
relations and operations they allow. To put this in the words of Siegel and 
Castellan (1988 p33>.
"the properties of an ordinal scale are not isomorphic to the 
numerical system known as arithmetic. When only the rank 
order of scores is known, means and standard deviation found 
on the scores themselves are m erro r ox m isleading to the extent 
that the successive intervals (distances between classes) on the 
scale are not equal and dot no t have substantive meaning When 
parametric statistical inferences are used with such data, any 
decisions about hypothesis are problematic Probability statements 
derived from the applications of parametric statistical tests to 
ordinal data may be in error when the variables do not satisfy the 
parametric assumptions. In as much as most measurements made 
by behavioural scientists culminate in nominal or ordinal scales, 
this point deserves strong emphasis."
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The position propounded by Siegel and Castellan (1988) is not universally accepted. 
Thus one finds, for example, Cooke (1989) using multi-regression analysis on data 
which was basically ranks. Marston and Shrives (1991) conducted a review of 
literature on the appropriateness of the use of parametric statistics on disclosure 
indexes. They quote three studies which support their position that the use of 
parametric statistics on ordinal data is permissible. The first study they consulted 
was the one by Gaito (1980). Gaito considered the ideas expressed by Siegel and 
Castellan as discussed above to be misconceptions. "Statistical procedures do not require 
specific scale properties. Numbers do not know where they came from.” While it is true that 
one can use any figure in a statistical test and obtain results, the interpretation of 
such results without reference to where the figures came from is likely to lead to 
erroneous conclusions.
More plausible quotations are perhaps the ones from Gregoire and Drivers (1987) 
and Davison and Sharma (1988). While the former provided empirical evidence 
showing that parametric test on ordinal data do not lead to great problems, the 
latter provided theoretical proof that there is no need for measurements to be on 
an interval scale if the assumptions of parametric tests are met.
On the basis of this evidence, the use of parametric statistics on ordinal data is 
perhaps acceptable. Since the objective of this research is to establish the strength of 
relationship between disclosure practices and the various explanatoiy variables, 
correlation analysis was considered a more appropriate procedure. Correlation 
analysis is a very powerful statistical test since it examines all information 
provided by all individual elements in the sample. Most other statistical tests 
concentrate on the few parameters. AN OVA, for example, examines only the 
variances and compares the mean of the sub-samples (Daniel and Terrel, 1986). 
Correlation analysis has, however, more restrictive conditions. The proper use of
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Pearson correlation coeffients' test would require that the distribution be free of 
outliers and that all variables (investigated and explanatory) used in the analysis 
be normally distributed.
These assumptions are tested for the explanatory variables in the following 
section. Where the assumptions are not met, Spearman's rank order correlation 
coefficient's are used. The level of significance are tested using the formula:
Z = rV n l
where r  ■ Spearman's rank order coefficient, 
n *  the sample size.
2 = normal probability value 
In situations where the explanatory variable is categorical as is the case of type of 
corporate governance, for example, Kruskal-Wallis one way analysis of variance by 
ranks is used. The distribution and nature of all explanatory variables are now 
examined in order to select appropriate statistical test for each hypothesis.
6.4.1). HYPOTHESIS 6.2.1: The Level Profits Earned by Corporations in Tanzania is 
Associated with Corporate Disclosure Practices.
In this hypothesis* the level of profits earned was measured and captured by two 
financial statements ratios: the net profit before tax but after interest to turnover 
(P/T) and net profit after tax to owners equity -including preference shares - (P/ E) 
ratios. Owners equity was defined as total assets owned by a company less total 
liabilities owed as reported in the financial statements. Only one adjustment was 
made to these figures. Since extraordinary items were not expected to have a long 
term impact on management attitude towards information disclosure, they were 
all eliminated from the reported profits.
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The net profit before tax to turnover ratio ranged from a minimum of -6.02 to a 
maximum of 0.92, with a mean of -0.117 and median of 0.06. A boxpiot^  in exhibit 
6.4.1(a) below revealed the existence of outliers in the distribution of P/T ratio. 
These outliers were re-checked to ensure that they were not due to data processing 
errors.
Exhibit 6.4.1(a): Boxpiot showing nature of distribution of profit before tax to turnover ratio.
0 0 0 **-+!-* *0
 +-------------- +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+P/TURN
-6 .0  -4 .5  -3 .0  -1 .5  0.0 1.5
It was also decided to check whether the P/T ratio is normally distributed. Normal 
probability plots were used for this purpose. If a variable is normally distributed, 
the normal distribution plots will exhibit a straight line, otherwise a curvature will 
be visible. As can be seen from exhibit 6.4.1(b) below, this ratio is not normally 
distributed as revealed by the lack of a straight line.
4Boxplots display the main features of a batch of data. The 
middle half of each batch is represented by a box and the median 
is marked with a V . The extent of the data and the location 
of possibly extraordinaiy values are indicated on either side of 
the box with special symbols.
In a boxpiot, dashed "whiskers" run from the hinges to the 
adjacent values on each side. Values between the inner and 
outer fences are possible outliers, and are plotted with a 
Values beyond the outer fences are probable outliers, and are 
plotted with a M (P.
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Exhibit 6.4.1(b): Normal probability plots for the P /T  ratio.
P /T  -
_ *  *
-  * * * * * * *
0.0+ * * * 2  3 43 4 * 2 3 *2 2 2 2 2 * 2
-2 .5+
-5 .0+
------------- +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+------------- Expected normal
-2 .0  -1 .0  0.0  1.0 2.0  distr. values
Since the distribution of P/T contained outliers and was not normally distributed, 
it was decided to use Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient's test rather 
than Pearson correlation coefficient's to test the association between the extent of 
mandatory disclosure; extent of voluntary disclosure and timeliness of disclosure 
on the one hand; and P/T ratio on the other. Correlation analysis was considered 
to be inappropriate for testing the relationship between P/T ratio and type of audit 
opinion. This is because of the nature of the distribution of the type of audit
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opinion discussed in the next chapter. As most companies received a clean audit 
opinion, there were too few non-ties in this variable. It was, therefore, decided to 
test the relationship between P/T ratio and type of audit opinion using Kruskal- 
Wallis test. The sample was divided into quartiles on the basis of P/T ratio. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test was used to test if the resulting four independent sub-samples 
were from similar populations. The results are presented in chapter eight.
Net profit after tax to owner's equity was another measure used to capture the 
level of profitability. Distribution of this ratio ranged from a lower of -1.32 to a 
maximum of 1.65 with a mean of 0.2106 and median of 0.115. The use of boxplots 
presented as exhibit 6.4.1(c) revealed the existence of outliers. These were double­
checked to ensure there were not due to data processing errors. Normal probability 
plots presented as exhibit 6.4.1(d) revealed that P/E ratio is not normally 
distributed since the plots are not on a straight line.
Exhibit 6.4.1(c): Boxpiot showing the nature distribution of profit after tax to owners equity ratio.
0 o  l + l * 000 0 0
 +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+--------------- +P/EQUITY
-1 .2 0  -0 .60  0.00 0.60 1.20 1.80
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Exhibit 6.4.1(d): Normal probability plots for the P/E ratio.
P/E -
1.0 +
2 3 * 3 * 3 * 2 2 * 2  
0.0+ * * * * 2 2  4222
- 1.0 +
 +-------------- +---------------+---------------+ ---------------+------------- Expected normal distr.
-2 .0  -1 .0  0 .0  1.0 2.0  values
Given the existence of outliers and a non-normal distribution, it was decided to 
use Spearman's rank correlation test to examine the relationship between the 
extent of mandatory disclosure, extent of voluntary disclosure and timeliness of 
disclosure on the one hand; and P/E ratio on the other.
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Oven the nature of distribution of type of audit opinion mentioned above, it was 
decided to use Kruskal-Wallis test to study the relationship between P/ E ratio and 
the type of audit opinioa The sample was divided into quartiles on the basis of 
P/ E ratio. Type of audit opinion of the resulting four independent sub-samples 
were tested if they all came from similar populations. The results are presented in 
Chapter eight.
6.4.2). HYPOTHESIS 6.2.2: The Type of Accounting Firms Auditing CARs is 
Associated With Disclosure Practices in the Countiy.
Accounting firms are classified into international firms; private domestic firms 
and state-owned firms. By 1986, there were a total of 110 accounting firms in the 
countiy, out of which one was a government department, two were parastatals, 
five were international firms and 103 were domestic private sector firms. In the 
sample under investigation, one company is audited by a government 
department, 26 by a parastatal, 17 by international audit firms and 14 by private 
sector domestic firms. For the purposes of this research, the office of Auditor 
General (a government department) was grouped as a parastatal. It was assumed 
that there is no substantial difference between TAC (a parastatal) and this office (a 
government department). It has always been a government policy that positions in 
the parastatals and civil service are interchangeable. SCOPO was essentially created 
to ensure that the remuneration package in the parastatals are not significantly 
different from the ones offered to civil servants. Furthermore, this government 
department audited only one company in the sample - TAG This classification is 
not expected to have any significant impact on the outcome of this research.
Since all the investigated variables were measured at the ordinal level it was 
decided to use Kruskal-Wallis test to study the relationship between the extent of 
mandatory disclosure, extent of voluntary disclosure, timeliness of disclosure and
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type of audit opinion on the one hand and type of accounting firm on the other. 
Choice of this test was also motivated by the fact that the explanatory variable was 
categorical in nature. The sample was, therefore, categorised into three groups on 
the basis of type of accounting firm providing audit services. Disclosure practices 
of the three independent sub-samples in terms of the the four measures of quality 
of disclosure practices were compared using Kruskal-Wallis test if they all came 
from similar parent populations. The results are presented in chapter eight.
6.4.3). HYPOTHESIS 6.2.3: Type of Corporate Governance Is Associated With 
Corporate Disclosure Practices in Tanzania:
Four types of corporate governance were identified, namely,
- parastatal corporate governance,
- international corporate governance,
- joint ventures and,
- domestic private sector corporate governance.
Parastatal corporate governance includes parastatals whose boards of directors are 
appointed and held accountable to the government of Tanzania. Joint ventures 
were parastatal organisations with international representation in their board of 
directors. The international representation in the board may have come about 
because of international participation in its equity or because of a management 
contract. International corporate governance includes those companies whose 
boards of directors are appointed and accountable to bodies outside the countiy. 
Domestic private sector corporate management is appointed and held accountable 
to the local private investors.
To scrutinise this hypothesis, the Kruskal-Wallis test was considered appropriate. 
The decision was based on the fact that this variable -type of corporate governance 
was categorical in nature while all the dependent variables were measured at 
ordinal level.
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The sample was divided into five groups according to the five identified types of 
corporate governance. Disclosure practices (type of audit opinion, timeliness of 
disclosures, extent of voluntary disclosure and extent of mandatory disclosure) of 
the resulting five independent groups were tested to determine if they all came 
from similar parent populations. Results are presented in chapter eight.
6.4.4). HYPOTHESIS 6.2.4: Company Size is Associated With Corporate Disclosure 
Practice:
Two measures of company size were used. These are the turnover and the value of 
total assets (fixed assets plus current assets, including intangible assets) as reported 
in the income statement and balance sheet respectively. No adjustments were 
made to the financial statement figures. Adjusting for revaluation of fixed assets 
was attempted. This, however, was not feasible as only 30 companies disclosed the 
necessary information for adjustment purposes.
The distribution of the total assets value was observed first. They ranged from a 
minimum of three million Tanzanian shillings (T/=) to a maximum of 60,474 
million/ =. The distribution was also observed using boxplots and normal 
probability plots. These are presented as exhibits 6.4.4(a) and 6.4.403) below.
Exhibit 6.4.4(a): Boxplots showing the nature of distribution of total asset value.
+ *0 0 0  0  
+-------------- +---------------+---------------+--------------- +---------------+----------asesize
0 12000 24000 36000 48000 60000
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Exhibit 6.4.4(b): Normal probability plots for total assets value.
ASSET SIZE 
60000+
40000+
20000+
0+ *  *  * * * * * * 2 * 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 * 2 * *
-------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+----------- Expected normal distr.
-2 .0  -1 .0  0.0 1.0 2.0  values.
From the boxplots presented in exhibit 6.4.4(a) above, it can be seen that the 
distribution is skewed to the right and that the sample contained outliers as far as 
total asset values are concerned. The normal probability plots presented in exhibit 
6.4.4(b) confirmed that this distribution is not normally distributed.
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Since the total assets value is a continuous variably Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient's test was performed to establish its association with extent of 
mandatory disclosures, extent of voluntaiy disclosures and timeliness of 
disclosure. Given the nature of distribution of type of audit opinion, it was 
considered inappropriate to study its associations through correlation analysis. 
Kruskal-Wallis test was considered a better test. The sample was divided into 
quartiles on the basis of the total asset value. Kruskal-Wallis test was then used to 
establish whether type of audit opinion of the four resulting independent groups 
were from the same population.
Turnover was also used as a measure of company size as was stated earlier. The 
turnover ranged from a minimum of 1 million /=  to a maximum of 6,720 
million/ = with mean of 542 million/ = and median of 87 million/ =. The boxplots 
presented as exhibits 6.4.4(c) below showed that some corporations were 
significantly different from the rest of the sample (outliers) in terms of turnover 
size. This motivated the re-checking of all figures to ensure that the presented 
figure were accurate.
The sample was then tested to find out whether it is normally distributed by the 
use of normal distribution plots. The results are presented as exhibit 6.4.4(d). Since 
the plots did not result in a straight line as can be seen in the exhibit below, it is 
concluded that the distribution is not normal.
Exhibit 6.4.4(c): Boxplots showing the nature distribution of the turnover.
1+ 1—  *  00 0 0 0 0 0
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+----------TURNOVER
0 1200 2400 3600 4800 6000
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Exhibit 6.4.4(d): Normal plots showing the nature of distribution of the turnover. 
TURNOVER
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-------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+----------Expected normal distr. values.
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Since the distribution was found not to be normally distributed and the fact that it 
contained the outliers led to the adoption of Spearman's rank correlation test as a 
tool for studying the relationship between turnover on the one hand and extent of 
voluntary disclosure, extent of mandatory disclosure and timeliness of disclosure. 
Kruskal-Wallis test was considered a better test for examining the relationship 
between type of audit opinion and the turnover. The sample was divided into 
quartiles on the basis of turnover. Kruskal-Wallis and %2-tests were used to see if
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the type of audit opinion of the resulting four independent groups came from 
similar populations.
6.4.5; HYPOTHESIS 625: Qualified Accountants Employed is Associated With 
Disclosure Practices:
Hypothesis 625 examines the relationship between qualified accountants 
employed and corporate information disclosure. As discussed in chapter 4, 
accounting personnel are categorized into lower-technidans, technicians, semi­
professionals and professional accountants. The evidence reported by the NBAA 
(1989) shows that only the last two categories are in critical short supply. This 
study therefore, concentrates on semi-professional and professional accountants 
who are registered by the NBAA To ascertain the number of qualified accountants 
employed by each company in the sample, the NBAA registers of approved and 
authorised accountants were consulted. These registers provide the names and 
work addresses of all registered accountants in Tanzania.
It was decided to investigate the relationship between the employment of qualified 
accountant and disclosure practices (as captured by the extent of mandatory 
disclosures, the extent of voluntary disclosure, timeliness of disclosure and type of 
audit opinion) in two stages.
In the first stage, the sample was divided into two groups. The first group had no 
accountants at all. The second group employed at least one accountant. The 
difference in corporate disclosure practices between the two groups was examined 
using Mann-Whitney test at 5% level of significance.
In the second stage, it was decided to study the association between the four 
measures of corporate disclosure practices and qualified accountants after adjusting
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for size. It was decided that the size of a company might have an effect on the 
volume of work accountants have to cope with. To cater for this, the size effect was 
eliminated through the use of number of accountants per unit of turnover 
(number of accountants employed by a company to turnover ratio)5. The resulting 
ratio, number of accountants/turnover, is a continuous variable. Its distribution 
ranged from a lower of 0 to a maximum of 0.3541 with mean of 0.027 and a median 
of 0.0097.
Boxplots presented as exhibit 6.4.5(a) and normal probability plots presented as 
exhibit 6.4.5(b) were used to test the existence of outliers and whether the 
distribution is normal. As can be seen from these exhibits below, outliers were 
observed. The distribution was also not found to be normally distributed. It is 
skewed to the right.
Exhibits 6.4.5(a): Boxplots showing the nature of distribution of the number of qualified 
accountants to turnover ratio.
1+ I * 0 0 0
+-------------- +---------------+---------------+---------------+-------------- +---------- C568
0.000 0.070 0 .140 0.210 0.280 0.350
^Number of accountants/turnover was used because it is the impact of the number 
of accountants that is being investigated. The use of Turnover/accountants could 
have worked as well provided one is careful in interpreting the results. However, it 
faces one serious limitation under the circumstances. There are corporations which 
have no qualified accountants. If  the second approach is adopted, in some situations, 
turnover would be divided by zero. Any number divided by zero is infinite. This 
would prevent the calculation of association between this ration and corporate 
disclosure practices through Spearman's rank-order correlation coefficient.
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Exhibit 6.4.5(b): Normal Probability Plots for Number of Accountants to Turnover Ratio. 
A/C per turnover
0.36+ *
0.24+
0 .12+
_ *  *
#  *  *  *
0 .00+ + * * 2* 22* 2* 2*
+-------------- +---------------+---------------+--------------- +---------------+ Expected normal distr. values.
-1 .40  -0 .70  0.00 0.70 1.40 2.10
It was, therefore, decided to examine the association between qualified accountants 
employed on the one hand and the extent of mandatory disclosures, extent of 
voluntary disclosure and timeliness of disclosure on the other by the use of 
Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient's test.
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The association between the number of qualified accountants employed to 
turnover ratio and type of audit opinion was investigated using Kruskal-Wallis 
test. This decision was based on the distribution of type of audit opinion as 
discussed earlier.The sample was segregated into quartiles on the basis of number 
of qualified accountants to turnover ratio. The type of audit opinion of the 
resulting four independent groups were examined to see if they come from a 
similar parent populatioa The results are presented in chapter eight.
6.4.6). HYPOTHESIS 6.2.6: Industry Type is Related to Corporate Information 
Disclosure Practices.
As discussed in section 6.3, five industries are represented in the sample. These are 
Distribution, Hotels, Catering and Repairs; Chemical manufacturing industry; 
Banking Finance, Insurance, and Business services; Textiles manufacturing 
industry and Metal goods, Engineering and Vehicles Industry.
Since type of industry is a categorical variable, Kruskal-Wallis test on disclosure 
practices of the companies categorised on the basis of type of industry was 
considered to be the appropriate test. The results are presented in chapter eight.
6.4.7). HYPOTHESIS 6.4.7: Liquidity Position of a Company is Associated With 
Disclosure Practices.
Liquidity position of a company was measured by the current ratio. Current ratio 
was defined as total current assets to total current liabilities. No adjustment was 
made to the financial statement figures in calculating this ratio. The ratio ranged 
from a minimum of 0,09 to a maximum of 15.11, with the mean of 1.63 and 
median of 1.14.
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Boxplots and Normal probability plots were used to establish whether the 
distribution of current ratio had outliers and it was normal or not. The results of 
these two procedures are presented as exhibits 6.4.7(a) and 6.4.7(b), respectively. The 
two exhibits reveal the existence of outliers and the current ration is not normally 
distributed. It is skewed to the right.
Exhibit 6.4.7(a): Boxplots showing the nature of distribution of the current ratio.
*_!+!_#*** o 0
+------------+------------ +------------ +------------ +------------ +-------- CURATIO
0.0 3.0 6.0 9.0 12.0 15.0
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Exhibit 6.4.7(b): Normal probability plots for the current ratio. 
CURATIO
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6.4.8). HYPOTHESIS 6.2.8: Number of Sources of Loan Capital is Associated With 
Disclosure Practices.
The number of sources of loan capital was defined as number of sources of all 
current and longterm liabilities as disclosed in the CARs. Breakdown of current
-------------- +------------Expected normal distr.
values.
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and long term liabilities is a required information disclosure item. This breakdown 
was reconciled with some other related disclosure items in the CAR The related 
disclosure items examined were the comparative statement of sources and 
application of funds for two years; long term loans payable in foreign currency and 
breakdown of long term liabilities. From discussions presented in chapter seven, 
the information items used to track down the sources of loan are among the most 
popular disclosure items6. Trade creditors were considered to form only one 
source of loan capital. Trade creditors are expected to be interested in similar 
information items. As such, disclosure practices are not expected to vary with the 
number of individual trade creditors. Moreover, trade credit is not a significant 
source of funds in Tanzania. This treatment is, therefore, not expected to bias the 
reported results.
Related party interest in loan capital was not counted as sources of funds. This was 
due to two reasons. First, most related party transactions are hardly disclosed in the 
Tanzania CARs. For example, it can be seen from appendix 7.1 that no company in 
the sample disclosed management interest in the liabilities. But more 
significantly, the related parties have access to inside information. They cannot 
therefore be expected to press for more extensive corporate disclosure in the CARs. 
This omission is also not expected to have any significant impact on the reported 
results.
The data gathered showed the number of sources of loan capital ranged from a 
minimum of 2 to a maximum of 12 sources, with mean of 4.879 and median of 
45. Since the number of loan capital sources is a discrete variable, it was decided to 
use Kruskal-Wallis test to study the four measures of corporate disclosure 
practices. The sample was segregated into quartiles on the basis of number of
6see appendix 7.3.
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sources of loan capital. The extent of mandatory disclosure, the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, the timeliness of disclosure and type of the audit opinion of the 
resulting four independent categories of companies in terms of number of sources 
of loan were compared to see if they were from similar populations. Results are 
presented in chapter eight.
6.4,9). HYPOTHESIS 6.29: The Proportion of Liquid Assets in Place are Associated 
with Corporate Disclosure Practices:
The proportion of liquid assets in place was defined as fixed asset to total assets 
ratio. This ratio was calculated on the basis of balance sheet figures. No adjustment 
was made to the reported figures.
The distribution of the ratio varied from a minimum of 0.0046 to a maximum of 
0.9268, with mean of 03695 and median of 0.2754. Normal probability plots and 
boxplots were used to test if this ratio is normally distributed and to test for the 
existence of outliers. The boxplots and the normal probability plots are presented as 
exhibits 6.4.9(a) and 6.4.9(b) respectively. As can be seen in these two exhibits below, 
no outliers were observed in the distribution of this ratio. However, the 
distribution was not normally distributed.
Exhibit 6.4.9(a): Boxpiot showing the nature of the distribution of the proportion of 
liquid assets in place.
I + I
+-------------- +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+----------F A/asset
0.00 0.20 0 .40 0.60 0 .80 1.00
184
Exhibit 6.4.9(b): Normal probability plots showing the nature of distribution of FA/TA ratio.
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Since the distribution was not found to be normally distributed, Spearman's rank 
correlation coefficient's test was used to establish association between fixed assets 
to total ratio on the one hand, and the extent of mandatory disclosure, extent of 
voluntary disclosure and timeliness of disclosures. Given the nature of 
distribution of type of audit opinion described earlier, Kruskal-Wallis test was used 
to test the relationship between type of audit opinion and the proportion of liquid
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asset in place. The sample was divided into quartiles on the basis of fixed assets to 
total assets ratio. The type of audit opinion of the four resulting independent 
groups were compared using Kruskal-Wallis and %2 tests to see if they came from 
similar parent populations.
65). RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES:
Several explanatoiy variables are used in this study. It is possible that some of the 
variables are highly correlated. In such a case it would be difficult to conclude 
which of the two highly correlated factors is responsible for the reported results. It 
was, therefore, considered necessary to examine the relationship between the 
various explanatory variables in order to control for them in the analysis. This was 
done in three stages. First, the relationship between the continuous variables was 
tested using Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient's test. Then, the 
relationship between the continuous variables and the qualitative ones was 
examined using Kruskal-Wallis test. Finally, the relationship between all 
qualitative variables was investigated using x2-test. The findings are presented in 
the next three subsections.
6.5.1). All Continuous Explanatory Variables: Correlation Analysis.
The results of Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient's test on the 
relationship between the various continuous variables are presented in table 6.5.1 
below:
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Table 6.5.1: Relationship between the various explanatory variables as revealed by 
Spearman's Rank Order Correlation coefficients' test.
firs t variable second variable rs z sig. at%
P /T P/E 0.35 2.548 1%
P /T Turnover -0 .124 -0 .903 18%
P /T Asset Size -0 .133 -0 .968 17%
P /T accountant/turnover 0.046 0.335 37%
P /T current ratio 0.414 3.014 0%
P /T FA/TA -0 .308 -2 .242 1%
P/E turnover 0.015 0.109 46%
P/E asset size -0 .243 -1 .769 4%
P/E accountant/turnover -0.181 -1 .318 10%
P/E current ratio 0.115 0.837 20%
P/E FA/TA -0 .449 -3 .269 0%
asset size accountant/turnover 0.053 0.397 35%
asset size current ratio -0 .014 -0 .105 46%
asset size FA/TA 0.197 1.487 7%
turnover asset size 0.594 4.445 0%
turnover accountant/turnover -0 .244 -1 .826 3%
turnover current ratio 0.020 0.1497 44%
turnover FA/TA -0 .175 -1 .310 10%
current ratio accoun tan t/  turnover 0.216 1.616 5%
FA/TA accountant/turnover 0.331 2.477 1%
FA/TA current ratio -0 .065 -0.491 31%
From table 65.1 above, it can be seen that a combination of nine explanatory 
variables were significantly correlated at 5% or greater confidence level. These 
combinations are: P/T and P/ E ratios; P/T and current ratios; P/ E ratio and asset 
size; Turnover and number of accountants employed per turnover; P/T and fixed 
assets to total assets ratios (FA/ TA); P/ E and FA/ TA ratios; FA/ TA and 
accountants to turnover ratios; current ratio and accountants/turnover ratio and 
turnover and asset size. Where any of these combinations are found to be related 
to any of the four measures of corporate disclosure practices, it is necessary to 
observe such association when the other factor is controlled for. Otherwise, it may 
not be feasible to drawn conclusion on the exact factors associated with disclosure 
practices. The cases where the several correlated explanatoiy variables are related 
to any of the four measure of corporate disclosures are presented in section 8.11 of 
chapter eight.
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6.5.2). Categorical Variables vs Continuous Variables: Kruskal-Wallis test:
The results of the study of the relationship between various categorical and 
continuous explanatory variables as revealed by Kruskal-Wallis test are presented 
in tables 6.5.2(a), 6.5.2(b) and 6.5.2(c) below:
Table 6.5.2: The association between the type of accounting firm  and the various 
explanatory variables as revealed by Kruskal-Wallis test.
International Parastatals domestic Results
firms firms firms
No of Coys 17 26 15
P/T 0.09 0.015 0.1 Ho=2.721
X5=5.99
P/E 0.23 0.08 0.095 Ho-2.03
X5=5.99
Asset size 128.88 387 46.17 Ho-16.18
X5-5 .99
Turnover 74.52 222.42 51.5 Ho= 12.49 
X5-5 .99
Accountants/turn 0.0036 0.0097 0.0119 Ho=0.7427
over X5=5.99
Current ratio 1.33 1.145 1.11 Ho=2.312
X 5-5.99
FA/TA 0.1738 0.4154 0.3888 Ho=4.449
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Table 6.5.2(b): The association between the type of corporate governance and the
various corporate attributes as shown by Kruskal-Wallis test.
MNC parastatals domestic J-V Results
No. of coys 17 22 14 5
P/T 0.09 0.01 0.1 0.03 Ho=2.456
X5=7.82
P/E 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.17 Ho=1.476 
Xs-7 .82
Asset size 107.94 280.71 51.63 529.72 H o-18.66 
Xs-7 .82
Turnover 51.41 190.98 51.6 529.72 Ho* 16.39 
X5=7.82
accountant/
turnover
0.013 0.011 0.008 0.003 Ho=3.496
Xs=7.82
current ratio 1.33 1.16 1.10 1.14 Ho-3.496
Xs=7.82
FA/TA 0.174 0.488 0.377 0.223 Ho-5.514
Xs=7.82
Table 5.5.2(c): The association between the industry type and various corporate 
attributes as revealed by Kruskal-Wallis test.
1 2 3 4 5 Results
No of coys 20 11 15 6 6
P/E 0.19 0.18 0.11 0.02 0.015 Ho=3.77
X5=9.49
P/T 0.02 0.22 0.07 0.03 -2 .77 Ho-12.13
Xs*9.49
Turnover 229.72 38.69 102.9 206.05 63.71 Ho* 12.09 
X5-9.49
Asset size 142.3 57.09 170.33 1770.34 1211.45 Ho* 12.29 
X5-9.49
current
ratio
1.12 1.37 1.13 1.86 0.99 Ho* 11.94 
X5=9.49
accountant/
turnover
0.006 0.023 0.003 0.013 0.023 Ho=6.188
X5=9.49
FA/TA 0.16 0.39 0.215 0.538 0.864 Ho* 15.87 
X5=9.49
Key: Type of industries:
1= Distribution, hotels, catering and repair industry. 
2= Chemical manufacturing industry.
3= Banking, finance, insurance and business services. 
4= Textiles manufacturing industry.
5= Metal goods, Engineering and vehicle industries.
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It can be seen that only size (as measured by both turnover and asset size) showed a 
significant association with the type of accounting firm offering auditing services 
at the 5% confidence level. It can also be seen from table 652(b) that size is 
associated with type of corporate governance. Table 6.5.2(c) shows that size, P/T 
ratio, current ratio and fixed assets to total assets ratio is associated with industry 
type. These established relationships are taken into account in analysing the factors 
associated with disclosure practices and the results are presented in section 8.11 of 
chapter eight.
65.3). All Categorical or Discrete Variables: x2-Test.
The associations between the all categorical variables as revealed by yl- test are 
presented in table 6.5.3 below:
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Table 6.5.3: The association between the various categorical corporate variables
as revealed by the *2-test.
firs t variable second variable associated
(yes/no)
Chi-Square
&d. f .
Type of accounting 
firm
type of corporate 
governance
yes 3(2=104.636
d.f.=6
*25=12.59
type of accounting firm qualified accountants 
(none vs at least one)
yes 3(2=6.081 
d.f.= 2 
3(25«5-*>
type of accounting firm industry type no 3(2=9.987
d.f.=8
3(25=15.51
accounting firm type number of loan sources no 3(2=4.358
d.f.=6
3(25=12.59
corporate governance 
type
qualified accountants 
(none vs at least one)
no 3(2=7.117
d.f.=3
3(25-7.82
corporate governance 
type
industry type no 3(2=15.899
d.f.=i2
3(25-2103
corporate governance number of loan sources no 3(2=9.524
d.f.=9
3(2^=16.92
industry type number of loan sources no *2=17.406 
d.f.=12 
X25=21.03
qualified accountants 
(none vs at least one)
number of loan sources no 3(2=0.666
d.f.=3
*25=7.82
Table 6.53 above shows that there is association between type of accounting firms 
providing auditing services and type of corporate governance and between type of 
accounting firms performing the audit function and number of qualified 
accountants employed.These findings are taken into account in drawing 
conclusions about factors associated with disclosure practices (see chapter eight, 
section 8.11).
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6.5.4) General Comments on the Above Observations:
General comments relating to observations presented in tables 6.5.1,6.5.2(a), 
6.5.2(b), 6.5.2(c) and 6.5.3 are summarised below:
- As revealed in table 65.1, it is not surprising that P/T and P/E ratios were found 
to be significantly correlated at the 1% confidence level, as both are measures of 
profitability. It is equally not surprising that turnover and asset size are 
significantly related at the 0% confidence level as they are both measures of size.
It can also be seen from table 65.1 that, while the number of accountants employed 
per turnover ratio is negatively related to turnover at the 3% significant level, it is 
not equally significantly related to the asset size at the 5% confidence level. Given 
the nature of shortage of accountants facing corporations in Tanzania, it is possible 
to observe the association between number of accountants employed per turnover 
and turnover. 16 companies for example were found to have no qualified 
accountants at all. Having used the turnover in the denominator, it is therefore 
possible to observe the relationship between this variable and the resulting ratio. 
However, having adjusted for size, no association was observed between asset size 
and number of accountant employed per turnover, thus confirming the 
appropriateness of the method used for adjusting for size.
Positive association between P/T ratio and current ratio reveals the nature of 
liquidity problems facing Tanzanian corporations as discussed in chapter three. 
Since most companies are expected to generate most of their funds from 
operations, those companies charging higher profit margins tend to have less 
liquidity problems. The significant association between the current ratio and the 
number of accountants employed per turnover seems to suggest that companies 
with lower current ratio have more severe shortage of accountants. Those
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companies may be facing difficulties in recruiting qualified accountants or 
retaining them or both.
Note also that no significant relationship between the current ratio, on the one 
hand, and P/ E ratio, turnover and asset size was established at the 5% confidence 
level. This tends to confirm the above conjecture that liquidity problem is related 
to the pricing policy adopted by a company. Companies adopting lower profit 
margins tend to face more liquidity problems. Since it was revealed by the 
interviews reported in chapter four that competitive threat is not a significant 
factor influencing corporate decisions, it is likely that the lower margins are 
imposed by the government policies.
It was also observed that companies with higher proportion of fixed assets (FA/TA 
ratio) tends to have lower P/T and P/ E ratios. These observations tend to suggest 
that companies with higher proportions of fixed assets seems to be more sensitive 
to political risks.
-Table 6.5.2 reveals that the asset size and the turnover are the only variables 
significantly related to the type of audit firm providing audit services. As can also 
be seen in table 6.53, type of accounting firm providing accounting services is 
significantly related to the type of corporate governance. It is therefore observed 
that while state-owned audit firms tend to audit larger corporations, they also tend 
to audit state-owned companies. It is, therefore, difficult to conclude whether size 
is related to type of audit firm or type of corporate governance governance. The 
qualitative nature of these variables and the fact that they are not normally 
distributed do not permit further analysis and therefore a future research is 
recommended to establish the nature of these relationships. It may be argued, 
however, that this observation tend to confirm the earlier conjecture that size is 
the appropriate proxy for political risks. The government seems to be more
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concerned with the larger firms than the smaller ones. This is confirmed by the 
observation presented in table 6.5.2(b) that size is significantly related to the type of 
corporate governance at the 5% confidence level or higher.
6.6). THE SOFTWARE PACKAGE USED:
MINITAB statistical package was used in the above analyses. The choice of this 
package was based on the approach recommended by Currall (1991 )7. He poses 
seven questions which offered guidance in selecting a statistical software:
What class of analysis techniques do you require?
-  Are your data predominantly continuous or categorical?
-  Are your response variables measurements, counts or proportions?
-  Are your data from experiments or surveys?
-  Do you want to explore your data one step at a time or process it all at a once?
-  Are there repeated measures or multiple responses?
-  Is prediction or description your ultimate goal?"
7Currall (1991) has identified several approaches to selection of a statistical analysis 
package. These are the classical approach, the common approach, the reasonable 
approach and the recommended approach. In the classical approach, one decides 
what analysis one requires and then scans a list of all analyses available in each 
package to find a match. This approach, however suffers from several problems:
- not all packages refer to the same techniques by the same name.
- a single name may imply different things to different packages or a greater or 
lesser degree of breadth from one package to another.
- how do you choose if several packages have the techniques you require?
The second approach he identified appears to be the most commonly used. In this 
approach, one simply selects the package and then design the analysis to fit the 
statistical selection on offer This approach is likely to end up in one using 
inappropriate tools in ones analysis.
The third approach is what he calls the reasonable approach. In this approach, one 
finds what ones colleagues are using and then opts for the same package. The 
advantage of this approach is that one is likely to get help with getting started and 
with on going problems. However, if your colleague did not make the right choice 
initially, you might end up using inappropriate package.
He however, recommends an approach which considers the philosophical view of 
ones requirements. The philosophical base of requirements must match the 
philosophy of a statistical package (Currall, 1991 p.3).
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MINITAB was seen to be an appropriate choice in light of the intended objectives, 
the nature of data used and subsequent use. MINITAB is easy to use, interactive 
and quite appropriate for medium sized data sets. It has excellent facilities for 
exploring data and testing simple hypotheses of both parametric and non- 
parametric varieties. It also presents results in an easily understood fashion.
6.7). CONCLUSION.
The objective of this chapter was to describe and select research procedures 
considered appropriate in order to investigate disclosure practices in Tanzania. A 
random sample of 58 profit orientated companies was selected. The relationship 
between the nine explanatory variables are examined using Spearman's rank order 
correlation coefficients' test, Kruskal-Wallis test and Chi-Square test. Spearman's 
rank correlation analysis was used where all the variables examined are considered 
continuous; Kruskal-Wallis test was used when one of the two variables was 
continuous while the other was discrete and Chi-square test was used where both 
variables are discrete or categorical.
It was observed that type of accounting firm auditing CARs is related to type of 
corporate governance, qualified accountants employed and company size 
(measured by both turnover and asset size). Industry type is associated to P/T ratio, 
company size, current ratio and FA/TA ratio. Type of corporate governance was 
also found to be related to company size. It was further observed that P/T is 
correlated to P/ E ratio, current ratio and FA/ TA ratio. P/ E ratio was also found to 
be correlated to FA/TA ratio while FA/TA is related to current ratio.
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CHAPTER SEVEN.
THE CORPORATE DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN TANZANIA 
7.1) INTRODUCTION.
The main objective of this chapter is to discuss corporate disclosure practices in 
Tanzania. The chapter also investigates the relationship across the four measures 
of quality of corporate disclosures and concludes that there is more to quality than 
the extent of voluntaiy disclosures. While the tests show that the extent of 
voluntary disclosures may be used as proxy for the extent of mandatory disclosures 
and vice versa, the results also show that any study investigating the quality of 
corporate disclosures must observe the type of audit opinion and the timeliness of 
corporate disclosures if genuine conclusions are to be drawn on the quality of 
corporatedisclosurepractices.
The chapter is divided into eight sections. The next section gives a general view of 
corporate disclosure practices in Tanzania. Section three discusses the extent of 
mandatory disclosure practices while section four presents the extent of voluntary 
disclosures. This is followed by discussions on the extent of combined corporate 
information disclosure, type of audit opinion and timeliness of disclosures. The 
final section investigates the relationship across the four measures of quality of 
corporate disclosure.
721 CORPORATE INFORMATION DISCLOSURES IN TANZANIA* A GENERAL 
VIEW:
The four variables used to capture the quality of corporate disclosures were defined 
in chapter five. These are the extent of mandatory disclosure, the extent of
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voluntary disclosure, the timeliness of disclosures and the type of audit opinion. 
These variables will be used to describe disclosure practices in Tanzania.
It is a usual practice for corporations to report their results of operations and the 
financial position at least once every year. This is necessary to establish whether 
the entity is viable or not. It is also necessary as a part of corporate accountability 
mechanism as was discussed in chapter three. Precisely when an entity should 
publish its CAR is a corporate decision. Most business firms adopt an accounting 
period that ends when operations are at low ebb. This may simplify the year-end 
cut-off procedures and thus simplify the process of measuring income and 
financial position. It tends to give the best possible figures for stock and cash.
Apart from the natural business year, other factors may influence the choice of 
accounting year end. Some companies have their year end dictated by the parent 
corporation. Some are likely to follow the calendar year. Yet others are likely to 
prefer the year-end which is consistent with the government's fiscal year. Courtis 
(1976) studied the question of diversity of balance sheet dates in New Zealand. He 
argued that high diversity of corporate balance sheet dates could affect inter­
company comparability and thus distort the investor resource allocation process1. 
He observed that subsidiary companies tended to keep in line with their parent 
company's balance sheet dates.
For Tanzania, it appears that most corporations follow the calendar year. From the 
observed sample of 58 companies, 40 or 69% of the sample had their accounting 
period ending 31st December; 12 or 21% had their accounting year ending 30th 
June; two (3%) companies had year ending 30th September and the rest had their 
accounting period ending 31st October, 30th November 31st Januaiy and 31st
*10 what extent diversity of balance sheet dates distort corporate governance in 
general and resource allocation in particular is a matter for future research.
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March. Seven different balance sheet dates were therefore observed in Tanzania. 
The distribution of these balance sheet dates among different industries 
represented in the sample is presented in table 7.4(a) below. It was observed that 
companies prefer reporting their CARs on 31st December. A notable exception are 
the companies in distribution, hotels, catering and repair service industry. Eight 
companies in this industry (40%) reported on 30th June, presumably to comply 
with the government financial year.
Table 7.2(a): Diversity of balance sheet dates in Tanzania.
Accounting year 
end
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
1
31 st Dec 8 10 3 5 14 40
30th June 8 1 3 - - 12
30th Sept 1 - - - 1 2
31st Oct 1 - - - - 1
30th Nov 1 - - - - 1
31st Jan 1 - - - - 1
31st Mar - - - 1 - 1
Total 20 11 6 6 15 58
KEY: Industry group as explained in chapter six.
1= Distribution, hotels, catering and repair service industry. 
2= Chemical manufacturing industry.
3= Banking, Finance, Insurance and Business services industry. 
4= Textile manufacturing industry.
5= Metal goods, engineering and vehicle industries.
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Compare this to eighteen different balance sheet dates observed in New Zealand 
(Courtis, 1976) and nine dates observed in Nigeria (Wallace, 1987). All Tanzanian 
and Nigerian balance sheet dates were observed to end-up by the end of the 
month. For New Zealand, two companies had their accounting year ending at the 
beginning of the month and four of the corporations had their year ending on 
nineteenth of January, June, July and October.
It was also observed that, while there are minor variations, the CARs comprise a 
directors' report2; profit and loss account; profit and loss appropriation account; 
balance sheet; statement of sources and application of funds and notes to the 
financial statements.
Although both the Companies Ordinance and TSS APS require corporations to 
prepare the directors' report, it was found that only 37 companies or 64% of the 
sample prepared the report. Of the companies preparing this report, only 54% (20 
companies) complied with the TSSAP requirements.lt was interesting to note also 
that only one auditor (Tellis & Company - a domestic private auditing firm) 
expressed an opinion on the directors' report of the Highland Soap and Allied 
Products Company Ltd. The companies ordinance requires the auditor to express 
an opinion on the directors' report while the recently introduced Auditing Guide­
lines only require the auditor to express an opinion when the report is not 
consistent with the other financial statements.
Both TSSAPs and the Companies Ordinance require at least two directors to sign 
CARs as a way of assuming responsibility for their accuracy. For the sample under 
observation, 41 companies or 71% complied with this requirement.
2Some companies have the Chairman s Statement in addition to the directors 
reports.
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As pointed out in chapter four, the companies ordinance requires the auditor to 
express a "true and correct view" while TSSAPs require the expression of "true and 
fair view". It was noted that only one CAR contained "true and correct view" 
opinion3. The rest were expressed as "true and fair view" or "present fairly..." 
Typical audit reports prepared by the three different categories of auditors are 
presented as appendix 73.
It was observed that three of the CARs were actually prepared and audited by the 
same firm. Discussions with the auditors in Tanzania revealed that in situations 
where they both prepare and audit a client's Financial Statements, they send two 
different teams of accountants. The first team would prepare the statements while 
the second one performs the audit function. In addition, this fact is disclosed in the 
Financial Statements. However, performance of both functions by one accounting 
firm is likely to jeopardise the credibility of CARs themselves. The major function 
of audit opinion is to make people believe the contents of the CARs. It is, 
therefore, necessaiy for the Auditors to be independent of the client and they must 
also be seen as such.
It was further observed that CARs vaiy greatly in size. In terms of the number of 
pages, the size of CARs in the sample varied from a minimum of eight to a 
maximum of 172 pages with a mean of 25 and a median of 15 pages. In terms of 
appearance, their quality also varied. Some were printed and represented a well 
prepared document for public relations purposes. Others, however, were type­
written and then manually reproduced through duplication machines. From the 
observed sample of 58 companies, only 14 or 24% of the CARS were printed4.
30nly S.A. Jaffer 6c Company - a domestic private sector accounting firm - expressed 
a "true and correct view on Quality Garage (1975) Company Ltd financial 
statements".
^Out of the 14 printed CARs, 9 were parastatals (41% of parastatals), 2 joint venture 
(40% of joint ventures), 1 domestic private company (7% of domestic Private 
companies) and 2 MNCs (12% of MNCs). In terms of industries, 5 were financial
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In general, the disclosure practices in Tanzania are not good On the average, only 
50.5% (median) of the mandatory disclosure requirements and 16.5% of voluntary 
items are disclosed. It takes an average of 7 months for the CAR to be released to 
the public The quality of these disclosures as revealed by audit opinions is 
encouraging. These details are presented in table 7.2(b) below:
TABLE 7.2(b):
Summary of disclosure practices in Tanzania.
Mandatory Voluntary Quality of Timeliness of
Disclosures Disclosures Disclosures Disclosures
Mean 52,93 16.79 4.7759 8.115
Median 50.50 16.50 5.0000 7.000
Mode 71.00 3.00 5.0000 9.000
Maximum 72.00 41.00 5,0000 23.000
Minimum 30.00 0.00 2.0000 2.000
Upper Quartile 64.50 22.50 5.0000 9.000
Lower Quartile 44.00 8.75 5.0000 5.000
Std Deviation 11.84 10.16 0.5936 4.639
7.3). THE EXTENT OF MANDATORY INFORMATION DISLOSURES:
Disclosure of mandatoiy items in less developed countries cannot be taken for 
granted as it is taken in some developed countries5.
institutions (83%of companies in the industry), 5 distribution industry (25%), 1 
textiles (17%), 1 chemical (10%) and 1 metal and engineering industry (7%).
5Japan appears to be one of the few exceptions. Hiramatsu (1990) and his 
elaborations in a seminar presentation at the Centre for International Accounting 
and Finance University of Glasgow observed how mandatory requirements are not 
complied with in Japan.
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For Tanzania, it was observed that only five items (about 6%) were disclosed by all 
companies. These were comparative balance sheet for two years, comparative 
income statement for two years, auditors' reports, breakdown of intangible assets 
and breakdown of current assets.
It is surprising that breakdown of intangible assets6 is among items disclosed by all 
companies in the sample. This is difficult to explain. It may only be speculated that 
it is due to the potential risk of nationalisation and subsequent negotiations for 
compensation7. For state-owned corporations or joint ventures between the state 
and MNCs, rewards to intangible assets such as fees for technical assistance and 
licence fees constitutes significant payments to owners of the intangible assets.
Another striking observation is that less than 29% of the sample disclosed 
consolidated financial statements. TSSAFs (NBAA, 1983; p20) allow non­
disclosure of consolidated statements under the following circumstances8:
- Where the holding corporation is itself a wholly owned 
subsidiary of another parent corporation incorporated in 
Tanzania.
- Where consolidated accounts would not add any significant
information to users of financial statements.
- Where the preparation of consolidated financial statements 
would lead to delays in publishing the CAR
- Where the preparation of consolidated accounts might lead to 
harmful effects to the corporation or mislead users of
^Examples of intangible assets disclosed are Goodwill, Patents, Trade Marks and 
Licences.
7Absence of stock exchange means that in case of nationalisation, the government 
engages in negotiations with the former owners as to what would be the value of 
nationalised assets.
8It is argued that the provisions of this sections are so vague as to present a 
formidable problem for the necessary enforcement of compliance. The way they 
are put, they can be used to justify almost anything.
202
financial statements.
- Where the business of subsidiary company and holding 
corporation are so different that the two cannot reasonably be 
treated as one entity.
It was observed that only two companies disclosed some justification for non­
disclosure of consolidated financial statements. One company9 stated that its 
business was so different from that of the subsidiaries that they cannot reasonably 
be construed to be one entity. The other company10 argued that the subsidiary 
companies were yet to start operations.
It was also interesting to note that only 62% of the companies disclosed the 
directors' reports. This is consistent with the opinion gathered during the 
interviews that the disclosure of directors' reports is not accepted by some 
professional accountants. It was further observed that only 28 items or about 32% 
of the mandatory items were disclosed by at least 80% of the corporations. These 
items are shown in table 7.3(a) below:
Table: 7.3(a)
THE MOST POPULAR ITEMS OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE:
1. Auditors' report _____________________________100%
2. Breakdown of current assets ______________________ 100%
3. Breakdown of intangible assets ______________________ 100%
4. Comparative balance sheet for two years ___________________100%
5. Comparative income statement for two years ________________.100%
6. Basis of recognizing revenues ______________________ .98%
7. Breakdown of retained eamings and reserves _______________ 98%
8. Estimated corporate tax __________________________ 98%
^National Development Corporation (NDC).
1°L0NRH0 Tanzania Ltd.
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9. Turnover  97%
10. Audit fees and expenses _________   96%
11. Basis of inventory valuation _______________________ 96%
12. Accounting policy on depreciation _____________________ .95%
13. Breakdown of fixed assets ________________________ 95%
14. Cost of goods sold __________________________ .95%
15. Breakdown of cost of production ______________________ 94%
16. Government grants and subsidies ______________________ 94%
17. Appropriation of profits ____________________________.93%
18. Breakdown of depreciation expenses ____________________93%
19. Breakdown of investments ___________________________ .93%
20. Issued and paid-up share capital ______________________93%
21. Authorised share capital ____________________________91%
22. Actual corporate tax paid ________________________90%
23. Interest expense _____________________________ 90%
24. Long term loans payable in foreign currency _______________ 88%
25. Breakdown of long term liabilities ---------------------------------- 86%
26. Dividends remitted abroad ________________________ 86%
27. Comparative statement of sources and application of funds
for two years ________________________________84%
28. Emoluments paid to directors _______________________83%
Several items were not disclosed at all. Some items were disclosed by veiy few 
companies. For example, breakdown of management interests in the receivables or 
payables was not disclosed at all despite the TSSAP stipulations. The other items 
which are not generally disclosed are shown in table 7.3(b) below:
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Table 73(b):
THE LEAST POPULAR ITEMS OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURES.
1. Comparative consolidated balance sheet for two years __________ 29%
2. Justification for deviations from fundamental accounting
principles ________________________________ 29%
3. Nationality of the CEO __________________________ 29%
4. Changes in accounting policies ______________________ 287*
5. Justification for the observed variance _______________ 27%
6. Breakdown of payments in foreign currency -management and
other professional fees -------------------------------------------- 26%
7. Distribution of income within the company _____________25%
8. Taxes paid abroad ____ 25%
9. Comparative consolidated income statement for two years ----------------23%
10. Staff turnover __________________________________23%
11. Deviations from fundamental accounting principles ------------- 22%
12. Impact of changes in accounting policies -----------------------------22%
13. Raw materials used in production (in units) -------------------------- 22%
14. Breakdown of payments in foreign currency -equipments --------21%
15. Emoluments paid to the CEO------ --------------------------------- 21%
16. Breakdown of payments in foreign currency -licence, trade
marks, etc ________________________________ 18%
17. Manpower requirements ________________________ 16%
18. Efforts to increase local content of production  -------------------------14%
19. Terms of short term credit facilities offered ________________ 14%
20. Terms of short term credit facilities received ________________ 14%
21. Company policies on disabled ____________________13%
22. Installed production capacity in units __________________ 13%
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23. Expatriates paid in foreign currency ___________________ 12%
24. Related part/s interest in the company (shares,
contracts, etc) _______________________________12%
25. Accounting policy on warranties and guarantees _____________10%
26. Breakdown of advances to staff ___________  7%
27. Accounting policy on maintenance and repair expenses __________5%
28. Breakdown of directors interest in receivables _______________5%
29. Breakdown of trade debtors ________  5%
30. Breakdown of directors' interest in payables ________________ 4%
31. Breakdown of bad debts written off ____________________ 3%
32. Efforts made to recover bad debts before being written o ff_________ 3%
33. Breakdown of other staffs' interest in payables ______________ 2%
34. Breakdown of management's interest in payables _____________0%
35. Breakdown of management's interest in receivables _ 0%
Further details of the extent of mandatory disclosure are provided in appendix 7.1.
It must be pointed out that auditors have failed to ensure that the prescribed 
requirements are complied with. This is reflected by the fact that most CARs 
receive clean audit reports despite the low level of compliance with TSSAP 
requirements. Precisely why this is happening is open to speculation. Some hints 
were provided by the interviewees.
First, it was pointed out that the governing board of the NBAA did not approve 
the inclusion of the directors report as part of mandatoiy disclosure requirements. 
However, when the document was finally published, this requirement was not 
deleted. This account is supported by subsequent events. When the accounting 
guide-lines were later introduced, the Director's Report was not defined as one of 
the essential components of the CARs. One wonders, therefore, whether this was
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simply an oversight or a case where the accounting experts (within the NBAA 
secretariat) felt that the board was not capable of making a right decision on the 
issue. If the latter is the case, then one wonders about the validity of such a move. 
One also wonders why such a move was not simply overruled by the governing 
board and why it should move indirectly to scrap it through accounting guide­
lines. These are issues to be clarified by future research.
The interviewees argued that the directors' reports were not acceptable to the 
governing board because some of the requirements such as future forecasts are not 
easily verifiable. Some items can be verified but only at a considerable cost. Factors 
leading to failure to achieve the planned targets is a case in point.
Whether the Directors' Report is required by NBAA or not, it remains a 
mandatoiy requirement in Tanzania. Section 113 of the Companies Ordinance 
requires the directors report to be presented to the AGM. It is true that the 
requirements of these two documents are not identical. Nonetheless, the two 
positions and requirements will have to be harmonised somehow.
Secondly, the lack of auditing standards at the time also meant that auditors had 
no professional guide-lines to guide them in performing the audit function. The 
auditing standards were introduced in February, 1989.
Thirdly, interviewees argued that auditors do not insist on disclosure of some 
items on the basis of the accounting concept of materiality. It is argued here, 
however, that any item prescribed by law is primae fade significant, otherwise 
there would be no point in prescribing it. If it is accepted that some items are 
immaterial and, therefore, not capable of influencing users dedsions, it would be 
more logical to recommend their disclosure rather than require their disclosure. 
Disclosure requirements should be reserved for items which must be disclosed.
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Specific details may not matter in this case. The important point is that an 
opinion of dissatisfaction with the present disclosure requirements was expressed 
by the interviewees. Most dissatisfaction was expressed on items required to be 
disclosed in the directors' report. This may partially explain the observed non- 
compliance with the requirements. The other problems facing regulation of 
accounting in Tanzania were discussed in chapter four.
Below is a summary of the mandatory disclosure practices by type of corporate
ownership.
extent o f mandatory disclosure
I  Parastatals 
18? Domestic Coys 
H  MNCs
^  Joint-Ventures
Exhibit 7.3: EXTENT OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURES EXPRESSED IN %.
From exhibit 7.3 above, it is clear that MNCs comply better with disclosure 
requirements than the other categories of companies. They are followed by Joint 
Ventures, parastatals and domestic private companies - in that sequence. This is 
consistent with obseivations in Nigeria (Wallace, 1987) and India (Singhvi, 1968) 
This issue is discussed further in chapter nine.
1
O w nership
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7.4) THE EXTENT OF VOLUNTARY INFORMATION DISCLOSURE:
Corporations in Tanzania appear generally not to volunteer information. Of the 
forty four items included in the index, the following items were not disclosedat 
all;
- value added statement,
- total emoluments paid to lowest paid worker, (only 3.4% of 
the companies studied disclosed total emoluments to the 
average and the highest paid workers),
- audit opinion on the directors' report,
- audit opinion on timely recording of transactions,
- intra-group pricing policies,
- long-term forecasts,
- variance analysis,
- procedures for monitoring projects under implementation,
- qualification and experience of directors and,
- directors other directorships.
Although no item is voluntarily disclosed by all corporations, there are a few items 
which are generally disclosed. These are:
- amount spent on marketing activities(81%),
- line of business segments (72%),
- loans received in foreign currency (80%) and,
- holding corporations interest in the subsidiaiy companies.
Further details are provided in appendix 7.5.
The low level of voluntary disclosures reflects the lack of effective framework 
within which accounting information is used in corporate decisions. It was argued
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in chapter three that the allocation of financial resources do not reflect the risk- 
retum relationship.
7.5). THE EXTENT OF COMBINED CORPORATE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE:
A combination of mandatoiy and voluntary disclosures in Tanzania can be 
compared with disclosure practices in other developing countries, namely: India 
(Marston, 1986), Nigeria (Wallace, 1987), and Mexico (Chow and Wong-Baren, 
1987). However, there are several limitations in making this comparison. The 
Importance of individual information items tends to vary from one place to 
another. Moreover, these are four different studies and their methodologies are 
not identical and all of them have different information items. The closest to this 
study is Wallace (1987) with many similarities including, for example, the fact that 
both studies have about 67% mandatory items and 33% voluntary items. To the 
extent that these studies provide some indication of disclosure practices in these 
countries, they can be compared. Table 7.5 below summarises disclosure practices 
in these four countries:
Table 7.5: Disclosure practices in four developing countries compared.
India Mexico Nigeria Tanzania
Extent of disclosure 62% 40% 54% 41%
Number of companies 30 52 47 58
7.6). THE TYPE OF AUDIT OPINIONS ON CARs:
This research has established that most profit oriented companies in Tanzania 
receive clean audit reports. Specifically, 84.5% received clean reports, 10.3% 
received 'except for opinion', 3.4% received 'subject opinion' and 1.7% got a 
disclaimer of opinion. From a random sample of 58 companies, none received a
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negative report. Looking at the four established types of ownership, it appears that 
all MNCs and Joint-Ventures received clean audit reports. 79% of the domestic 
private sector corporate reports received clean audit opinions, 14% received 
'except for1 opinion while 7% received 'subject to' opinion. 73% of parastatals 
received clean audit reports, 18% received 'except for' opinion, 4.5% got 'subject to' 
opinion while 4.5% received disclaimer of opinion (See exhibit 7.6(c) below). It is 
clear from exhibits 7.6(a) and 7.6(b) below that there is no significant difference in 
terms of types of audit opinions between the established categories of ownership:
Type o f audit opinions.
I  ParastatalsA 
W  Domestic Coys/ 
M  MNCsA 
E3 Joint-Ventures.
Exhibit 7.6(a) Medians: Quality of Disclosures as captured by audit opinions.
5
4
3
2
0
O w nership
211
Type of audit opinions
6
5
4
3
2
1
I
O w nership
I  ParastatalsM 
SI Domestic Coysf 
H MNCsM 
S3 Joint-Ventures
Exhibit 7.6(b) Means: type o f audit opinions.
% o f companies receiving qualified reports..
Parastatals Ore
Domestic Co. 
MNC
Joint-Vent.
O w nership
Exhibit 7.6(c): % of companies receiving qualified audit repo rt as categorised 
by type o f ownership.
Although the quality of CARs for profit oriented companies in Tanzania looked 
good, 15.5% (9 companies) of these corporations received qualified reports. One
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company received a disclaimer of opinion; two companies received 'subject to' 
opinion and six companies received 'except for1 opinion. The following reasons 
were sighted for the audit qualifications;
-22% of the non-clean reports (2 CARs) were qualified because 
of significant discrepancy between physical assets and 
company records;
-22% (two companies) had no title deeds for some fixed 
assets. It was therefore difficult to establish the ownership 
of the assets in question;
-33% (3 companies) failed to reconcile their records with the 
bankers records. One of the companies attempted to conceal 
the difference by writing off the unreconciled amount as bad 
debts.
-22% (2 companies) failed to reconcile subsidiary records and 
the control accounts.
-22% (2 companies) failed to confirm or reconcile their 
records with those of the third parties. Debtors or creditors 
disputed the amounts circularised to them as due from or 
owing to them. The documents to support the initial 
transactions were missing.
-11% (1 company) had a questionable "going concern" status.
It was making losses, yet its assets were less than its 
liabilities.
-22% (2 companies) had weak internal controls. Since auditors 
rely on internal controls to form an opinion, they could not 
express it without stating the reservations on this.
-11% (one company) failed to supply information auditors 
considered necessaiy for the opinion.
213
From the evidence available, it appears that the failure to reconcile the banking 
transactions is the most common reason for qualifying audit reports.
7.7). THE TIMELINESS OF CORPORATE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE:
On timeliness of CARs, companies are required to have draft financial statements 
ready for audit within three months of the accounting year end. Audit work must 
be completed within the next three months. It, therefore, follows that the CARs 
should be released to the public within six months of the end of accounting period. 
On the average this legal requirement is not met. The average reporting period is 
8.115 (median=7) months1 L Some companies release their CARs as early as two 
months after the end of the accounting period, while others take up-to 23 months 
to get their CARs ready for publication. Only 35% of the corporations met the
s3 month 
4 -6  months 
7 -9  months 
10-12 months 
12s months
1
T im eliness
Exhibit 7.7: Timeliness of Disclosures.
1 •Measured by the time period between the end of accounting period and the 
signing of audit report.
legally set time limit for the publication of corporate reports.
Number of companies.
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On the average, MNCs take 5.4 months (median=5) to publish their CARs. Joint 
Ventures take 5.25 months (median=5); parastatals take 9.57 months (median=8) 
while the domestic private companies take 11.12 months (median=9) to publish 
the CAR The MNCs and Joint Ventures met the legally set deadline on the 
average. Parastatals and Domestic private sector companies failed to meet the 
deadline. The relationship between the four categories of companies in terms of 
timeliness of disclosures is depicted in exhibit 7.7 above. Factors associated with 
timeliness of disclosures are discussed in the next chapter.
7.8). THE RELATIONSHIP ACROSS THE FOUR MEASURES OF QUALITY OF 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE PRACTICES.
In order to study the relationship between the four measures of corporate 
information disclosure, it is important to examine the nature of distribution of 
these variables. The nature of distribution may determine which statistical test is 
appropriate. It was decided to test whether these variables are normally distributed 
and the existence of outliers in the data. Minitab has two graphical techniques for 
testing the normality assumption.
a) If a sample is taken from a normal population, the sample histogram 
should have approximately the normal curve.
b) Another plot, called a normal probability plot, is a useful check for 
nonnormality. It plots the sample values versus the values we would expect, on 
the average, if the sample came from a normal population. This plot is 
approximately a straight line if the sample is from a normal population, but 
exhibits curvature if the population is not normal. The normal probability plot 
was used in this research to check for normality assumptions. The results of this 
effort are presented as appendix 7.4.
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As can be seen from appendix 7.4 only the extent of voluntary disclosure was 
found to be normally distributed. Extent of mandatory disclosures, timeliness of 
disclosures and type of audit opinion were found to be skewed.
Boxplots were used to establish the existence of outliers. The boxplots are presented 
in exhibit 7.8(a) below:
Exhibit 7 .8 (a ): Boxplots for the four measures of corporate information disclosures.
■I +
 +-------------- +---------------+---------------+---------------+--------------- +MANDISC
32.0 40.0 48.0  56.0 64.0 72.0
Boxplots for mandatory disclosures. No outliers were observed.
+ I
+-------------- +------------+---------------+-------------+------------- +---------VOLDISC
0.0 8.0 16.0 24.0  32.0 40.0
Boxplots for voluntary disclosures. No outliers were observed.
0 0 0 +
+--------------+------------+---------------+-------------+------------- +---------AUD0PIN
1.80 2.40 3.00 3 .60 4.20 4 .80
Boxplots for type of opinion. Outliers were observed.
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I + I # *  # o
 +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+------------- TIMELI
4.0 8.0 12.0 16.0 20.0
Boxplots for Timeliness of disclosures. Outliers were again observed.
Exhibit 7.8 above revealed that timeliness of disclosures and type of audit opinion 
were found to contain outliers.The data were double checked to ensure that the 
outliers do not represent data coding errors. On the basis of appendix 7.4 and 
exhibit 7.8, the statistical tests were selected. It was decided that:
- The association between extent of mandatory disclosure and extent of voluntary 
disclosures would be tested using correlation coefficients test. Although both 
variables were considered continuous, only voluntary disclosures were found to be 
normally distributed. The extent of mandatory disclosures was not normally 
distributed. Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient rather than Pearson 
correlation coefficients were used. Pearson correlation coefficient test requires both 
variables to be normally distributed.
- The association between mandatory disclosures and extent of voluntary 
disclosure on the one hand and timeliness and type of audit opinion on the other 
were tested using Kruskal-Wallis test, j l  was used to test the relationship between 
timeliness of disclosures and type of audit opinion.The sample was divided into 
four cells presented in table 7.8(a) below.
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Table 7.8(a): Association between timeliness of reports and type of audit.
timely CARs Late CARs Total
Clean audit report 19 24 43
Qualified audit report. 1 8 9
Total 20 32 52
Description of disclosure practices in Tanzania in sections 7.2 through to section 7.7 
above seems to suggest that the four measures of quality of corporate disclosures 
would lead to different conclusions if each measure on its own is used as a proxy 
for quality of corporate disclosure practices. It has been established that most 
mandatory requirements are not observed in Tanzania. An average corporation 
discloses only 505% of the mandatory requirements and 16.5% of voluntary 
information items. Average timeliness of reporting is 8.1 months, well beyond 
legal requirement of six months. It was, however, observed that most corporations 
receive clean audit reports. It may, therefore be prudent to test statistically if a 
relationship exists between the four variables used above. Are the companies 
disclosing more extensive mandatory items also disclosing more extensive 
voluntary information items or producing more timely CARs or receiving higher 
quality audit reports? Four statistical techniques are used to test the existence of 
this relationship. The results of these tests and the tests performed are presented in 
table 7.8 (b) below:
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Table 7.8(b): The relationship across the four measures of corporate disclosure practices.
Mandatory vs voluntary 
disclosure
mandatory vs timeliness
tests performed statistics
Spearman's rank rs=0.513
coefficients test Z=3.87
significant at % 
0%
Voluntary vs timeliness
Kruskal-Wallis H0 - 1.727
Xs-5.99
Kruskal-Wallis Ho=1.172l  15%
X5=5.99
Ho=0.7026 20%
Xs=3.84
Ho=0.0166 45%
X5=3.84 
X 2-3 .44 X2 
at 5% =3.84
Mandatory vs audit opinion Kruskal-Wallis
voluntary vs audit opinion Kruskal-Wallis
Timeliness vs audit opinion x2 -test
Key: Ho = Kruskal-Wallis Statistic.
Xs = Estimated critical value at 5%.
The relationship between mandatory disclosures and vohmtaiy disclosures was 
tested using Spearman's rank order correlation coefficients. Correlation test was 
chosen because both variables were found to have continuous distribution. The 
two distributions were tested using normal probability plots. While vohmtaiy 
disclosures were found to be normally distributed, mandatory disclosures were not 
normally distributed. Spearman's rank order correlation was used instead of 
Pearson's correlation coefficients. Positive association between mandatory 
disclosures and voluntaiy disclosures was proven at 0% confidence limits 
(rs=0.513; z=3.87).
The association between the extent of information disclosure (both voluntaiy and 
mandatory disclosures) and type of audit was tested using Kruskal-Wallis test.
This method was adopted because of the outliers shown in the distribution of type 
of audit opinion as presented above. The relationship between timeliness and type 
of audit opinion was tested using chi-square. No association was established 
between mandatoiy disclosures and type of audit opinion or between voluntaiy 
disclosures and type of audit opinion at 5%. The two associations were established
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at 20% and 45% confidence level, respectively. The type of audit opinion was not 
found to be associated with timeliness of CARs at 5% $2=3.44 while x2=3.84 at 5%).
The association between extent of voluntary and mandatory disclosures on the one 
hand and timeliness of disclosures on the other was tested using Kruskal-Wallis 
statistical test. No association was established at 5% confidence level (Hq=1.173 for 
mandatory vs timeliness and Ho=1.72712 for voluntary vs timeliness while the 
critical value at 5% was 5.99 in both cases).
Of the six relationships tested, only one showed a significant association at 5% 
confidence level. This was the association between mandatory disclosures and 
voluntary disclosures. This relationship has a significant implication for future 
research. It implies that any one of the two may be used in a study investigating 
the extent to which corporate information is disclosed. However, the failure to 
prove a significant association between the extent of information disclosure and 
the other qualitative aspects of CARs -type of audit report and timeliness of CARs- 
throws a considerable doubt on other studies which used only one measure of 
corporate disclosure practices. It is necessary to observe at least three measures of 
corporate disclosure practice in order to draw conclusions on the quality of 
reporting One has to observe the timeliness of disclosures, the type of audit 
opinion and the extent of voluntary disclosures or extent of mandatory 
disclosures.
12Hq = Kruskal-Wallis distribution statistic.
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CHAPTER EIGHT.
FINDINGS: FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH DISCLOSURE PRACTICES.
&1). INTRODUCTION.
The objective of this chapter is to present the results of all the statistical tests and 
other procedures performed in order to identify the factors associated with 
disclosure practices in Tanzania
The chapter is divided into eleven sections. The next section presents results 
relating to the association between the four variables used to capture corporate 
disclosure practices and profitability. This is followed by findings relating to type of 
accounting firms, type of corporate governance in place, company size, number of 
qualified accountants employed, industry type, liquidity, number of sources of loan 
capital and proportion of liquid assets in place. Finally, the factors found to be 
associated with disclosure practices are summarised and the relationship across 
these factors examined in section eleven.
82.) PROFITABILITY.
Hypothesis 621 states that disclosure practices are associated with the level of 
profits earned by corporations in Tanzania. Two aspects of profitability were 
scrutinised in order to test this hypothesis. The two aspects were captured by the 
profit before tax to turnover ratio (P/T) and the profit after tax to owners' equity 
(P/  E). The findings are presented below:
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821). Profit before tax to turnover ratio:
This ratio may be used as a measure of the company's ability to absorb rising costs. 
The higher the ratio, the stronger is the company in terms of ability to withstand 
price competition. A company with a higher profit before tax to turnover ratio is in 
a better position to incur the rising cost of corporate information disclosure. It is 
also less likely to be afraid of price competition. It is expected, therefore, that 
companies whose profit/turnover ratio is higher will have more timely CARs, 
comply more fully with statutory requirements, receive more favourable audit 
reports and have more extensive voluntary disclosures.
This hypothesis was investigated in several stages. First, the relationships between 
the extent of mandatory disclosure, the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
timeliness of disclosure; on the one hand, and P/T ratio, on the other, were tested 
using Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient's test as was discussed in 
chapter six. Results are presented in table 821(a) below:
Table 8.2.1: The association between the three measures of quality of corporate
disclosure practices and P /T  ratio as revealed by the Spearman's rank 
order correlation test.
Disclosure practices profit/turnover z sig. at
(coefficients)
Mandatory disclosures -0 .12 -0 .906 17 %
Voluntary disclosures -0 .03 -0 .218 3 9 *
Timeliness of CARs -0 .27 -1 .93 3 *
As can be observed from table 821(a), the correlation coefficients test revealed that 
the timeliness of disclosure is associated with the profit to turnover ratio at the 3%
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confidence leveL It is observed that less profitable firms take longer time to 
disclose corporate information than their more profitable counterparts. The results 
also show that the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure are not related to 
P/T ratio.
Hypothesis 62.1 is therefore confirmed for the timeliness of disclosures. More 
profitable companies could probably afford to absorb rising costs including perhaps 
hiring accounting firms to help them clear their accounts once they are in arrears.
In the second stage; the relationship between the type of audit opinion and P/T 
was tested using Kruskal-Wallis. The sample was segregated into quartiles on the 
basis of P/T ratio. Type of audit opinion of the resulting four independent groups 
were compared using Kruskal-Wallis test. The result reveals that type of audit 
opinion is not related to P/T ratio. The observed Kruskal-Wallis statistic is 1.656 
while the critical value at the 5% confidence level is 7.82%.
822). Net profit to equity ratio.
The second aspect of profitability was captured by the use of net profit to equity 
(P/ E) ratio. This ratio may be used as a measure of good management (Singhvi, 
1967; 1968). A company whose P /  E ratio is high is more likely to impress owners 
and thus attract more resources. Managers of such companies are likely to disclose 
more information in order to justify their position, compensation and possibly 
improve their human capital.
Again the association between P/ E ratio and disclosure practices was investigated 
in two stages as discussed in chapter six First, Spearman's rank order correlation 
test was performed on the relationship between P/ E ratio, on the one hand and the
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extent of mandatory disclosure, extent of voluntary disclosure and timeliness of 
disclosure, on the other. Results are presented in table 822. below:
Table 8.2.2: The association between the three measures of quality of corporate disclosures 
and P/E ratio as revealed by Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficients test.
Disclosure practices P/E corr Z sig at X
coefficients
Mandatory disclosures 0.066 0.495 3 13
Voluntary disclosures -0 .24 -1 .747 4%
Timeliness of disclosures 0.123 0.876 1975
From table 822 it can be seen that while the extent of mandatory disclosure and 
timeliness of CARs are not associated with P/ E ratio at the 5% confidence level, the 
extent of voluntary disclosure was found to be associated with this ratio at the 4% 
confidence limits. The companies with lower P/ E ratio tend to disclose more 
voluntary information items.
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that companies would disclose more 
information if that will enable them to access the required resources. This reflects 
the general management practice observed in chapter three. Managerial 
compensation or resource allocation is not based on performance in Tanzania.
Loss making companies were receiving direct state subsidies or preferential 
treatment where politicians believe it is in the national interest to do so. Managers 
in turn were motivated to disclose more voluntary information in order to give 
the impression that they are not in serious trouble despite their loss making status.
In the second stage, the relationship between P/ E and type of audit opinion was 
tested using both Kruskal-Wallis test and x2-test. Both tests revealed that there is a 
relationship between the type of audit opinion and P/E ratio. Companies with 
higher P/E tends to receive qualified audit reports. This finding reinforces the
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observation presented above regarding the extent of voluntaiy disclosures. Firms 
with lower P/ E ratio tend to receive dean audit reports and also tend disdose more 
voluntaiy information items. These findings are consistent with those of Warren 
(1975). He argued that the his observation was likely to result from the attempts by 
less profitable firms to 'capture' their auditors in order to signal 'good news'. The 
observed Kruskal-Wallis statistic was 10.49 while the expected Kruskal-Wallis 
statistic at the 5% confidence level is 7.82. The observed ^ -statistic was 9.947 while 
the expected x2-statistic at the 5% confidence limit with 3 degrees of freedom is 
7.82.
83). THE TYPE OF ACCOUNTING FIRM PROVIDING AUDIT SERVICES:
Hypothesis 622 states that type of accounting firm auditing CARs is assodated 
with disdosure practices in the country. The major role of auditors is to instil the 
public confidence in CARs. They examine finandal records and report whether the 
finandal statements present fairly the finandal position and results of operations. 
They also give assurance that all relevant information has been disdosed. It is, 
therefore, the auditors' duty to demand that all significant information items be 
disdosed.
In order to investigate hypothesis 622, the sample was divided into three groups 
on the basis of the type of accounting firm auditing the companies. As pointed out 
in chapter six, three types of auditors are international accounting firms, state- 
owned firms and domestic private firms.
The disdosure practices of the three groups are presented in Table 83(a). Results of 
Kruskal-Wallis test are presented in table 83(b). It is revealed that disdosure 
practices are assodated with the type of accounting firm providing audit services. 
While companies audited by international accounting firms complied more fully
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with statutory requirements and had more timely CARs, the companies audited by 
parastatal accounting firms had more voluntaiy information items. These facts 
were established at the 5% confidence level These observations are likely to be due 
to discriminatory regulatory power accorded to the NBAA as was discussed in 
chapter four.
Table 8.3(a): Summary of disclosure practices of companies segregated on the basis of 
the type of accounting firm .
International firms State-owned firms Domestic private firms
Number of companies 17 26 15
Mandatory disclosures 69 48 44
Voluntary disclosures 17 18.5 10
Type of audit opinion 5  5 5
Timeliness of disclosures 5 7.5 9
Table 8.3(b): The association between disclosure practices and the type of accounting
firms as revealed by Kruskal-Wallis test.
Disclosure Practices Ho X5 X10
Mandatory disclosures 22.55 5.99 4.60
Voluntary disclosures 6.95 5.99 4.60
Type of audit opinion 4.39 5.99 4.60
Timeliness of CARs 11.61 5.99 4.60
Key: Ho *  Calculated Kruskal-Wallis parameter.
X5 « critical value for accepting null hypothesis at the 5 8  confidence level.
X 10 -  critical value for accepting null hypothesis at the 108 confidence level.
As can be seen from table 83(b), type of audit opinion was found not to be 
associated with the type of accounting firm offering auditing services at the 5% 
confidence level x2-test also confirmed that the type of audit opinion is not related
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to the type of accounting firm providing auditing services. The observed £2- 
statistic was 5.502 while the ejected £2-statistic at the 5% confidence limits with 6 
degrees of freedom is 1239.
R4) TYPE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Hypothesis 623 was designed to test the relationship between corporate 
information disclosure practices and type of corporate governance. As discussed in 
chapter six, four types of corporate governance were identified in Tanzania. The 
sample was then segregated into four groups according to the type of corporate 
governance in place. Disclosure practices of these fbur independent groups are 
presented in table 8.4(a).
Table 8.4(a): Disclosure Practices of companies categorised by the type of corporate governance.
MNCs Parastatals Domestic private Jolnt-Ventures
Number of companies 17 22 14 5
Mandatory Disclosures 68 3 47% 45 3 54 3
Voluntary disclosures 173 193 113 193
Type of audit opinion 6% 5 3 5 3 5 3
Timeliness of disclosures 5% 7.53 9 3 6 3
Kruskal-Wallis test results of the relationship between type of corporate 
governance in place and corporate disclosure practices are presented in table 8.4(b) 
below:
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Table 8.4(b): The association between the type of corporate governance and disclosure
practices as revealed by the Kruskal-Wallis test.
Disclosure Practices Ho X5 X10
Mandatory disclosures 17.56 7.82 6.25
Voluntary disclosures 6.69 7.82 6.25
Type of audit opinion 6.59 7.82 6.25
Timeliness of CARs 14.72 7.82 6.25
The results of Kruskal-Wallis test reveals that the extent of mandatory disclosure 
and the timeliness of CARs are assodated with the type of corporate governance in 
place. MNCs and JV complied more fully with mandatory disclosure 
requirements. They also had more timely reports than their purely domestic 
counterparts. These results were confirmed at the 5% confidence limits. This 
observation reflects the superiority of foreign types of corporate governance over 
the domestic types as was argued in chapter five. This finding is consistent with 
what Singhvi (1967; 1968) observed in India The extent of voluntary disdosure is 
not assodated with the type of corporate governance. This is contrary to Wallace 
(1987) hypothesis that foreign management would be expected to be assodated with 
corporate disdosure practices because of the increased contacts. If subjecting 
corporations to international requirements induces more extensive disdosure it 
would be in terms of voluntary items rather than domestic mandatory 
requirements.
The Kruskal-WaHis test indicates that type of audit opinion is not related to the 
type of corporate governance as is presented in table 8.4(b) above. This observation 
was confirmed by the j(2-test. The observed x2-statistic was found to be 7.863 while 
the expected # -statistic at the 5% confidence limits with 9 degrees of freedom is 
16.92
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85). SIZE
Hypothesis 624 states that company size is associated with corporate information 
disclosure practices. It is expected that larger firms are assodated with better 
disdosure practices. This is because larger firms are likely to accumulate similar 
information items for internal decision while the smaller ones are likely to gather 
such items primarily for public reporting Moreover, larger firms are more likely 
to face higher political costs than smaller ones. This hypothesis was investigated 
using two measures of corporate size as was discussed in chapter six These are 
asset size as measured by total asset value and turnover.
85.1) Turnover,
To analyse the relationship between the turnover and disdosure practices, 
Spearman's rank order correlation coeffident's test was performed between the 
extent of voluntary disdosure, the extent of mandatory disdosure and timeliness 
of disdosure, on the one hand, and turnover, on the other. The assodation 
between the type of audit opinion and turnover was investigated by dividing the 
sample into four quartiles according to the size of each company as measured by 
the turnover. The type of audit opinion of the resulting four independent groups 
was compared using Kruskal-Walhs and x2 tests.
Table 85.1 below presents the results of the correlation coeffident's test. 
Assodation between the extent of voluntary disdosure and turnover was proven 
by Spearman's rank order correlation test at 3% confidence leveL This finding 
confirms the political cost hypothesis that large firms would strive to disdose 
more information in order to minimise their political risks' exposure.
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Table 8.5.1(d): The association of the three measures of corporate disclosure practices and
turnover as revealed by Spearmans rank order correlation coefficient's test.
Disclosure Practices turnover z sig. at%
(corr.)
Mandatory disclosures 0.09 0.67 2 5 3
Voluntary disclosures 0.26 1.86 33
Timeliness of CARs 0.06 0.45 33 3
With regard to the association between the type of audit opinion and turnover, 
both the Kruskal-Wallis and #-tests revealed that the two variables are not 
associated at the 5% confidence level. The Kruskal-Wallis statistic (Ho) was 7282. 
At the 5% or greater confidence Unfits, this statistic is expected to be at least 7.82 
The revealed x2-statistic was 8.968 while the critical value at the 5% confidence 
level with 9 degrees of freedom is 16.92 The type of audit opinion is, therefore, not 
related to the turnover.
852). Asset Size:
To find out whether asset size is associated with disclosure practices^  similar 
procedures performed to prove assodation between corporate disdosure practices 
and turnover were repeated. The assodation between the extent of mandatory 
disclosure practices, the extent of vohmtaiy disdosure practices and timeliness of 
disclosures, on the one hand, and the size as measured by the total value of assets, 
on the other, was investigated using Spearman's rank order correlation test. The 
relationship between type of audit opinion and the asset size was tested using both 
Kruskal-Wallis and # -tests. The results of Spearman's correlation tests are 
presented in table 852 below:
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Table 8.5.2: The association between the three measures of corporate disclosure practices 
and the asset size as revealed by the Spearman's rank order correlation 
coefficient’s test.
Disclosure Practices asset size z sig. at8
(corr)
Mandatory disclosures 0.15 1.13 138
Voluntary disclosures 0 A4 3.32 08
Timeliness of CARs -0 .07 0.50 318
The table above indicates that size, as measured by total asset value, is associated 
with the extent of voluntaiy information disdosure. The extent of mandatoiy 
disdosure practice and timeliness of disdosure were found not to be assodated 
with asset size at the 5% confidence level. These results suggests that it does not 
matter whether size is measured by turnover or asset size. Cooke (1989) reached 
similar condusion for research conducted in Swedea
As stated above, the assodation between asset size and type of audit opinion was 
tested using both Kruskal-Wallis and # -tests. Both test revealed consistent results. 
Type of audit opinion is not assodated with asset size at the 5% confidence leveL 
The Kruskal-Wallis Statistic was 1.705 while the critical value at the 5% confidence 
level is 7.82. The observed ^-statistic was 12.456 while the critical value for the 5% 
confidence level with 9 degrees of freedom is 16.92.
8.6) NUMBER OF QUALIFIED ACCOUNTANTS EMPLOYED.
Hypothesis 625 was designed to test the relationship between the employment of 
qualified accountants and corporate disdosure practices. It has been argued that the 
observed poor disdosure practices in the public sedor in Tanzania are due to lack 
of qualified accountants (TAC, 1988; NBAA, 1985; 1989; Mengi, 1985). If this
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argument is true, then one would expect the companies which employ more 
qualified accountants to have better disclosure practices than companies which 
employ less or no accountants at all Parry and Grooves(1990) tested this hypothesis 
with evidence from Bangladesh. They could not confirm this hypothesis as was 
discussed in chapter five.
In order to test the relationship between corporate disclosure practices and the 
number of qualified accountants employed by companies operating in Tanzania, 
the sample was initially divided into two groups. One group employed no 
qualified accountants. The other group employed at least one qualified accountant 
The association between employment of accountants* on the one hand, and the 
extent of mandatory disclosure, the extent of voluntary disclosure, the timeliness 
of disclosure and the type of audit opinion, on the other, were tested using Mann- 
Whitney test as presented in chapter six The relationship between the type of 
audit opinion and the employment of accountants was further tested using *2 - 
test Disclosure practices of these two groups are presented in table 8.6(a) while 
table 8.6(b) presents the results of Mann-Whitney test
Table 8.6(a): Disclosure practices of companies categorised according to whether they employed
at least one accountant or no accountant at all.
No accountant At least one accountant
Number of companies 16
Mandatory disclosures 52.5
Voluntary disclosures 11.5
Type of audit opinion 5.0
Timeliness of disclosures 8.0
42
49.5
17.5
5.0
7.0
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Table 8.6(b): The association between the four measures of corporate disclosure practices and 
the employment of qualified accountants as revealed by Mann-Whitney test.
Mandatory disclosures 
Voluntary disclosures 
Type of audit opinion
Timeliness of disclosures
sig. at#  
95  
7
77
47
Table 8.6(b) reveals that the four measures of corporate disdosure practices are not 
assodated with the employment of qualified accountants at the 5% confidence 
level The extent of voluntaiy disdosure was, however, found to be significantly 
related to the employment of qualified accountants at the 7% confidence level. 
Companies which employ more qualified accountants tend to disdose more 
voluntaiy items. Since the relationship was only significant at the 7%, it is likely 
that the relationship is a weak one. The other other variables, that is, the extent of 
mandatory disdosure, the type of audit reports and the timeliness, from the results 
presented in table 8.6(b), are not likely to be related to the employment of qualified 
accountants.
The result of j(2-tests confirm the results presented in table 8.6(b) in that it reveals 
that type of audit opinion is not related to the employment of qualified accountant. 
The observed x2-statistic is 1266 while the critical value at the 5% confidence 
limits with 3 degrees of freedom is 7.82 Contrary to the widely held view that lack 
of adequate number of qualified accountants is responsible for the observed weak 
disdosure practices, these results show that there is no relationship between the 
employment of qualified accountants and the quality of corporate disdosure
A second approach was adopted in order to confirm the results presented above. 
The relationship between the number of accountants employed and the four
practices.
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measures of quality of disclosure practices were examined after adjusting for 
company size as was presented in chapter six Spearman's correlation coefficients 
test was applied to establish the association between the number of qualified 
accountants employed per turnover, on the one hand, and the extent of mandatoiy 
disclosure, the extent of voluntaiy disclosure and the timeliness of disclosure; on 
the other. The relationship between the number of qualified accountants 
employed per turnover and the type of audit opinion was tested by both Kruskal- 
Wallis and *2 -tests. The results of correlation coefficients test are presented in 
table 8.6(c) below
Table 8.6(c): The association between the number of accountants employed per turnover 
and disclosure practices as revealed by Spearman’s correlation test.
Disclosure Practices accountants/ z sig. at 3
turnover (corr.)
Mandatory disclosures 0.13 0.95 173
Voluntary disclosures 0.19 1.38 8 3
Timeliness of CARs -0 .18 1.29 103
Table 8.6(c) confirms the findings presented in table 8.6(b) that the employment of 
qualified accountants is not related to the quality of coiporate disclosure practices 
as measured by the extent of mandatoiy disclosure; the extent of voluntaiy 
disclosure and the timeliness of disclosures at the 5% confidence limits. Again, 
Spearman's correlation test revealed a significant association between the extent of 
voluntaiy disclosures and the employment of qualified accountants at the 8% 
confidence level. It appears that there is a weak relationship between the extent of 
voluntaiy disclosures and the employment of qualified accountants.
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The results of Kruskal-Wallis and #-tests also confirmed the findings reported 
above that type of audit opinion is not related to the employment of qualified 
accountants. Kruskal-Wallis statistic observed was 4.77 while the critical value at 
the 5% confidence limits is 7.82. The observed y l statistic was 5.093 while the 
critical value at the 5% confidence limits with 9 degrees of freedom is 16.91
8.7). INDUSTRY TYPE
Hypothesis 6.16 was designed to investigate the relationship between industiy type 
and disclosure practices. Disclosure practices were expected to vaiy with industiy 
because information are industiy specific. Again, regulatory agencies vary with 
industiy type. Yet, there are industiy leaders and followers. The leaders set the 
standards to be followed by other companies in the industiy.
Although the methods adopted by this study controlled for the differences in 
information needs, the disclosure practices were expected to vaiy with the type of 
industiy. First, two of the four measures of corporate disclosure practices were not 
controlled for. These are type of audit opinion and timeliness of disclosures. The 
second point is more significant. The different industries are monitored by 
different regulatoiy agencies. For example, the different industries are regulated by 
different ministries. If the different ministries differ in their effective use of CARs 
and in monitoring coiporate activities, then corporate disclosure practices should 
vaiy from one industiy to another. Thirdly, the difference was also expected 
because of different priorities accorded to different industries by the politicians. 
Some industries are considered to be of more strategic importance than others.
To test hypothesis 626, the sample was divided into five industries represented in 
the study. Quality of disdosure practices of the companies represented in the five 
industries under investigation are presented in table 8.7(a) below
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Table 8.7(a): Quality of disclosure practices of companies categorised by Industry.
Disclosure Practices Type of Industry
distribution chemical metal financial textiles
etc etc institutions
No. of coys 20 11 15 6 6
Mandatory disclosures 50.5 49 53 62.5 45
Voluntary disclosures 15 15 17 29 16
Type of audit opinion 5 5 5 5 5
Timeliness of disclosures 8.5 6.5 7 6.5 6
The relationship between the extent of mandatoiy disclosure, the extent of 
vohmtaiy disdosure, the type of audit opinion and the timeliness of disdosures, 
on the one hand, and the type of industiy, on the other, was tested using Kruskal- 
Wallis test The relationship between the type of audit opinion and type of 
industiy was further tested using x2-test. The results of Kruskal-Wallis test are 
presented in table 8.7(b) below:
Table 8.7(b): The association between the various measures of quality of corporate
disclosure practices and the industry-type as revealed by Kruskal-Wallis 
test.
Ho X5 X10
Mandatory disclosures 4.50 9.49 7.78
Voluntary disclosures 6.35 9.49 7.78
Type of audit opinion 2.25 9.49 7.78
Timeliness of CARs 2.94 9.49 7.78
Key: Ho *  Calculated Kruskal-Wallis parameter.
X5 = critical value for accepting null hypothesis at the 5 8  confidence level. 
X10 ■ critical value for accepting null hypothesis at the 108 confidence level.
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It can be seen from table 8.7(b) above that no association between the four 
measures of quality of corporate disclosure practices and industiy type was proven 
by the Kruskal-Wallis test at the 5% confidence limits. The relationship between 
type of audit opinion and the type of industiy was once more tested using yl. The 
result confirms the findings reported above that the type of industiy is not related 
to type of audit opinion. The calculated ^ -statistic is 15.454 while the critical value 
at the 5% confidence limits with 12 degrees of freedom is 21.03.
8.8). LIQUIDITY.
Hypothesis 627 states that liquidity position of a company is associated with 
corporate disclosure practices. Companies fadngliquidity problems are expected to 
disclose more information and prepare more timely reports. They are expected to 
use CARs to negotiate for financial resources. They, therefore, disclose more 
extensive information in order to present the picture that the observed liquidity 
problems do not present a serious problem.
The relationship between the extent of voluntaiy disclosure the extent of 
mandatoiy disclosure and timeliness of disclosure, on the one hand, and the 
current ratio, on the other, was tested using Spearman's rank order correlation 
coefficient's test. The association between the type of audit opinion and liquidity 
was tested by both Kruskal-Wallis and #-tests. The results of correlation 
coefficient's test are presented in table 8.8 below
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Table 8.8(d): The relationship between the three measures of quality of corporate 
disclosure practices and the current ratio as revealed by Spearman's 
correlation test.
Disclosure Practices current z sig.
ratio (corr.) at 3
Mandatory disclosures 0.15 1.132 133
Voluntary disclosures 0.16 1.210 113
Timeliness of CARs -0 .26 -1 .963 3 3
As presented in table 8.8 above, correlation coefficients' test shows no association 
between current ratio, on the one hand, and the extent of mandatoiy disclosures 
and the extent of voluntaiy disclosures, on the other. However, table 8.8 also 
shows that timeliness of disclosure is related to current ratio at the 3% confidence 
limits. Companies with higher current ratio tends to have more timely CARs. The 
current ratio reflects not only the ability to meet the maturing obligations* but also 
the ability to incur additional costs including cost of disdosing corporate 
information.
Both Kruskal-Wallis test and #-test showed that the type of audit opinion is not 
related to the current ratio. The observed Kruskal-Wallis statistic is 5.022 while the 
critical value at the 5% confidence limit is 7.82. The observed x2-statistic is 10314 
while the critical value at the 5% confidence level with 9 degrees of freedom is 
16.92.
The failure to establish association between current ratio and extent of voluntaiy 
disclosures, extent of mandatoiy disclosures and the type of audit opinion would 
seem to suggest that although banks would insist that CARs be provided before 
they can offer credit facilities, they do not use the information contents in the 
decision making process. They, for example, would accept CAR regardless of the
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audit report attached This finding is also consistent with the hypothesis that banks 
would not use CARs to establish the extent of risk they face before making credit 
decisions. It is also consistent with statements by Nsekela* (1978) that banks would 
primarily consider the government guarantee on the loans and priorities in 
allocating credit facilities to the public sector. In the private sector, Nsekela argued 
that the quality of security offered is given prime consideration in the process of 
credit allocation
8.9). NUMBER OF SOURCES OF LOAN.
Hypothesis 628 states that the number of sources of loan is associated with 
corporate information disclosure practices. In order to test this hypothesis* the 
sample was stratified into quartiles on the basis of number of sources of loan The 
resulting four groups had the quality of disclosures presented in table 8.9(a) below.
Table 8.9(a): Disclosure practices of companies stratified by number of sources of loans.
Loan Sources
Disclosure Practices 3 or less 4 5 6 or more
No of coys 12 17 15 14
Mandatory disclosures 47 41 60 51.5
Voluntary disclosures 18 12 19 18
Type of opinion 5 5 5 5
Timeliness of disclosures 8 7 7 6.5
Kruskal-Wallis test was used to examine the relationship between the extent of 
voluntaiy disclosure, the extent of mandatoiy disclosure, timeliness of disclosures 
and type of audit opinion, on the one hand, and the number of sources of loan 
capital, on the other. Results are presented in table 8.9(b) below:
1 Nsekela is the chairman and managing director of the National Bank of Commerce 
(NBC). NBC is the largest commercial bank in Tanzania.
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Table 8.9(b): The association between the four measures of quality of 
corporate disclosure and number of sources of loan as 
revealed by Kruskal-Wallis test.
Disclosure Practices Ho X5 X10
Mandatory disclosures 2.24 7.82 6.25
Voluntary disclosures 4.69 7.82 6.25
Type of audit opinion 2. 16 7.82 6.25
Timeliness of CARs 0.97 7.82 6.25
In addition, #-test was used to test the relationship between the type of audit 
opinion and the number of sources of loan. The test confirmed the results 
presented above. No association between these two variables was established. The 
observedx2-statistic was 12204 while the critical value at the 5% confidence level 
with 9 degrees of freedom is 16.92.
aiO), LIQUID ASSETS IN PLACE;
Hypothesis 629 examines the relationship between corporate disclosure practices 
and the proportion of liquid assets in place. It was anticipated that since current 
assets are easily movable than fixed assets, companies with more liquid assets 
would institute better internal control systems than companies with less. Better 
internal controls are expected to lead to better disclosure practices.
This hypothesis was investigated using Spearman's correlation coefficient and ! l -  
tests. The results of Spearman's correlation coefficients' test are presented in table 
8.10 below:
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Table 8,10: The association between the three measures of quality of corporate 
disclosure practices and the proportion of liquid assets in place.
FA/Asset size z sig. at
(corr.). %
Mandatory disclosures -0 .03 -0 .226 4\%
Voluntary disclosures 0.18 1.359 9%
Timeliness of CARs 0.12 0.857 20%
The x2-test was used to examine the relationship between the type of opinion and 
the proportion of liquid assets in place. The results show that there is no 
association between the proportion of the liquid asset and the type of audit 
opinion. The probed £2-statistic was 13.794 while the critical value at the 5% 
confidence limits with 9 degrees of freedom is 16.91
8.11) FINDINGS ACROSS VARIABLES.
Table 8.11 below summarises the results of the investigation of factors associated 
with disclosure practices in Tanzania.
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Table 8,11: Summary of Findings on Factors Associated with Disclosure Practices in 
Tanzania.
mandatorv voluntarv timeliness tyfifi Qf.PVtfft.
P /T not associated not associated negatively associated not associated
P/E not associated negatively not associated negatively
associated associated
Type of audit firm associated associated associated not associated
Type of corporate associated not associated associated not associated
governance
Turnover not associated positively associated not associated not associated
Asset size not associated positively associated not associated not associated
qualified accountants not associated not associated not associated not associated
Industry not associated not associated not associated not associated
liquidity not associated not associated negatively associated not associated
Number of loan not associated not associated not associated not associated
sources
Proportion of liquid not associated not associated not associated not associated
assets in place
8.11.1) Type of Audit of Opinion:
P/ E was found to be associated with the type of audit opinion accorded to CARs. 
Companies with lower P/ E tends to receive more clean audit reports. Since no 
other factor was found to be related to type of audit opinion, a conclusion is drawn 
that P/ E is the only factor associated with the type of audit report.
8.112) Extent of Mandatory Disclosure:
It was observed that the extent of mandatory disclosure is related to type of 
accounting firm providing audit services and the type of corporate governance. 
These two factors to which the extent of mandatory disclosure is associated were 
themselves related. The companies audited by the international accounting firms 
are mostly MNCs. It cannot be concluded therefore that type of corporate 
governance and type of audit firm are jointly responsible for this observation or 
that only one of the two factors is responsible for the established relationship
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without controlling for at least one of the factors while observing the other. Since 
both of these factors are qualitative in nature and the extent of mandatory 
disclosure was found not to be normally distributed, it is left for future research to 
clarify the established relationship. This could be carefully considered at the 
sample design stage.
8.113) The Extent of Voluntary Disclosure:
The extent of voluntary disclosure were found to be associated with P/ E ratio, 
turnover, asset size and type of accounting firm providing audit services. It was 
reported in chapter six (section 65) that P /  E ratio and Asset size are related at the 
4% confidence level It was also observed that turnover and asset size are related at 
the 0% confidence limits. In light of these observations* it is difficulty to conclude 
whether P/ E ratio and asset size are both related to the extent of voluntary 
disclosure practices or just one of them is, without observing the relationship 
when one of the variables is controlled for.
The asset size was first controlled for2 in order to observe the relationship between 
P/  E and the extent of voluntary disclosure. It was found that P/  E is not 
significantly related to the extent of voluntary information disclosure when the 
asset size is controlled for at the 5% confidence limits. The association could only 
be established at the 13% confidence level (r,= -0.152; z = -1.107).
In the second stage, ?/ E was controlled while observing the relationship between 
the extent of voluntary disclosure and the asset size. It was discovered that the 
extent of voluntary information disclosure is related to the asset size at the 0% 
confidence level when P/ E ratio is controlled for (rs = 0374; z = 2.824). It is
2This was controlled for through partial correlations.
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therefore concluded that it is the asset size which is responsible for the observed 
association.
It was observed, however, that turnover and asset size are related at the 0% 
confidence limits. Yet, the extent of voluntaiy disclosure was found to be related to 
both of these measures of size. In order to find out which measure of size best 
explains the extent of voluntaiy disclosure, it was decided to first, examine the 
relationship between turnover and the extent of voluntaiy disclosure when asset 
size is controlled through partial correlations. It was found that association 
between turnover and the extent of voluntaiy disclosure could be established only 
at the 47% confidence level (rf = -QD1; z = -0.07).
In the second place, the association between the asset size and the extent of 
voluntaiy information disclosure was observed when turnover was controlled for 
through partial correlations. It was found that the asset size and the extent of 
voluntary information disclosure are related at the 0% confidence level when the 
turnover is controlled for (r} = 0374; z = 2.824). Size; as measured by asset size 
appears to explain better the extent of voluntaiy information disdosure than size 
measured by turnover. One explanation of this is likely to be that the political costs 
are more related to the asset size than to turnover since politicians appear to be 
more concerned with the property ownership as was discussed in chapter.
In conclusion, the extent of voluntaiy disclosure is related to the asset size and the 
type of accounting firm providing audit services. It was observed that large firms 
in terms of asset size appear to be disclosing more voluntaiy informatioa It was 
also observed that companies audited by state-owned audit firms tends to 
volunteer more information.
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8.11.4) The Timeliness of Disclosure:
It was observed that timeliness of disclosure is related to P/T ratio, type of 
accounting firm providing audit services, type of corporate governance and the 
current ratio. It was also reported that P/T and current ratio are related at the 0% 
confidence level and that the type of corporate governance and type of accounting 
firms are related
The Current ratio was controlled for in order to observe the relationship between 
P/T and the timeliness of disclosure. P/T ratio was controlled for next, while 
observing the relationship between the timeliness of disclosure and the current 
ratio. It was found that both the current ratio and the P/T ratio are jointly 
responsible for the observed timeliness of disclosure.
When the current ratio was controlled for, the association between P/T and the 
timeliness of disclosure was only proven at the 10% confidence level (r, = -0.1812; 
z= -1.294). The association between the current ratio and the timeliness of 
disclosure could only be established at the 10% confidence level when P/T is 
controlled for (r, = -0.1734; z = -126).
Since P/ T ratio was considered to be a measure of the ability to absorb the rising 
costs while the current ratio measures the ability to meet the maturing obligations, 
it is surprising to discover that both these factors are responsible for the observed 
timeliness of disclosure. It therefore implies that the profitable companies must 
have sound liquidity position in order to have timely financial reports.
The other two factors associated with timeliness of disclosures are type of 
accounting firm and type of corporate governance. It was observed that companies 
audited by international accounting firms have more timely reports than those
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audited by the domestic accounting firms. It was further observed that MNCs have 
more timely CARs than their domestic counterparts Since the association between 
the type of corporate governance and the type of accounting firms was also 
established, it is not known for certain whether the association which has been 
established is related to the type of corporate governance or type of accounting firm 
or both. Since both of these factors are qualitative in nature, it is left for future 
research to clarify these relationships.
In conclusion, it has been established that the timeliness of disclosure is associated 
jointly with P/T and current ratio ratio. Type of corporate governance and type of 
audit firm where also found to be related to timeliness of disclosure. But there is a 
need for future research to clarify whether type of corporate governance and type 
of audit firm are jointly responsible for the observed timeliness of disclosure or 
only one of the two factors is.
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CHAPTER NINE.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.
9.1) INTRODUCTION.
The objective of this study was to extend our knowledge of the factors associated 
with disclosure practices in a developing country - Tanzania. Knowledge of the 
factors related to corporate disclosure practices in the developing world is far from 
perfect. Since the environments of the developing world are significantly different 
from those of the western economies, as discussed in chapter one, it was 
considered useful to investigate relevant factors in these environments. 
Knowledge of these factors is likely to lead to improved disclosure practices in the 
developing countries.
Tanzania is of particular interest for several reasons. First, it is among veiy few 
countries which attempted to evolve its own approach to economic development. 
This was the subject of chapter two. It is of interest to confirm the applicability of 
existing theories of disclosure in this unique environment. Secondly, little is 
known about disclosure practices in developing countries in general, and Africa in 
particular. Tanzania is reported to be among the few African countries with 
advanced regulatoiy framework (U. N, 1991a). Tanzania and Zimbabwe are 
reported by the World Bank, the United Nations Centre on Transnational 
Corporations and the International Labour Organisation to have the best accounts 
in Africa (NBAA, 1991 p.44). In light of these observations, it was considered of 
interest to investigate factors related to corporate disclosure practices in Tanzania.
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There was a secondary objective for undertaking this study. No detailed research 
on corporate disclosure practices has ever been based on Tanzania. This study, 
therefore, aimed at filling this gap.
Most studies on corporate disclosure practices in developing countries have 
focused narrowly on the quantity of information disclosed. As presented in 
chapters three and four, the other qualitative aspects of information cannot be 
taken for granted The regulatory framework and enforcement mechanisms were 
observed to be inadequate in Tanzania. Furthermore, there is widespread shortage 
of qualified accountants and there is no stock exchange to exert pressure for 
improved financial reporting It was decided, therefore, to use all encompassing 
measures of quality of corporate disclosures and also investigate whether one 
measure could be used as a proxy for quality of financial reports. Thus, four 
measures were used to capture the quality of corporate disclosure practices. These 
are the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosures, timeliness of disclosure 
and type of audit opinion. The extent of voluntaiy and mandatory disclosure were 
captured by the use of two indices of disclosure as presented in chapter seven. Most 
studies reported in chapter five focused only on one of the four variables. The 
relationships between these four measures of quality of corporate information 
disclosure were investigated using Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficient's 
test. As pointed out above, this was necessary in order to establish whether the 
four measures of quality of disclosures were required to study disclosure practices 
or just one of them could be used as a proxy to disclosure quality.
As a result of literature reviewed (see chapter five), eleven explanatory variables 
were examined. These are P/T ratio, P/E ratio, current ratio, proportion of liquid 
assets in place, employment of qualified accountants, type of accounting firm 
providing audit services, type of corporate governance in place, asset size, 
turnover, number of sources of loan capital and type of industry. After examining
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the nature of data and their distribution in chapter six and seven, Spearman's rank 
order correlation coefficients', Kruskal-Wallis, Mann-Whitney and x2-tests were 
used to examine the relationship between the measures of quality of corporate 
disclosure practices and the explanatory variables.
The objective of this chapter is to draw conclusions and provide a summary of the 
major findings of this study. It is divided into four sections. The next section 
summarises the findings of this study and possible explanations for the findings. 
This is followed by a discussion of the limitations of this research, finally, various 
potential future studies are recommended.
9.2). SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND THE LIKELY EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS.
Chapter three discussed the corporate governance in Tanzania. Its main objective 
was to investigate the framework within which the accounting information is 
diffused and used in the decision making process. It was found that this 
framework is ill-developed. Most decisions are made without reference to 
accounting information. As presented in chapter four, there is a general consensus 
that lack of qualified accountants explains the unsatisfactory disclosure practices in 
the country. There is also a general consensus that this is a "national" problem and 
that, therefore, there is no point of penalising corporations for issues beyond their 
control. Improved disclosure practices are expected to result from the increase in 
the number of qualified accountants.
It was further observed in chapter four that although significant efforts were made 
in order to regulate financial reporting in Tanzania, no attention was devoted to 
building a framework within which accounting information could be used. No 
attempt was made to develop a framework within which usefulness of
249
promulgated accounting standards could be evaluated. No attempt was made, for 
example, to develop a conceptual framework of accounting This has resulted in a 
disclosure regulatoiy approach being adopted in Tanzania. In light of the 
environment discussed in chapter two and three, it is argued that this was not the 
rigjit approach to accounting regulation in Tanzania. A stock exchange, financial 
analysts, stock brokers and all the intermediaries which make corporate 
information disclosure througji CARs meaningful, are all lacking By June 1990, 
out of more than twenty thousand companies, only five were public companies. 
The situation was probably worse when disclosure approach to accounting 
regulation was adopted in June 1983. It is probable that more emphasis on 
National Accounting Public Sector Accounting and Managerial Accounting would 
have been more appropriate at the time.
Chapter seven examined the quality of corporate disclosure practices and what 
variables could be used to measure such quality. Four measures of quality of 
disclosures were considered. These are the extent of mandatory disclosures, the 
extent of voluntary disclosures, timeliness of disclosures and type of audit opinion 
received by these disclosures. As presented in table 7.8(b), correlation coefficients' 
test revealed a significant relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosure 
and the extent of voluntary disclosures. The other measures of quality of corporate 
disclosures did not show a significant relationship at the five percent confidence 
level, as a look at table 7.8(b) would reveal. Based on this evidence, the conclusion 
is drawn that it will be necessary for future research on quality of corporate 
disclosure practices to examine at least three measures of quality. The extent of 
voluntary or mandatory disclosure could be used to capture the extent to which 
corporate information is disclosed through the CARs. But if conclusions are to be 
drawn on the quality of corporate disclosure practices, it is considered essential that 
timeliness of CARs and type of audit opinions are also examined.
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Chapter seven also discussed corporate disclosure practices in Tanzania and 
attempted to compare these results to findings reported elsewhere, namely:
Nigeria, India and Mexico. This comparison is summarised in table 7.5. Due to 
differences in research methodology and the environments, it may not be 
revealing to compare disclosure practices of corporations located in different 
countries. However, to the extent that each of these studies attempted to describe 
disclosure practices in these countries, they can be compared. It appears that 
disclosure practices in developing countries are not satisfactory. It was observed, 
for example, that only 50.5% of mandatory disclosure items are disclosed in 
Tanzania. This low level of compliance with mandatoiy requirements is, perhaps, 
due to ineffective enforcement mechanisms as reported in chapter four. Currently, 
the NBAA relies on the auditors to demand compliance with its regulatory 
requirements. It could, perhaps be more effective, in light of the observations of 
this study, for the NBAA to start monitoring the extent of compliance with its 
disclosure requirements itself. The NBAA could perform this by requiring all 
companies to file annual reports with the NBAA The filed CARs could then form 
a basis for preparing disclosure scores for each corporation and appropriate 
regulatory action taken for companies which fail to comply with regulatory 
requirements. Precisely how this could be organised for effective results is a matter 
for future research.
Chapter eight presents the main findings of this research. Eeven corporate 
attributes were investigated in order to find factors associated with corporate 
disclosure practices. The selection of these attributes were based on the literature 
review presented in chapter five. These are P/T ratio, P/ E ratio, type of accounting 
firms providing audit service, type of corporate governance, turnover, asset size, 
employment of qualified accountants, type of industiy, current ratio, number of 
sources of loan capital and proportion of liquid assets in place.The results of the 
findings are summarised in table 8.11.
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The extent of mandatory information disclosure was found to be related to type of 
accounting firm and type of corporate governance in place. However, it could not 
be established whether these two factors were jointly responsible for the observed 
disclosure practices or just one of them is responsible for the observations. MNCs 
and companies audited by international accounting firms were found to comply 
more fully with the mandatory disclosure requirements. Yet, it was also observed 
that International Accounting firms tend to audit MNCs. In order to find out 
which of the two factors is specifically responsible for what has been observed, it is 
necessary to control for one of the factors while observing the other. This can be 
done at the data analysis stage or at the sample design stage. As both factors are 
qualitative in nature and the extent of mandatory disclosure was not found to be 
normally distributed, it is left for future research to clarify these relationships.
Theoretically, both factors may be associated with the extent of mandatory 
information disclosure. Although auditors are expected to demand compliance 
with statutory requirements, there are two main reasons which may lead to this 
observation:
- Section 39 of the Accountants and Auditors (Registration) Act (1972) exempts 
state-owned audit firms from regulatory powers of NBAA State-owned firms are, 
therefore, not legally obliged to demand compliance with regulations stipulated 
with the NBAA
- International accounting firms may be associated with better mandatory 
disclosure practices because of their long experience and experience gained from 
different countries. It appears that International Accounting firms are in a better 
position to demand compliance and also guide their clients on mandatory 
requirements. As reported in chapter four, Coopers and Lybrand, for example, 
prepared a comprehensive disclosure check-list immediately disclosure 
requirements were approved by the governing board of the NBAA No domestic
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accounting firm has prepared such general guide-lines for its clients.
Type of corporate governance may also be related to the extent of mandatoiy 
information disclosure. Most MNCs have executive directors who are mainly 
professional managers while most domestic companies do not have qualified 
professional managers as their directors. Moreover, parastatal directors are non­
executive. They are mainly civil servants who are likely to lack professional 
experience and training needed to effectively monitor corporate activities. Also, 
the fact that they are non-executive and, therefore, part-time may imply that they 
consider their responsibility as directors to be secondaiy and may, therefore, not 
devote the necessary time for effective direction of companies. A two-tier board 
was recommended in chapter three. There is, however, an urgent need for 
research which may lead to ways and means of making the boards more effective 
organs of corporate governance.
MNCs also tend to pay higher salaries (Chandrasekhar and Bagachwa, 1984b). 
Employees of the MNCs receive adequate remuneration to afford them a decent 
lifestyle without resorting to the second market described by Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa, (1990). Contrast this to parastatal employees who are encouraged by the 
government to participate in the second maiket
The extent of voluntary disclosure was initially found to be related to P/E ratio, 
type of accounting firm providing audit services, turnover and asset size. After 
controlling for the related variables through partial correlations, the extent of 
voluntaiy disclosure was observed to be associated with type of accounting firm 
providing audit services and the asset size. Positive association between asset size 
and extent of voluntary disclosures was proven. Companies audited by state- 
owned audit firms were found to volunteer more corporate information. This was 
significant at the 5% confidence limits.
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This finding reflects the observation reported in chapter four that interviewees 
within the state-owned audit firms aired dissatisfaction with the current disclosure 
requirements as specified by the TSSAPs. They argued, that significant disclosure 
items such as Kiswahili translation of CARs were not prescribed by the NBAA It 
appears that the state-owned audit firms use the overriding principle of "true and 
fair view" to demand disclosure of items other than the ones specified by TSSAPs. 
It is necessary for regulatory authorities to take steps which would make the 
stipulated standards acceptable to most professionals. Onesuch step appears to be 
the need to receive responses from the widest possible audience. It may be 
necessary to send exposure drafts to individual professionals and other interested 
parties in addition to the current practice of sending them to the institutions. Only 
nine responses were received for the exposure drafts which led to the 
promulgation of TSSAPs.
The positive association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and asset size 
may be explained by different factors. More people tend to be interested in activities 
of larger firms than smaller ones. Larger firms would, therefore, attempt to 
volunteer more information in order to pre-empt the requirement by the 
interested parties for special reports. Moreover, the environment discussed in 
chapters two and three indicates that political costs are relatively high in Tanzania. 
Larger firms tends to face more political costs as they tend to be regarded as the 
"Commanding Heights" of the economy. This revelation also confirms the fact 
that political risks tend to be related to asset size rather than turnover (Cooke,
1989).
The positive association between the extent of voluntaiy disclosures and asset size 
was, perhaps, observed in Tanzania for yet another reason. It is possible that larger 
firms tend to accumulate disclosure items for their internal decisions, whereas,
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their smaller counterparts accumulate the same information items primarily for 
external financial reporting purposes. This makes, as pointed out in chapter five, 
disclosure costs a more severe constraint on smaller companies than the larger 
ones.
Timeliness of CARs was found to be related to P/T ratio, current ratio, type of audit 
firm providing audit services and type of corporate governance, MNCs and 
companies audited by International Accounting firms were found to have more 
timely CARs than their domestic counterparts, yet it was also observed that most 
MNCs are also audited by International Accounting firms as previously stated. It 
was therefore necessary to control for one of the two factors in order to establish a 
relationship between the non-controlled variable and timeliness of disclosure. 
Again, it was not feasible to control for either of the two factors. This was because 
both factors were qualitative in nature and timeliness of disclosure was not 
normally distributed as was discussed in chapter seven. It is therefore left for 
future research to clarify these relationships, perhaps through matching at the 
sample design stage.
P/T ratio and current ratio were jointly found to be responsible for timeliness of 
disclosure. Corporations with higher P/T ratio and higher current ratio tend to 
have more timely reports. While P/T ratio measures the ability to absorb rising 
costs, current ratio measures the ability to meet the maturing obligations. This 
study has revealed that the most significant factors explaining the timeliness of 
disclosure in Tanzania are the ability to incur additional cost of corporate 
information disclosure and the ability to actually pay such additional costs as they 
fall due.
Type of audit opinion was found to be related to P/E ratio. Companies with higher 
P/ E ratio tend to receive more qualified audit reports. As was presented in chapter
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seven, most audit qualifications were related to cash transactions. 33% of audit 
qualifications were due to failure to reconcile bank records and the company's 
bank records. Cases were observed where deliberate attempts were made to conceal 
such discrepancies through dubious methods such as writing them off as 
uncollectible debts. It maybe argued that the observed association between the type 
of audit reports and P/ E reflects the good managers' desire to have a performance 
linked remuneration system. Since wages and salaries are set at levels below the 
minimum amount necessaiy to sustain workers and managers for the whole 
month, the best performing managers in terms of P/ E ratio would attempt to 
obtain funds from the company through unofficial means and also attempt to 
conceal this fact as it is against the stipulated regulations. These results suggest that 
the temptation to obtain funds from the companies unofficially tends to increase 
with P/E ratio. Singhvi and Desai (1971) observed that when P/E ratio is high, 
managers would indulge themselves with practices which would attract a better 
compensation package for themselves. Since the compensation scheme is not 
linked to performance in Tanzania, managers of good performing companies may 
tend to resort to unofficial means and ways to circumvent the stipulated 
regulations. Since auditors role is to ensure that CARs present "true and fair" 
view, they attempt to disclose such instances.
It can now be summarised that the extent of mandatory disclosures may be 
associated with the type of corporate governance or type of accounting firm 
providing accounting services or both. There is need for research to confirm this.
It has been established that the extent of voluntary disclosure is related to the asset 
size and type of accounting firms providing audit services. It was found that the 
timeliness of CARs is associated Jointly with the current ratio and P/T ratio. In 
addition, timeliness of disclosures may also be associated with the type of corporate 
governance, type of audit firm or both.
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Given the nature of these findings, the likely explanation of the observed 
unsatisfactory disclosure practices observed in Tanzania are summarised below:
- The possibility that corporations may be lacking the capacity to absorb the 
necessary costs of disclosure. Some corporations can afford to absorb rising costs
in the sense that although their profit margin may be high enough they cannot 
afford to pay the costs of disclosure because of liquidity problems. Examples of 
such costs are audit fees, resources needed to engage consulting firms to help in 
writing-up books and cost of instituting appropriate accounting systems.
- The political costs and potential for interference appears to be high. The threat of 
government intervention and the possibility that the interested parties may 
require special reports appears to be equally high. Larger firms tend to pre-empt
these threats by volunteering information on their own.
- The non-acceptance of regulatory requirements coupled with discriminatoiy 
regulatory powers of the NBAA appears to contribute towards the observed 
disclosure practices. It may therefore be necessary for regulatory authorities to 
reconsider the need to exempt the TAC and the Controller and Auditor-General 
from the regulatory powers of the NBAA as is stipulated by section 39 of the Act
- The results also reveal that differences in compensation packages, professional 
experience and training and executive directors as opposed to non-executive 
directors are likely to be responsible for the observed disclosure practices. These 
factors are discussed in detail in chapter three.
Future research is recommended to confirm these hypotheses. Such a study should 
be designed to investigate the causes of the observed unsatisfactory disclosure 
practices.
But most of all, the lack of a well thought-out framework within which accounting 
information could be used is responsible for the unsatisfactory state of accounts. As 
is discussed in chapter five, Foster(1986) argued that the information set available 
to external parties in corporations is dependent on market forces, regulatory forces
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and decisions based on accounting information. This view was reinforced by 
Wallace and Briston (1991) in the context of developing countries. They argued 
that accounting infrastructure in developing countries comprises three main 
factors. These are the framework within which accounting information is diffused 
and put into use, facilities of information production and quality control systems.
Wallace and Briston (1991) argued that facilities of information production or 
supply function include facilities in place for training and educating professional 
accountants, and equipment and institutions available to aid preparers in the 
CARs preparation stages. They hold that the framework for corporate information 
diffusion or demand function includes the framework in place through which 
corporate information is put into the decision making process. In situations where 
there is a proper framework to use accounting information such as the existence of 
an active stock exchange, a critical and effective financial press and other 
intermediaries, there are automatic incentives for corporations to improve 
disclosure practices. Corporations are likely to improve their disclosure practices in 
order to access financial resources at reasonable costs.
They also maintained that quality control systems include laws and regulations 
that govern the production, transmission and usage of accounting information. 
Legal entities and personnel who are involved in the process of implementing the 
laws and regulations relating to financial reporting are all included in this 
categoiy.
It is argued that any strategy aimed at improving disclosure practices in developing 
countries must aim at improving all three aspects of the accounting infrastructure. 
Attempts to concentrate only on one or two of these three factors is not likely to 
succeed. Thus attempts to improve disclosure practices through increasing the 
number of qualified accountants have not been successful. While, perhaps, the
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increased number of qualified professional accountants has a potential for 
improved disclosure practices, in itself, the increase in the number of qualified 
accountants in a country is not likely to create a demand for accounting 
information and, therefore, is unlikely to improve the current unsatisfactory state 
of affairs. Tanzania is higjrly regarded as having taken appropriate steps towards 
accounting regulation and training Yet, these steps are not reflected in the 
disclosure practices. There is a need to focus now on the framework within which 
the accounting information could be used.
9.3) LIMITATIONS.
This research focused on CARs. There are, however, several avenues through 
corporate information could be disclosed. For example, management audit reports 
are a fairly public document for the public sector companies. It is therefore 
recommended that future research on disclosure practices should also examine 
management audit reports and other media of disclosure. Such research is likely to 
give a fuller picture of corporate information available to the public.
The impact of the number of qualified accountants employed was examined 
without specific reference to the accountants' responsibility in the organisation. 
While the NBAA register for Authorised Accountants and Auditors provides the 
accountants1 specific responsibility in the organisation, the second register - the 
approved accountant's register -provides no such detail. Professional accountants 
may serve as CEOs, directors of finance, management accountants, internal 
auditors, etc While the existence of a qualified accountant in a corporation is likely 
to have an influence on financial reporting even when the accountant is not 
directly involved with financial reporting it is recommended that future research 
examine the impact of employment of qualified accountants after controlling for 
the exact role performed by the accountants in question.
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Difficulties faced in the data collection stage, as presented in chapter si* means that 
the observed practices are biased and presents the best picture of disclosure 
practices in the country. 98 companies or 40% of the initial simple random sample 
did not file the annual reports. The two sampling frames used contained 
companies which were not operational. The problems faced are discussed in 
chapter six In light of these problems, it is possible that the sample under study is 
biased towards companies with the best disclosure practices. Interpretation of the 
findings must take this observation into account.
Limitations in research funds and other resources coupled with difficulties faced in 
the data collection stage meant that a rather small sample was used in this study. 
The smallness of the sample size meant that some issues were not adequately 
clarified. It was not possible, for example, to establish whether the extent of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements and timeliness of disclosure 
are related to either type of corporate governance or type of audit firms providing 
audit services or both.
Finally, the study was intended to focus on the year 1986. However, due to non­
availability of data, it was extended to 1987. The time gap of two year may mean 
that the different CARs used in this study are not comparable simply because of 
time factor. This limitation should be considered when interpreting the results of 
this study.
9.4) FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS:
Attempts were made to suggest future research studies at an appropriate point 
throughout the study. These recommendations are now summarised in order to 
give an overview picture of pending issues:
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- Unsatisfactory disclosure practices have been observed in Tanzania. Research is 
recommended to establish the causes of the observed state of affairs. Factors 
associated with disclosure practices revealed by this study are likely to be useful 
inputs in designing such study.
- It was apparent that many companies do not file the annual returns with the 
Registrar of Companies as required by law. The evidence is presented in both 
chapter three and six of this study. It is time a study is undertaken to investigate 
why this is so. The knowledge of the factors leading to the observed situation is 
likely to lead to improved regulatory framework in Tanzania.
- This study established that the extent of compliance with disclosure 
requirements and the timeliness of disclosure are both related to corporate 
governance and type of audit firm. Since it was observed that most parastatals are 
audited by state-audit firms while most of MNCs are audited by international 
accounting firms, it was not clear whether both factors are related to the 
investigated variables or just one of them is. Differently designed research 
could throw light on this.
- It was also observed, as presented in table 7.8(b), that the extent of compliance 
with mandatory requirements and the extent of voluntary information 
disclosure are significantly related. Yet, these two investigated variables are 
associated with different factors. While it is not clear whether the extent of 
compliance with mandatory requirements is related to the type of corporate 
governance or type of auditing firm or both, the extent of voluntary information 
disclosure is related to the type of auditing firm as well as the asset size. Due to 
the small sample size, this issue could not be pursued further. A study is 
recommended to clarify this issue.
- This study revealed serious non-compliance with mandatory requirements.
This clearly indicates ineffective enforcement mechanisms. It is recommended 
that, instead of relying on auditors to demand compliance as discussed in chapter 
four, the NBAA should get itself involved in the enforcement system. Precisely
a.£oO)
how this should be organised is a matter for future research.
- Ineffective corporate governance was observed in chapter three. Various 
attempts to improve this process were also noted in the same chapter. Research is 
needed to investigate factors leading to this state of affairs and also find out 
ways and means of making board of directors more effective organs of corporate 
governance.
- Recently the government of Tanzania has seen the need to establish a stock 
exchange in the country (Malima, 1992). Financial resources could then be 
mobilised through this mechanism The creation of a stock exchange and 
individuals direct participation in the economic processes is likely to stimulate 
demand for accounting information. The current inclination towards the price 
system creates an urgent need for research which will establish the investors 
information needs in Tanzania. The findings of such research is likely to 
contribute significant inputs into the disclosure regulation in Tanzania
Appendix 3.1
INTERVIEW GUIDE:
A) NBAA
1). What is the regulatory framework for financial reporting in Tanzania?
- Regulatory agencies.
- Coordination between these agencies.
- Regulatory requirements stipulated by these agencies.
- Sources of compliance information.
- Options available for corrective actions.
2). With specific reference to the NBAA what aspects of financial 
reporting do you regulate?
- what are your sources of compliance information on these aspects, 
(professional ethics, TSSAPs, employed accountants, practicing
accountants, certification of annual tax returns, etc).
3). Do companies whose financial reporting you are regulating file their 
corporate annual reports (CARs) with you?
- Do you make use of the audit report in the regulatoiy process?
4). What sort of actions (penalties, incentives) do you take for 
compliance or non-compliance with the stipulated regulations?
5). What are the arbitrate mechanisms in cases of professional 
disputes between auditors and accountants or between auditors and 
clients or dissatisfied users of CARs.
6). What improvements on the regulatory framework do you anticipate in
the near future?
- what are inadequacies or short-comings in the current regulatory 
framework?
- what are the problems you face in the regulatory process?
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B). PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTANTS:
1). What is the regulatoiy framework for financial reporting in Tanzania?
- Regulatoiy agencies.
- Coordination between these agencies.
- Regulatoiy requirements stipulated by these agencies.
- Sources of compliance information.
- Options available for corrective actions.
2). In your opinion, is this regulatoiy framework beneficial?
- What improvements would you suggest for improving the current 
regulatoiy framework.
3). In performing your current responsibilities, you probably need CARs 
to enable you to make certain decisions.
- for what specific decisions do you need CARs?
- what specific information items do you need?
- what are the alternative sources of information?
Q  REGULATORY AGENCIES:
- Price Commissioner
- Registrar of Companies.
- Commissioner for Public Investment (CPI).
- Presidential Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisations 
(SCOPO).
- Planning Commission.
- Parliamentary Parastatal Accounts Committee (POC).
- Commissioner for income tax (CIT).
- Tanzania Audit Corporation (TAC).
- Bank of Tanzania (BOT).
- Officials in the ministries of Agriculture, Finance and Trade and 
Industries.
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1). In performing your current responsibilities, you probably need CARs 
to enable you to make certain decisions.
- for what specific decisions do you need CARs?
- Do you require corporations to file CARs with you?
- what specific information items do you need?
- what are the alternative sources of information?
- How do you compare these alternative sources of information to 
CARs?
2) What corrective actions do you take for failure to provide CARs on 
time or to encourage early submission of accounts?
3). How do you establish whether the filed CAR is reliable or not?
4). What actions do you take in situations where CARs cany qualified 
audit reports.
5). What is the regulatory framework for financial reporting in Tanzania?
- Regulatory agencies.
- Coordination between these agencies.
- Regulatory requirements stipulated by these agencies.
- Sources of compliance information.
- Options available for corrective actions.
6) What improvements would you recommend in the current financial 
reporting regulatory framework in Tanzania.
263
APPENDIX 4.1.
QUESTIONNAIRE ON FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR QUALITY OF 
FINANCIAL REPORTING IN TANZANIA 
In your opinion, to what extent does each of the following factors contribute 
negatively towards the quality of financial reporting in Tanzania?
1 2 3 4 5
not at all moderate to a large extent
extent
1. Shortage of qualified accountants [ ]
2. Inadequate office machines [ ]
3. Inadequate communication system between head office 
and branches of companies in Tanzania I 1
4. Cost of data collection and processing [ ]
5. Cost of competitive disadvantage [ 1
6. Cost of publishing CARs I 1
7. Professional disputes between accountants and
auditors [ 1
8. Possibility of intervention by government agencies I 1
9. possibility of intervention by tax authorities I J
10. Regulation of accounting practice by NBAA I 1
11. Accounting manpower turnover I 1
12. Accountants are not aware of the regulatory 
requirements I 1
13. Quality of accounting training I 1
14. Inadequate printing facilities [ ]
15. Nature of reported message I 1
16. Deliberate efforts to suppress accounting function { J
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17. Inadequate remuneration package for accountants [ ]
18. Inadequate use of CARs [ ]
19. Cost of auditing CARs I J
20. Inadequate assiduity on part of accountants ( ]
21. What could be leading to inadequate assiduity on part of accountants?
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Appendix 4.2.
FACTORS CONSTRAINING INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN TANZANIA
Rank mean stddev
1 shortage of accountants 4.450 0.826
2 inadequate remuneration for accountants 3.850 1348
3 quality of accounting training 3.750 1.164
4 accounting manpower turnover 3.550 0.999
5 inadequate use of annual reports 3.400 1.429
6 regulation of accounting practice by the NBAA 3316 1.455
7 inadequate assiduity on part of accountants 3.300 1.218
8 communication problems between branches and H/O 3.158 1259
9 deliberate efforts to suppress accounting function 2.950 1.099
10 inadequate awareness of regulatoiy requirements
by accountants. 2.950 1.432
11 inadequate office machines 2.737 0.872
12 inadequate printing facilities 2.650 1.089
13 cost of publishing CARs 2350 1.146
14 cost of data collection and processing 2.550 1234
15 possibility of intervention by tax authorities 2500 1.100
16 nature of reported message 2500 1.318
17 cost of auditing CARS 2368 1.065
18 possibility of intervention by government agencies 2200 1.056
19 professional disputes between accountant and auditors 1379 0.692
20 cost of competitive disadvantage 1379 0.769
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APPENDIX 5.1 
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE INDEX:
1. Country of incorporation.
2. Comparative balance sheet for two years.
3. Comparative income statement for two years.
4. Comparative statement of sources and application of funds for two years.
5. Comparative consolidated balance sheet for two years.
6. Comparative consolidated income statement for two years.
7. Directors' report.
8. Auditors' report.
9. Nationality of directors.
10. Nationality of the CEO.
11. Principal activities of the company.
12. Installed production capacity in units.
13. Planned production /  planned capacity utilization in units.
14. Actual production in units.
15. Justification for the observed variance.
16. Raw materials used in production (in units ).
17. Justification for the overtime payments.
18. Breakdown of bad debts written off.
19. Efforts made to recover bad debts before being written off.
20. Staff turnover.
21. Reasons for staff turnover.
22. Related party's interest in the company ( shares, contracts,etc).
23. Industrial relationship in the company.
24. Distribution of income within the company.
25. Breakdown of earnings in foreign currency.
26. Breakdown of payments in foreign currency -raw materials.
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27. Breakdown of payments in foreign currency -equipments.
28. Breakdown of payments in foreign currency -management and other 
professional fees.
29. Breakdown of payments in foreign currency -licence trade marks,etc.
30. Dividends remitted abroad.
31. Expatriates paid in foreign currency.
32. Efforts to increase local contents of production.
33. Company policies on disables.
34. Manpower requirements.
35. Terms of short term credit facilities offered.
36. Terms of short term credit facilities received.
37. Turnover.
38. Basis of recognizing revenues.
39. cost of goods sold.
40. Breakdown of cost of production.
41. Breakdown of operating expenses.
42. Audit fees and expenses.
43. Interest expense.
44. Breakdown of depreciation expenses.
45. Emoluments paid to the CEO.
46. Emoluments paid to directors.
47. Breakdown of non-operating income.
48. Estimated corporate tax
49. Breakdown of the difference between actual corporate tax and the
estimate.
50. Taxes paid abroad.
51. Appropriation of profits.
52. Breakdown of intangible assets.
53. Breakdown of shareholders in the company ( treasury, domestic,
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overseas, operating parastatals, investing parastatals.)
54. Authorised share capital.
55. Issued and paid-up share capital.
56. Government grants and subsidies.
57. Breakdown of retained earning? and reserves.
58. Breakdown of long term liabilities.
59. Interest rates on long term loans.
60. Repayment schedule of long term loans.
61. Long term loans payable in foreign currency.
62. Restrictions on distribution of reserves and profits.
63. Current value of fixed assets ( realisable value or replacement value 
or inflationary adjusted value).
64. Basis of revaluation of fixed assets.
65. Impact of revaluation on profits.
66. Breakdown of fixed assets.
67. Breakdown of investments.
68. Breakdown of current assets.
69. Basis of inventory valuation.
70. Breakdown of intra-group receivables.
71. Breakdown of directors interest in receivables.
72. Breakdown of management's interest in receivables.
73. Breakdown of advances to staff.
74. Breakdown of trade debtors.
75. Breakdown of intra-group payables.
76. Breakdown of directors' interest in payables.
77. Breakdown of management's interest in payables.
78. Breakdown of other staffs' interest in payables.
79. Accounting policy on translation of foreign currency.
80. Accounting policy on bad debts.
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81. Accounting policy on depreciation.
82. Accounting polity on warranties and guarantee.
83. Accounting policy on maintenance and repair expenses.
84. Changes in accounting policies.
85. Impact of changes in accounting policies.
86. Deviations from fundamental accounting principles.
87. Justification for deviations from fundamental accounting principles.
88. Actual corporate tax paid.
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APPENDIX 5.2
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE INDEX.
1. Comparative value added statement for two years.
2. Audit opinion on directors reports.
3. Audit opinion on timely recording of transactions.
4. Amount spent on R&D.
5. R&D activities planned and undertaken during the year.
6. Intra-group pricing policies.
7. Intra-group transfers.
8. Short term quantitative forecasts.
9. Long term quantitative forecasts.
10. Anticipated economic environment.
11. Corporate objectives.
12. Targets set.
13. Variance analysis.
14. Corrective action on variance analysis.
15. Amounts spent on marketing activities.
16. Criteria for identifying and appraising projects.
17. Procedures for implementing and monitoring projects.
18. Terms of management contracts.
19. Efforts made to protect the environment.
20. Qualification and experience of the directors.
21. Directors' other directorships.
22. Qualification and experience of the CEO.
23. Line of business segments.
24. Geographical segments.
25. Turnover of each segments.
26. Contribution of each segment to profits.
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27. Number of employees in each segment.
28 Operating costs incurred in each segment.
29. Number of employees in the company.
30. Amount of total emoluments paid to the highest paid employee.
31. Amount of total emoluments paid to the average employee.
32. Amount of total emoluments paid to the lowest paid employee.
33. Identity of shareholders.
34. Plans and actual transfer of technology.
35. A statement that managers have complied with and implemented the 
terms of management contract.
36. Reasons for failure to implement or comply with the management 
terms of contract
37. Loans received in foreign currency.
38. Comparative balance sheet for subsidiary companies for two years.
39. Comparative income statement for subsidiary companies for two 
years.
40. Comparative statement of sources and application of funds for two 
years ( subsidiary companies).
41. Subsidiary companies' directors' reports.
42. Kiswahili version of annual reports.
43. Breakdown of the holding corporation's interest in subsidiary 
companies.
44. Marketing activities undertaken during the year.
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APPENDIX 7.1 
EXTENT OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURES;
1. Auditors' report _______________
2. Breakdown of current assets _________ _
3. Breakdown of intangible assets ________
4. Comparative balance sheet for two years ___ ......
5. Comparative income statement for two years ......
6. Basis of recognizing revenues
7. Breakdown of retained earnings and reserves
8. Estimated corporate tax
9. Turnover __________
10. Audit fees and expenses ___
11. Basis of inventory valuation
12. Accounting policy on depreciation
13. Breakdown of fixed assets __
14. cost of goods sold
15. Breakdown of cost of production
16. Government grants and subsidies
17. Appropriation of profits ___
18. Breakdown of depreciation expenses
19. Breakdown of investments __
20. Issued and paid-up share capital  --------
21. Authorised share capital ___________
22. Actual corporate tax paid ________
23. Interest expense ____________
24. Long term loans payable in foreign currency
25. Breakdown of long term liab ilities-------
26. Dividends remitted abroad _______
27. Comparative statement of sources and application of funds for two
IMHIIMHNNNNNNNIMNi
 100%
 100%
 100%
_ 100%
....100%
 98%
98% 
98%
 97%
 96%
 96%
 95%
 95%
 95%
 .94%
 94%
 93%
 93%
 .93%
 .93%
91% 
..90%
 90%
— 88%
 86%
 86%
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2R Emoluments paid to directors ......___
29. Breakdown of non-operating income ....
30. Interest rates on long term loans _____
31. Basis of revaluation of fixed assets ___
32. Country of incorporation ...._____
33. Breakdown of operating expenses ___
34. Breakdown of shareholders in the company (treasury, domestic,
overseas, operating parastatals* investing parastatals.)_____
35. Breakdown of the difference between actual corporate tax and the
36. Accounting policy on translation of foreign currency ______
37. Principal activities of the company ________________
38. Accounting policy on bad d e b ts  ----------------------
39. Directors' report _______________________
40. Impact of revaluation on p ro fits _________________
41. Repayment schedule of long term loans --------------------
42. Current value of fixed assets (realisable value or replacement value
or inflationary adjusted value) _________________
43. Breakdown of intra-group payables _______________
44. Reasons for staff turnover —  ---------- ------------------
45. Restrictions on distribution of reserves and profits _______
46. Breakdown of payments in foreign currency -raw materials —
47. Actual production in units -------------------------------
48. Industrial relationship in the company __________ __
49. Breakdown of intra-group receivables  ------------
50. Breakdown of earnings in foreign currency __________
51. Nationality of directors ____________________
52. Planned production / planned capacity utilization in units ___
83% 
,.78% 
,.76% 
,.75% 
_ 7 4 %  
 72%
..70%
 70%
 67%
 66%
 63%
 62%
  62%
 57%
 52%
 48%
 47%
 45%
 43%
 39%
 39%
 38%
 36%
 33%
 .32%
53. Justification for the overtime payments _________________ 30%
54. Comparative consolidated balance sheet for two year ___________29%
55. Justification for deviations from fundamental accounting
principles  _______     29%
56. Nationality of the CEO _____________________________29%
57. Changes in accounting policies  _____________________28%
58. Justification for the observed variance ______ ...__________ 27%
59. Breakdown of payments in foreign currency -management and other
professional fees _____________________________26%
60. Distribution of income within the company ----------------------  25%
61. Taxes paid abroad  ...................................   25%
62. Comparative consolidated income statement for two years________ 23%
63. Staff turnover ______________________________   23%
64 Deviations from fundamental accounting principles ___________.22%
65. Impact of changes in accounting policies _________________22%
66. Raw materials used in production (in units ) _____________ .22%
67. Breakdown of payments in foreign currency -equipments ---------------- 21%
68. Emoluments paid to the CEO -------------------------------------- 21%
69. Breakdown of payments in foreign currency -licence, trade
marks,etc ________________________________ 18%
70. Manpower requirements ________________________ 16%
71. Efforts to increase local contents of production ------------------------14%
72. Terms of short term credit facilities offered ________________ 14%
73. Terms of short term credit facilities received -------------------------- 14%
74. Company policies on disables ---------------------------------------13%
75. Installed production capacity in units _________   13%
76. Expatriates paid in foreign currency ___________________ 12%
77. Related party's interest in the company (shares, contracts,etc)----------- 12%
78. Accounting policy on warranties and guarantee ______________ 10%
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79. Breakdown of advances to staff ______________________ .7%
80. Accounting policy on maintenance and repair expenses __________ 5%
81. Breakdown of directors interest in receivables ......______     5%
82. Breakdown of trade debtors __________________ 5%
83. Breakdown of directors' interest in payables _______________ 4%
84. Breakdown of bad debts written off _______________   3%
85. Efforts made to recover bad debts before being written off..________3%
86. Breakdown of other staffs' interest in payables ______________ 2%
87. Breakdown of management's interest in payables  ______„____.0%
88. Breakdown of management's interest in receivables ____________ 0%
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APPENDIX 7.2 
EXTENT OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES.
1. Amounts spent on marketing activities _________________  81%
2. Loans received in foreign currency ____________________  80%
3. Breakdown of the holding corporation's interest in subsidiary
co m^ 32niies ............................................................................................................... 75%
4. Line of business segments ..._________   72%
5. Identity of shareholders _______________________ 64%
6. Turnover of each segments .....___________________ ..._ 64%
7. Plans and actual transfer of technology  _________________  51%
8. Geographical segments _________________________  45%
9. Comparative balance sheet for subsidiary companies for two
years ___________________    44%
10. Comparative income statement for subsidiary companies for two
years 44%
11. Contribution of each segment to profits ..._____     44%
12. Marketing activities undertaken during the y e a r---------------------  42%
13. Number of employees in the company___________    34%
14. Comparative statement of sources and application of funds for two
years ( subsidiary companies) ______________________  30%
15. Targets set _________________________  24%
16. Anticipated economic environment ------------    21%
17. Corporate objectives ________________________  — 14%
18. R&D activities planned and undertaken during the year----------------- 14%
19. Reasons for failure to implement or comply with the management
terms of contract ____________________________  11%
20. Corrective action on variance analysis __________________  10%
21. Subsidiary companies' directors' reports__________________ 10%
22. Short term quantitative forecasts ____________________  9%
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23. Operating costs incurred in each segment ______________ _
24. Amount spent on R&D _________________________
25. A statement that managers have complied with and implemented the
terms of management contract  ___________________
26. Criteria for identifying and appraising projects _____________
27. Kiswahili version of annual reports __________________ _
28. Amount of total emoluments paid to the average employee______
29. Amount of total emoluments paid to the highest paid employee------
30. Audit opinion on directors reports ___________________
31. Efforts made to protect the environment ________________
32. Number of employees in each segment  ___________ ____
33. Intra-group transfers ___________________________
34. Qualification and experience of the C E O ---------------------------
35. Terms of management contracts  ___________ ....--------- -
36. Amount of total emoluments paid to the lowest paid employee____
37. Audit opinion on timely recording of transactions ___________
38. Comparative value added statement for two years -------------------
39. Directors' other directorships --------------------------------------
40. Long term quantitative forecasts ----------------------------------
41. Intra-group pricing policies ----------------------------------------
42. Procedures for implementing and monitoring projects ---------------
43. Qualification and experience of the directors ------ -----------------
44. Variance analysis ____________________________
... 8% 
7%
..... 7% 
..... 7% 
.. 7%
 3%
3% 
.. 2% 
.... 2%
.... 2%
2% 
2% 
„ 2% 
....... 0%
..... 0%
..... 0%
0% 
... 0% 
0% 
...... 0%
..... 0%
0%
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APPENDIX 7.3:
TYPICAL AUDIT REPORTS.
A) Prepared by domestic private accounting firm:
REPORT OF THE AUDITORS TO THE MEMBERS 
We have audited the Financial Statements on pages 3 to 11 in accordance with the 
generally approved audit standards.
In our opinion, the financial statements which have been prepared under 
historical cost convention as modified by valuation of tangible assets, gives a true 
and fair view of the state of the Company's affairs at 31st December 1986 and of the 
profit and source and application of funds for the year then ended.
signed
DAR-ES-SALAAM CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS
30TH SEPTEMBER 1987 AUTHORISED AUDITORS
B) PREPARED BY PARASTATAL ACCOUNTING FIRMS:
REPORTS OF THE AUDITORS 
We have examined the attached Balance Sheet of National Chemical Industries as 
at 31st December, 1986, the related Profit and Loss Account and the Statement of 
Sources and Application of Funds for the year ended on that date. Our 
examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards 
and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and such other 
auditing procedures as we considered necessaiy.
In our opinion, the accompanying Balance Sheet, the Profit and Loss Account and 
the Statement of Sources and Application of Funds present fairly the financial
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position of National Chemical Industries as at 31st December, 1986, its profits and 
sources and application of funds for the year ended on that date.
TANZANIMUDrCORPORATION
HXSENKORO- CA.
DIRECTOEENERAL
DARES SALAAM 
APRIL 1987.
C). INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING FIRMS:
AUDITORS' REPORTS TO THE MEMBERS 
OF TANGANYIKA DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 
COMPANY LIMITED.
1. We have audited the financial statements on pages 18-31. These financial 
statements are in agreement with the accounting records and we obtained the 
information and explanation we required.
2. In our opinion, the financial statements give a true and fair view of the state of 
affairs of the company as at 31st December 1986 and of its results and source and 
and application of funds for the year then ended.
DARES SALAAM, COOPERS&LYBRAND
28th May, 1987.
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APPENDIX 7.4: NORMAL PROBABILITY PLOTS.
extent of mandatory disclosure.
75+
5 2
MAN - ** 2
*2
2
60+ 3*
*
*2*
*22  
3 22
45+ 3 3 3
2 2  
2 * *
* *
30+ * *
♦ ----------- +------------+------------ ♦ ------------+------------+-------- expected values if  the
-2 .40  -1 .60  -0 .80  0.00 0.80 1.60 sample came from a normal
population.
The observed curvature indicates that the extent of mandatory 
disclosure are not normally distributed. The expected values if  the 
sample came from normal d istribution shows that the extent of 
mandatory disclosure d istribution is skewed to the left.
Extent of voluntary disclosure.
45+
*
VOLD- 2
30+ 4**
**
2
3**
34 3
15+ 33*
22*
33
3 
5 2
0+ *
—......... +------------ +------------ +------------ +-------------+--------- Expected values if
-2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 the sample came
from a normally
distributed
population.
This normal plot exhibits nearly a straight line indicating that the 
distribution of the extent of voluntary disclosure is normally distributed. The 
expected normal distribution values also ranged from -2 to 2. thus confirming 
the symmetrical nature of the distribution.
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Audit opinion.
5.0+ +
AUDO-
4.0+ 6
3 .0+ 2
2 .0+ *
+-------------+------------+------------+------------ +------------ +-------Expected values if
-2.50 -2.00 -1.50 -1.00 -0.50 0.00 the sample came
from a normally
distributed
population.
This exhibit indicates that the type of audit opinions are not normally 
distributed. The curvature shown by these plots coupled by the fact that the 
expected normally distribution values ranged from -2.5 to 0 is a clear indication 
that this variable is not normally distributed.
Timeliness of disclosure
21 .0 +
2
TIMEL-
*
*  *
14.0+ 2
3
4 7
7.0+ 9
5 5
3
4
- 3
 +------------ +-............. +------------ +............... +-------------+Expected value if
-1.60 -0.80 0.00 0.80 1.60 2.40 the sample came
from a normally
distributed
population.
This normal probability plot indicates that timeliness of disclosures is 
skewed to the right (it ranges from -1.6 to 2.4). The curvature exhibited is 
another proof of a non-normal distribution.
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